Ex  Libris 
;    C.  K.  OGDEN 


THE  LIBRARY 

OF 

THE  UNIVERSITY 
OF  CALIFORNIA 

LOS  ANGELES 


; 

WA*~^> 


S  , 


THE    MEANING   OF   WORDS. 


THE 


•W  . 


MEANING    OF    WORDS 


ANALYSED   INTO 


WORDS  AND  UNVERBAI  THINGS, 


UNVERBAL   THINGS   CLASSIFIED   INTO   INTELLECTIONS, 
SENSATIONS,  AND  EMOTIONS. 


A.    B.    JOHNSON, 

AUTHOR  OT  A    "  TREATISE   ON  BANKING,11     "  RELIGION   IN   ITS    RELATION   TO  THK 
PRESENT   LIFE,11    ETC.,   ETC. 


Four  ineradicable  fallacies  are  concealed  in  the  structure  of  language  :  it  identifies  what 
unverbally  are  diverse,  assimilates  what  unverbally  are  heterogeneous,  makes  a  unit  of 
what  unverbally  are  multifarious,  and  transmutes  into  each  other  what  unverbally  are 
untransmutable. 


D.  APPLETON  AND  CO.,  346  &  348  BROADWAY. 

1854. 


J I      •     •        f  T 


Entered  according  to  Act  of  Congren,  in  the  year  1654, 

BY  A.  B.  JOHNSON, 
In  the  Clerk's  Office  of  the  District  Court  of  the  United  States  for  the  Southern  District  of  New  York 


- 


Stereotyped  cod  printed  by  BILLIS  &  BROTHERS,  No.  20  North  William-street,  N.  Y. 


p 


TO 

* ' 

ALEXANDEK    S.    JOHNSON, 

JUDGE  OP  THE  COURT  OF  APPEALS, 

OP  THE  STATE  OF  NEW  YORK. 
MY  DEAR  SON, 

I  believe  your  recollection  can  extend  back  to  no 
period  when  we  were  not  companions  of  each  other,  and  I 
often  query  which  of  us  is  more  indebted  to  the  other  for 
intellectual  and  moral  benefits  thereby  received;  but  I  usu- 
ally adjudge  myself  to  be  the  debtor.  The  topics  of  this 
book  you  have  heard  from  me  hi  every  form  in  which  my 
intellect  can  conceive  them,  hence  I  inscribe  the  book  to  you, 
not  to  communicate  its  contents,  but  to  record  the  social  re- 
lationship which  has  always  existed  between  us. 

Of  the  merits  of  the  work  neither  of  us  is  in  a  good 
position  to  judge — I  from  self-love,  and  you  from  preposses- 
sions towards  me.  It  has,  however,  exerted  a  kindly  in- 
fluence over  my  leisure  during  a  long  life  that  has  been 
marked  with  sorrows  of  no  ordinary  magnitude.  It  has, 
indeed,  been  to  me  like  the  poor  man's  lamb  in  the  parable 
of  the  prophet.  "It  has  grown  up  with  me  and  my  chil- 
dren, eaten  of  my  meat,  drunk  of  my  own  cup,  lain  in  my 
bosom,  and  been  unto  me  as  a  daughter."  Praying  you 
may  possess  a  son  to  whom  you  may  be  able  to  transmit  a 
memorial  of  social  intercourse,  like  that  recorded  in  this 
dedication, 

I  remain  yours  most  faithfully, 

THE  AUTHOR. 

UTICA,  State  of  New  York,  1854. 


PEEF  ACE. 


THE  inventor  of  the  "Rule  of  Three"  deemed  his  object 
accomplished  when  he  presented  sufficient  examples  of  his 
rule  to  elucidate  its  rationale  and  utility.  I,  also,  have  not 
communicated  all  the  results  which  will  follow  from  my 
analysis  of  language,  but  rather  as  few  as  will  suffice  to 
elucidate  my  doctrines,  the  materials  for  the  elucidation  being 
taken  from  any  source  that  seemed  to  me  best  adapted  to 
the  purpose ;  and  taken  usually  from  my  memory  irrespective 
of  their  merits  or  demerits  for  other  purposes.  Indeed  many 
of  the  scientific  tenets  on  which  I  comment  are  probably  no 
longer  authoritative,  and  my  comments  may  misconceive  those 
which  are  authoritative,  and  kindred  errors  may  be  numerous ; 
but  if  the  reader  shall  collect  from  my  comments  the  views 
of  language  that  I  entertain,  he  will  collect  all  that  I  seek  to 
accomplish,  and  I  plead  guilty  in  advance  of  all  the  scientific 
errors  of  which  he  may  be  able  to  convict  me. 

Some  paintings  require  to  be  examined  at  a  distance, 
others  need  a  near  inspection  or  the  merits  of  the  picture 
cannot  be  ascertained.  What  distance  of  view  is  to  paintings, 
rapidity  of  reading  is  to  books.  The  following  sheets  are 


8  PKEFACE. 

constructed  for  very  slow  reading — the  slower  the  better ; 
and  whoever  reads  them  fast  will  be  unable  to  judge  accu- 
rately of  their  design,  and  had  better  not  read  at  all.  I  have 
found  a  difference  myself  between  reading  my  speculations 
in  manuscript,  and  reading  them  in  print, — manuscript  being 
naturally  read  more  slowly  than  print,  and  the  effect  of  the 
difference  causes  the  printed  work  to  be  less  satisfactory  to 
me  than  the  manuscript. 

These  pages  convey  my  conceptions  neither  as  fully  as  I 
wish,  nor  as  methodically  and  perspicuously,  but  they  are  the 
miniature  results  of  at  least  fifty  years  of  reflection,  intently 
directed  to  a  search  whose  object  I  at  first  saw  but  dimly, 
and  to  which  I  approached  by  slow  approximations.  In  the 
year  1828, 1  published  my  first  views  under  the  title  of  "  The 
Philosophy  of  Human  Knowledge,  or  a  Treatise  on  Language." 
It  was  published  in  New  York,  by  G.  &  C.  Carvill.  In  the 
year  1836,  I  rewrote  the  whole  work  and  it  was  published 
in  the  same  city,  by  Harper  &  Brothers,  under  the  title  of  "A 
Treatise  on  Language,  or  the  Relation  which  Words  bear  to 
Things."  Some  years  after  both  these  publications,  I  heard, 
accidentally,  of  a  work  on  language  somewhat  similar  in  con- 
ception to  mine.  Its  author  is  the  late  Sir  Graves  Chamney 
Haughton,  F.  B.  S.,  and  of  the  Institute  of  France,  etc.,  and 
author  of  a  Bengalee  Dictionary  and  other  learned  works. 
He  named  his  production  Prodromus,  and  it  was  published 
in  London,  in  the  year  1839.  Like  my  above  named  two  pub- 
lications, it  deemed  intellectually  conceived  words  as  nothing 
but  words,  and  deemed  the  ultimate  significations  of  all  words 
to  be  only  sensible  perceptions  and  internal  feelings.  I  sup- 


PEEFACE.  9 

pose  such  a  limitation  necessarily  precedes  the  fuller  concep- 
tion of  language  contained  in  the  present  publication ;  our 
knowledge  being  naturally  cumulative  and  progressive. 

In  some  places,  I  anticipate  remarks  that  are  subsequently 
repeated  in  places  where  they  more  properly  belong.  I  have 
not  been  able  to  avoid  this  defect  without  more  labour  than 
I  thought  the  defect  justified ;  for  I  have  not  duplicated  the 
same  matter  except  to  subserve  some  new  purpose.  But 
another  difficulty  exists  that  no  care  can  obviate,  for  it  is 
organic  in  our  intellect.  Its  rationale  will  be  found  in  the 
following  sheets  where  they  speak  of  general  propositions : — 
every  modern  discovery  is  subsequently  found  to  be  included 
in  some  propositions  that  have  descended  to  us  from  past 
ages.  Even  a  foreshadowing  of  the  electric  telegraph  has 
been  lately  seen  in  the  scornful  exclamation  found  in  the 
Book  of  Job,  "Canst  thou  send  lightnings  that  they  may  go 
and  say  unto  thee,  here  we  are ! "  Like  the  above,  every 
sentence  of  a  book  suggests  to  the  reader  something  that  he 
knows,  while  the  writer  may  have  intended  something  that 
the  reader  knows  not.  The  difficulty  presents  an  insurmount- 
able obstacle  against  the  direct  communication  by  words  of 
new  intellectual  conceptions.  The  most  which  verbal  com- 
munications can  accomplish  in  the  premises,  is  by  a  species 
of  fermentation  or  elicitation  in  the  reader's  intellect,  whereby 
the  new  doctrines  may  possibly  become  evolved,  or,  as  we 
say,  conceived — a  term  that  is  more  literal  than  figurative. 

But  to  the  above  irremediable  difficulty  in  the  commu- 
nicability,  by  means  of  words,  of  new  conceptions  that  are 

not   merely   lexicographical   definitions,   we   add    an    avoidable 
1* 


10  PREFACE. 

difficulty  of  which  the  following  is  an  example : — "  We  hold 
these  truths  to  be  self-evident,  that  all  men  are  created  equal." 
Equal  in  what  ? — surely  some  men  are  created  deaf,  some 
blind,  some  idiotic,  deformed,  feeble,  black,  etc.  How  self- 
evidently  untrue,  therefore,  is  the  above  miscalled  self-evident 
truth  of  our  Declaration  of  Independence !  Such  criticism  is 
sometimes  heard  from  men  in  high  stations,  and  it  may  be 
philological,  but  to  deem  it  controversial  of  the  author's 
meaning  is  to  commit  the  error  I  am  anxious  to  expose. 
The  meaning  of  the  declaration  is  not  what  it  excludes,  but 
what  it  includes ; — not  what  is  false  therein,  but  what  is  true ; 
and  thus  interpreted  it  is  a  summary  of  many  truths ;  as, 
for  instance,  men  are  created  "not  with  saddles  on  their 
backs,"  to  designate  that  they  are  to  be  ridden,  but  rather 
with  no  peculiar  adaptation  to  the  artificial  distinctions  that 
men  impose  on  each  other.  All  are  created  equally  subject 
to  the  same  infections,  pains,  wounds,  mischances,  and  death ; 
all  are  created  with  the  same  passions,  instincts,  self-love,  and 
impatience  of  injury  ;  and  though  some  men  are  created  deaf, 
blind,  idiotic,  etc.,  such  evils  are  dispensed  with  no  reference 
to  artificial  social  distinctions,  but  like  sunshine  and  rain  fall 
on  all  classes  indiscriminately. 

Sectarian  dogmas  are  preeminently  subjected  by  opposing 
sectaries  to  the  foregoing  captious  misinterpretations,  hence  the 
incessant  criminations  and  recriminations  that  painfully  disfigure 
all  polemical  discussions  of  men  whom  we  wish  to  respect ; 
while  probably  every  sectarian  tenet  is  correct  in  its  proper 
meaning,  and  every  controvertist  is  combatting  a  monster  of 
only  his  own  conception.  "  I  will  tell  you,  sir,"  said  Laplace, 


PREFACE.  11 

to  one  of  his  friends,  "what  is  the  greatest  absurdity  in  the 
world :  it  is  the  doctrine  of  transubstantiation,  for  it  violates 
both  time  and  space."  I  will  not  venture  to  say  what  the 
doctrine  signifies  to  those  who  hold  it  understandingly,  but 
1  have  no  doubt  they  would  indignantly  reject  any  absurdity 
therefrom  that  Laplace  would  imply.  In  every  instance,  there- 
fore, where  a  reader  finds  that  his  interpretation  of  an  author 
contradicts  the  author's  comments  and  conclusions,  the  reader 
should  amend  his  interpretation,  and  make  it  conform  to  the 
author's  comments  and  conclusions.  At  least,  I  crave  such 
an  interpretation  for  my  following  speculations,  if  they  shall 
haply  gain  a  reader.  We  read  in  vain  if  we  look  into  a 
book  as  we  look  into  a  mirror,  and  receive  back  nothing  but 
a  reflection  of  our  own  familiar  lineaments.  Finally,  I  could 
not  make  the  work  pleasant  to  readers  who  seek  amusement 
only,  but  I  have  tried  faithfully  to  make  it  brief  and  intelli- 
gible, and  especially,  to  make  it  useful  to  those  who  desire  a 
knowledge  of  the  structure  of  language — a  knowledge  which 
bears  the  same  relation  to  all  speculative  learning  as  a  know- 
ledge of  the  qualities  of  drugs  bears  to  the  practice  of  medi- 
cine, or  as  a  knowledge  of  perspective  and  colours  bears  to 
painting.  Persons  who  know  not  the  latent  sophistries  of 
language,  know  no  verbal  knowledge  unfallaciously,  and  in  pro- 
portion as  their  defect  is  unsuspected,  the  world,  considered 
speculatively,  will  be  full  of  mysteries,  and  differ  from  un- 
verbal  realities  as  jugglery  differs  from  ordinary  operations. 
To  manifest  these  truths  is,  However,  not  easy.  A  celebrated 
English  physician  deemed  a  milk  diet  so  healthful,  that  he 
said  a  stomach  which  cannot  endure  milk  is  the  stomach  most 


12  PREFACE. 

in  need  of  milk ;  and  1  will  parody  the  remark,  by  saying 
that  a  man  who  supposes  he  has  nothing  to  learn  in  relation 
to  the  structure  of  language,  is  probably  the  man  who  is 
most  in  need  of  such  learning.  To  show  still  more  strongly 
my  own  opinion  of  the  nature  of  this  publication — aside  from 
its  execution,  of  whose  many  defects  I  am  only  too  painfully 
conscious — I  believe  that  a  full  fruition  of  what  is  herein 
attempted  will  make  no  longer  true  the  ancient  oracle,  which 
I  suppose  referred  to  language,  and  which  was  engraven  on 
the  pavement  of  Minerva's  temple,  "  I  am  all  that  has  been, 
that  is,  and  that  shall  be,  and  none  among  mortals  has  hith- 
erto taken  off  my  veil." 


CONTENTS 


LECTURE  I. — INTRODUCTORY,  EXPLANATORY,  AND  POSTULATORY. 

1.  Words    are   originally   unmeaning    sounds.     Words    conceived    in 
thought  are  not  different  in  this  respect   from  oral  words — oral 
words    being    only   articulated    sounds,    and   words   conceived    in 
thought  being  only  inaudible  articulations. 

2.  The  meaning  of  all  words  is  conventional,  and  can  be  analysed 
into  a  verbal  meaning  and  an  unverbal.     The  unverbal  meaning 
alone  is  considered  by  me — indeed,  to  discriminate  the  unverbal 
meaning  from  the  verbal  is  the  main  object  of  the  work. 

3.  The  unverbal  meaning  of  words  is  divisible  into  three  classes — 
sensible,  intellectual,  and  moral.     The  class  that  I  call  moral  is 
composed  of  our  internal  feelings,  which  latter  designation  being 
more  indicative  of  my  meaning  than  the  word  "  moral,"  I  usually 
employ  it  in  preference  to  "moral,"  though  I  sometimes  use  the 
word  "emotional." 

4.  The  elements  of  chemistry  are  so  generically  different  from  each 
other  that  no  one  element  can  be  converted  into  another.    Unverbal 
things — sensible,  intellectual,  and  emotional — are  equally  different 
from  each  other  generically,   and   equally  inconvertible   into  one 
another,   except   verbally,   though   they  seem   homogeneous  when 
contemplated  through  the  medium  of  words. 

5.  Chemistry  is  at  the  end  of  its  analysis  when  it  has  resolved  physi- 
cal bodies  into  the  respective  generical  elements  of  which  the  bodies 
are  composed ;  and  our  unverbal  knowledge  is  at  the  end  of  its 
analysis  when  it  is  resolved  into  its  unverbal  generic  components, 
sensible,  intellectual,  and  emotional. 

6.  Oxygen,  and  every  other  chemical  element,  is  its  own  best  expositor. 
It  is  what  it  is — -just  as  God,  in  addressing  Moses  from  the  burning 
bush,  could  no  way  so  well  designate  His  personality  as  by  saying, 
"  I  am  that  I  am."     So  its  own  best  expositor  is  each  sensible  per- 
ception, intellectual  conception,  and  internal  feeling.     Each  is  what 
it  is,  and  to  characterise  it  in  any  verbal  way  is  to  prevent  the  dis- 
crimination of  words  from  unverbal  things. 

*7.  The  ultimate  elements  of  our  unverbal  knowledge  is  not  words,  but 
unverbal  things — the  unverbal  meaning  underlies  the  verbal. 


14  CONTENTS. 

8.  Every  man  is  dependent  on  his  senses  for  his  unverbal  sensible 
knowledge,  and  the  unverbal  knowledge  revealed  to  him  by  any 
one  of  his  senses  cannot  be  revealed  to  him  by  any  one  or  more  of 
his  other  senses,  the  revelations  of  each  sense  being  unique  when 
estimated  unverbally. 

9.  A  man's  intellect  can  yield  him  no  sensible  information,  the  intellect 
being  able  to  yield  intellectual  conceptions  only. 

10.  Every  nominal  thing  which  is  insensible  is  intellectual,  unless  it  be 
an  internal  feeling,  and  every  nominal  internal  feeling  that  cannot 
be  felt  unverbally  is  also  an  intellection  only. 

11.  The  words  "physical"  and  "sensible,"  wherever  employed  in  these 
pages,  are  used  as  synonyms;  the  words  "moral,"  "emotional,"  and 
"  internal  feelings,"  are  also  employed  as  synonyms  of  each  other. 


PAET  I. 

OF    THE    STRUCTURE    OF    LANGUAGE. 

LECTURE  II. — THE  HETEROGENEITY  OF  UNVERBAL  THINGS  DISCRIMINATED  FROM 
THEIR  FALLACIOUS  VERBAL  HOMOGENEITY. 

1.  "We  possess  but  one  set  of  words  with  which  to  speak  of  three  incon- 
vertibly  different  sets  of  unverbal  things. 

2.  The  verbal  sameness  must  be  discriminated  from  the  unverbal  diver- 
sity, or  much  speculative  error  ensues. 

3.  We  mistake  the  homogeneity  of  words  for  a  characteristic  of  unver- 
bal things. 

LECTURE  III. — UNVERBAL  MULTIPLICITY  DISCRIMINATED  FROM  ITS  FALLACIOUS 
VERBAL  ONENESS. 

1.  Names  analysed,  and  their  implied  oneness  found  to  be  intellectual — 
verbal,  not  unverbal. 

2.  All  individuality  is  a  conception  of  the  intellect 

3.  The  intellect  aggregates  sensible  perceptions  into  nominal  units. 

4.  The  intellect  aggregates  internal  feelings  into  nominal  units. 

6.  The  intellect  aggregates  its  own  conceptions  into  nominal  units. 
6.  The  intellect  aggregates  into  nominal  units  its  own  conceptions  asso- 
ciated with  certain  internal  feelings. 

LECTURE   IV. — VERBAL  IDENTITY  ANALYSED  INTO  UNVERBAL  DIVERSITY. 

1.  Identity  is  a  subjective  conception  of  the  intellect,  not  an  objective 
perception  of  the  senses. 

2.  Physical  things  that  are  verbally  identical,  are  identical  in  only  the 
conception  of  the  intellect. 

8.  Intellectual  things  that  are  verbally  identical,  are  identical  in  only 
th"  conception  of  the  intellect. 


CONTENTS.  15 

4.  Internal  feelings  which  are  verbally  identical,  are  identical  in  only 

the  conception  of  the  intellect. 
6.  Language  is  founded  on  the  two  intellectual  organic  processes  of 

creating  nominal  units  and  verbal  identities. 


PAET  II. 

OF    THE    INTERPRETATION    OF    WORDS. 

LECTURE  V. — OF  THE  UNVERBAL  SIGNIFICATION  OF  WORDS. 

1.  The  verbal  identity  of  any  two  or  more  unverbal  things  must  be 
interpreted  by  their  unverbal  diversity. 

2.  The  verbal  homogeneity  of  any  two  or  more  words  must  be  inter- 
preted by  their  unverbal  heterogeneity. 

3.  The  verbal  oneness  of  any  verbal  thing  must  be  interpreted  by  its 
unverbal  multiplicity. 

LECTURE  VI. — OF  THE  UNVERBAL  INTERPRETATION  OF  AFFIRMATIVE  GENERAL 
PROPOSITIONS. 

1.  The  generality  of  a  proposition  is  subjective,  and  refers  to  the  intel- 
lect; but  the  objective  signification  of  a  proposition  is  governed  by 
the  unverbal  objects  to  which  it  refers. 

2.  Every  general  proposition  possesses  as  many  different  objective  sig- 
nifications, as  it  refers  to  different  objects. 

LECTURE  VII. — OF  THE  UNVERBAL  MEANING  OF  NEGATIVE  GENERAL  PROPO- 
SITIONS. 

1.  A  negation  that  refers  to  no  physical  object  .is  physically  insignificant 

2.  The  absence  of  a  physical  negative  will  make  an  affirmative  propo- 
sition true  universally ;  yet  the  proposition  will  mean  affirmatively 
only  the  sensible  particulars  to  which  its  affirmation  refers. 

LECTURE  VIII. — OF  THE  UNVERBAL  INTERPRETATION  OF  WORDS  THAT  ARE 
INTELLECTUALLY  CONCEIVED. 

1.  Words  conceived  by  the  intellect  mean,  unverbally,  the  organism 
of  the  intellect ;  not  the  objects  which  the  words  mean  when  they 
apply  to  perceptions  of  the  senses. 

2.  Intellectually  conceived  words  are  organic  subjective  responses  of 
the  intellect  to  objective  premises. 

3.  As  a  man  increases  his  objective  knowledge,  he  increases  the  materials 
out  of  which  his  intellect  conceives  its  subjective  verbal  responses. 

4.  The  intellect  cannot  originate  objective  knowledge,  except  what  re- 
lates to  its  own  organism. 

5.  The  responses  of  the  intellect  are  independent  of  our  volition. 


16  CONTENTS. 

LECTURE  IX. — THE  SAME  SUBJECT  CONTINUED. 

1.  The  subjective  nature  of  intellectual  verbal  conceptions,  as  contra- 
distinguished from  objective  things,  is  urged  upon  our  notice  by  the 
necromantic  dilemmas  to  which  the  intellect  organically  arrives  in 
predicating  such  conceptions  to  their  ultimate  results. 

2.  Conceptions  of  the  intellect  are  organic,  but  not  innate,  their  evolve- 
ment  depending  on  accidental  objective  occurrences. 

LECTURE    X. — OF  THE  UNVERBAL  MEANING  OF  VERBAL  INQUISITION. 

1.  Retrospect  of  the  preceding  lectures. 

2.  Questions  analysed  into  an  inquirer,  inquiree,  and  object. 

3.  Each  of  the  three  is  unverbally  triform,  and  only  verbally  a  unit. 

4.  The  error  exemplified  of  seeking  sensibly  what  is  only  intellect- 
ual, and  seeking  intellectually  what  is  only  sensible. 

5.  Inquisition  is  limited  by  the  purview  of  our  sensible,  intellectual, 
and  moral  organisms. 

6.  All  physical  inquisition  is  unanswerable  that  is  not  within  the  pur- 
view of  the  senses,  all  intellectual  inquisition  is  unanswerable  that 
is  not  within  the  purview  of  the  intellect,  and  all  inquisition  that 
relates  to  the  internal  feelings  is  unanswerable  that  is  not  within 
the  purview  of  our  consciousness  therein. 

7.  Knowledge,  except  of  language,  is,  in  its  ultimate  form,  not  verbal, 
but  unverbal. 

8.  Conclusion. 


CAUTION  TO  THE  HASTY  READER. 

A  table  of  contents  being  necessarily  composed  of  general  proposi- 
tions, is,  in  a  work  like  the  present,  as  unintelligible,  when  not  preceded 
by  the  items  in  detail  to  which  the  general  propositions  refer,  as  a  cata- 
logue of  plants  is  unintelligible  to  a  person  unacquainted  with  the  plants. 
This  has  prevented  me  from  making  as  copious  as  I  otherwise  should  the 
above  table,  and  the  headings  which  precede  each  lecture.  The  table 
and  headings  but  glance  at  some  of  the  main  topics  of  the  work,  and 
omit  wholly  collateral  reflections  and  consequences,  which  as  necessarily 
accompany  the  main  topics  of  every  work  as  foliage  accompanies  the 
production  of  fruit. 


THE  MEANING  OF  WORDS, 


LECTURE  I. 

INTRODUCTORY  AND  EXPLANATORY. 

CONTENTS. 

1.  Words  signify  either  words  or  unverbal  things. 

2.  Unverbal  things  are  either  sensible,  intellectual  or  emotional. 

3.  The  unverbal  things  of  any  one  of  the  above  three  classes  are  untrans- 

mutable  into  the  unverbal  things  of  any  other  of  the  classes  except 
verbally. 

4.  The  unverbal  things  of  the  different  classes  seem  homogeneous  when 

contemplated  through  the  medium  of  words. 

§  1.  LIKE  the  whistle  of  the  winds,  the  lowing  of  oxen, 
and  the  chirp  of  birds,  words  are  mere  sounds,  apart  from 
the  signification  which  they  acquire  conventionally  or 
otherwise ;  and  to  the  people  of  one  nation,  the  unaccus- 
tomed language  of  another  nation  is  still  unmeaning 
sounds.  "Words,  whenever  used  significantly,  must,  there- 
fore, signify  other  words  or  unverbal  things,  or  both  ;  but 
so  far  as  words  signify  other  words,  I  shall  not  discuss 
their  meaning,  how  important  soever  the  verbal  meaning 


18  THE   MEANING   OF  WORDS. 

of  words  may  be ;  for  it  constitutes  a  branch  of  learning 
which  has  been  abundantly  cultivated,  and  I  can  add 
nothing  thereto.  I  design  to  speak  of  only  the  unverbal 
signification  of  words, — the  signification  which  no  ex- 
planatory words  can  reach,  it  underlying  them  all. 

§  2.  I  shall  not,  however,  attempt  to  establish  the  un- 
verbal meaning  of  any  particular  word,  but  simply  at- 
tempt to  discriminate  words  from  unverbal  things ; — the 
discrimination  applying  to  all  words  in  common,  and  to 
all  languages.  The  meaning  of  particular  words,  as 
matter,  spirit,  body,  mind,  etc.,  is  constantly  engaging  the 
efforts  of  philosophers,  who  suppose  they  are  engaged  in 
profounder  discussions  than  merely  defining  the  significa- 
tion of  particular  words  ; — but  I  disclaim  the  discussion, 
not  because  I  deem  it  unimportant,  but  because  the  dis- 
claimer will  aid  in  showing,  by  contrast,  the  character  of 
my  design. 

§  3.  To  analyze  the  meaning  of  words  into  verbal  and 
unverbal,  is,  I  suppose,  new,  and  it  is  as  useless  as  new, 
unless  I  am  correct  in  the  above  assumption ;  that  words 
are  unmeaning  sounds  when  they  possess  no  ultimate  sig- 
nification that  is  unverbal.  As  this  character  of  words 
pervades  all  I  shall  say,  I  bring  it  prominently  into  con- 
sideration at  the  commencement  of  our  discussions,  that  if 
the  assumption  is  fallacious,  the  fallacy  may  be  readily 
and  speedily  detected.  Words  have,  heretofore,  been  de- 
fined as  signs  of  ideas,  and  the  meaning  of  words  has  been 
sought  in  the  ideas  of  which  the  words  are  said  to  be  the 


INTRODUCTORY  AND  EXPLANATORY.        19 

signs ;  but  ideas  are  often  composed  partially  or  wholly  of 
words;  hence,  to  deem  words  signs  of  ideas,  will  make 
words  signs  of  other  words,  while  I  desire  to  contemplate 
words  with  reference  only  to  their  unverbal  meaning.  My 
design  will,  therefore,  be  best  foreshadowed  by  saying  that 
I  shall  deem  words  as  signs  of  only  unverbal  things. 

§  4.  But  what  are  unverbal  things  ?  The  term  seems  to 
convey  no  definite  meaning  when  I  occasionally  use  it  in 
conversation.  Indeed,  after  much  effort,  I  am  not  always 
successful  in  making  my  hearers  understand  the  difference 
that  exists  between  words  and  unverbal  things.  We  can 
eat  unverbal  things  without  thinking  of  their  names,  and 
we  can  drink,  see,  smell,  and  handle  them;  but  to  talk 
about  them,  so  as  to  discriminate  what  is  unverbal  in  the 
meaning  of  our  words  from  what  is  verbal,  is  a  difficulty 
which  can  be  vanquished  by  only  a  strong  effort  of  the  in- 
tellect. Still  it  must  be  vanquished,  for  all  I  have  to  say 
relates  to  unverbal  things,  not  to  words ;  and  if  the  dis- 
crimination between  them  be  not  fully  seen,  I  shall  be 
wholly  unintelligible.  The  muster-roll  of  an  army  con- 
sists of  words  which  name  the  unverbal  components  of  the 
army,  and  when  the  names  are  called  during  a  muster, 
each  of  the  unverbal  components  answers  to  his  name; 
could  we,  in  the  same  way,  call  over  all  words  and  sen- 
tences of  the  English  language,  and  each  unverbal  thing 
could  present  itself,  as  the  word  or  sentence  that  refers  to 
it  is  called,  the  muster  would  exhibit  the  unverbal  things 
separated  from  the  words  that  refer  to  them. 


20  THE   MEANING  OF   WORDS. 

Unverbal  things  are  divisible  into  three  classes — sensible,  intel- 
lectual, and  moral. 

§  1.  But  all  unverbal  things  cannot  be  sensibly  thus 
mustered,  only  a  portion  of  them  being  cognizable  by  our 
senses.  This  portion  I  shall  classify  by  itself,  and  call 
them  sensations — sensible  things,  and  sometimes  physical 
things.  Physical,  wherever  used  by  me,  will  be  as  a 
synonym  of  sensible;  and  both  terms  will  severally  be 
employed  to  denote  what  any  one  or  more  of  my  senses 
can  reveal  to  me  as  a  sight,  sound,  taste,  feel  or  smell. 
By  saying,  therefore,  of  any  thing  that  it  is  sensible  or 
physical,  I  shall  only  mean  that  it  is  something  cognizable 
by  some  one  or  more  of  my  senses.  To  an  uneducated 
deaf  mute  sensible  things  must  appear  in  entire  separation 
from  words.  He  sees  in  the  heavens  neither  sun,  moon, 
stare,  clouds,  nor  firmament,  but  he  sees  the  unverbal 
things  which  the  words  name  ;  and  he  sees  on  the  earth, 
neither  trees,  grass,  men,  women,  houses,  streets,  nor 
water,  but  he  sees  the  unverbal  things  that  those  names 
designate.  All  sensible  things  possess  thus  an  unverbal 
existence,  and  all  that  I  require  at  present,  is  to  discrimi- 
nate what  is  unverbal  from  what  is  verbal. 

§  2.  Another  portion  of  unverbal  things,  but  not  cog- 
nizable by  my  senses,  I  shall  class  by  themselves,  under 
the  name  of  emotions,  or  internal  feelings ;  though  I  may 
occasionally  call  them  by  other  names.  I  refer  to  our  ap- 
petites, desires,  passions,  etc.  They  are  as  discriminable 


INTRODUCTORY  AND   EXPLANATORY.  21 

From  the  words  that  name  them  as  sensible  things.  A 
deaf  mute  knows  them  not  as  anger,  love,  vanity,  hatred, 
jealousy,  emulation,  hope,  fear,  desire,  aversion,  etc.,  but 
as  emotional  feelings  apart  from  any  verbal  designation ; 
and  they  can  appear  the  like  to  us,  to  the  extent  at  least 
3f  enabling  us  to  discriminate  what  is  verbal  in  relation  to 
them  from  what  is  unverbal ;  though  we  are  so  accustomed, 
from  the  earliest  infancy,  to  contemplate  unverbal  things 
through  the  medium  of  words,  that  to  contemplate  anger 
unverbally,  is  at  first  an  unintelligible  requirement. 

§  3.  A  third  class  of  unverbal  things  I  shall  designate 
as  intellectual.  Every  known  thing  is  intellectual  that  is 
not  comprehended  by  one  of  the  above  two  classes.  By 
this  comprehensive  rule,  we  never  need  suffer  any  hesita- 
tion as  to  whether  any  word  names  an  intellection  or  not. 
If  the  meaning  of  the  word  is  not  something  that  can  be 
perceived  unverbally  by  some  one  or  more  of  our  senses, 
the  unverbal  meaning  is  intellectual,  unless  it  be  emotional, 
as  stated  in  the  preceding  section.  Our  senses,  therefore, 
are  a  sort  of  Ithuriel's  spear,  which  will  at  once  inform  us 
whether  the  signification  of  any  word  is  physical  or  not. 
If  its  signification  is  neither  emotional  nor  can  be  recog- 
nized unverbally  by  some  one  or  more  of  the  senses,  the 
signification  is  intellectual.  Take,  for  instance,  the  word 
physical,  if  I  employ  it  without  any  reference  to  some  thing 
that  some  one  of  my  senses  can  perceive  unverbally — the 
only  meaning  of  the  word  will  be  intellectual.  I  labour 
this  point  unnecessarily  perhaps,  but  it  is  essential  to  a 


22  THE  MEANING  OF  WORDS. 

proper  understanding  of  the  use  which  I  shall  constantly 
make  of  the  words  physical  and  intellectual. 

But  I  have  not  yet  shown  what  intellectual  things  are 
unverbally — the  unverbal  things  which  I  have  thus  far  re- 
ferred to,  being  either  sensible  or  emotional.  I  will,  there- 
fore, proceed  to  adduce  some  examples  which  may  indicate 
what  I  mean  by  the  unverbal  meaning  of  intellectual 
things.  The  words  memory,  thought,  reflection,  etc.,  are 
names  of  some  of  the  unverbal  things  of  the  intellect,  and 
they  can  be  easily  recognized  unverbally.  When  Hamlet 
says,  he  sees  his  father  "  in  his  mind's  eye,"  his  words  refer 
to  an  intellectual  conception  that  is  entirely  distinct  and 
separable  from  the  words  which  he  utters.  We  can  see 
the  moon,  also,  unverbally,  in  our  mind's  eye,  and  the 
moon  thus  seen  intellectually  is  easily  discriminable  from 
the  word  moon,  or  from  the  sensibly  perceived  moon.  But 
all  intellections  are  not,  so  easily  as  the  above,  discrimina- 
ble from  words ;  for  instance,  the  conception  that  the  sun 
"required  a  creator  before  it  could  exist."  Have  these 
intellectually  conceived  words  any  unverbal  meaning — any 
meaning  that  can  be  discriminated  from  the  conceived 
words  and  from  all  words?  That  a  ship  needed  a  creator  is 
not  an  intellectual  conception  so  much  as  it  is  a  sensible 
experience ;  and  to  our  sensible  experience  about  ships  and 
analogous  things,  the  words  may  be  said  to  refer  when  I 
assert  that  a  ship  needs  a  creator  before  it  can  exist.  But 
when  a  creator  is  predicated  by  the  intellect  of  the  sun,  the 
conceived  words  refer  to  no  sensible  experience  with  suns 


INTRODUCTORY  AND  EXPLANATORY.       23 

or  with  anything  analogous  thereto.  At  one  period  of  my 
life,  I  believed  that  words  thus  conceived  by  the  intellect, 
of  the  sun,  are  totally  insignificant  unverbally,  except  as 
they  refer  to  our  sensible  experience  with  ships  and  other 
analogous  creations  of  man.  As  a  corollary  from  this  be- 
lief, I  supposed  that  an  uneducated  deaf  mute,  who  knows 
no  kind  of  language,  can  possess  no  intellectual  concep- 
tions in  relation  to  the  sun's  requiring  a  creator.  I  sup- 
posed such  a  mute  to  be  as  dumb  intellectually  as  he  is  ver- 
bally, and  to  be  dumb  intellectually  because  he  is  dumb 
verbally ;  and  accordingly  that  his  intellect  cannot  conceive 
that  the  sun  required  a  creator,  till  he  be  taught  some  ges- 
ticulations with  his  hands  or  fingers,  analogous  to  the 
movements  which  we  make  with  our  organs  of  speech,  and 
which  we  call  words.  I  found,  however,  that  a  deaf  mute 
manifests,  by  his  conduct,  a  knowledge  of  some  intellectual 
conceptions  that  are  as  seemingly  verbal  only  as  the  con- 
ception of  a  creator  in  relation  to  the  sun ;  for  instance,  he 
will  prefer  the  whole  of  any  desirable  thing  rather  than  a 
part,  though  he  cannot  know  verbally  "that  the  whole  is 
greater  than  a  part ;"  and  he  will  as  readily  receive  a  single 
five  dollar  bank  note  as  receive  five  notes  of  a  dollar  each, 
though  he  cannot  know  verbally  "  that  things  equal  to  the 
same  are  equal  to  each  other."  He  cannot  conceive  ver- 
bally the  relation  between  master  and  servant,  master  and 
slave;  yet  he  can  act  suitably  to  the  relations  as  master, 
servant,  or  slave. 

In  reflecting  on  these  anomalies,  and  knowing  that  men 


24  THE   MEANING   OF  WORDS. 

in  all  ages  of  the  world,  and  in  all  places,  have,  without 
any  possible  conventionality,  conceived  intellectually  that 
the  sun  required  a  creator  before  it  could  exist,  I  saw  that 
the  universality  of  the  conception  must  proceed  from  the 
organism  of  the  intellect ;  and  hence,  that  all  such  concep- 
tions, how  diversified  soever  in  verbal  creed,  possess  an 
unverbal  meaning  in  an  organic  impulse  from  which  the 
verbal  conceptions  all  proceed,  and  to  which  they  owe 
their  ultimate  cogency.  In  truth,  the  meaning  of  such 
words  is  subjective,  not  objective.  A  deaf  mute,  therefore, 
though  his  intellect  cannot  conceive  in  words,  as  ours  can, 
that  the  sun  required  a  maker,  will  possess  the  intellectual 
organism  from  which  the  words  proceed  in  us ;  and  his 
knowledge  in  the  premises,  excluding  what  is  taught  in 
the  Scriptures,  will  be  equal  to  ours,  except  that  he  can- 
not apply  thereto  words. 

So  when  an  uneducated  deaf  mute  is  under  the  influence 
of  anger,  he  cannot  utter  the  verbal  execrations  and  impre- 
cations which  anger  induces  us  to  utter,  but  he  can  feel 
unverbally  what  we  feel.  The  verbal  execrations  and  im- 
precations are  merely  the  effects  of  an  organic  unverbal 
feeling,  just  as  the  verbal  dogmas  in  relation  to  a  creator 
of  the  sun,  are  merely  the  effects  of  an  organic  unverbal 
intellectual  impulse;  and  while  the  said  feeling  and  the 
said  impulse  are  probably  much  the  same  in  all  men,  the 
verbal  execrations  and  imprecations  that  result  from  the 
feeling  of  anger,  and  the  verbal  dogmas  that  result  from 
the  intellectual  impulse,  will  be  rude  and  gross  among  an 


INTRODUCTORY  AND   EXPLANATORY.  25 

uncultivated  people,  and  will  at  all  times  be  Dutch,  French, 
Indian,  etc.,  according  to  the  nationality  of  the  speaker ; 
and  may  be  inarticulate  screeches  in  a  deaf  mute,  or  gib- 
berish in  an  idiot,  or  spasmodic  screams  in  an  infant. 

As  I  am  endeavouring  to  manifest  a  very  important,  and, 
I  suppose,  unrecognized  unverbal  meaning  of  intellectually 
conceived  words,  I  will  give  another  illustration  of  my  dis- 
crimination of  the  unverbal  meaning  from  the  verbal.  In 
an  uneducated  deaf  mute  the  organs  of  speech  are  situated, 
in  relation  to  words,  somewhat  like  the  hands  of  a  man  are 
situated  in  relation  to  manipulations  when  the  man  is 
handcuffed.  His  hands,  though  unable  to  perform  their 
proper  organic  movements,  will  possess  the  tendency  to  per- 
form them  when  an  occasion  occurs  that  naturally  excites 
the  movements,  and  the  tendency  may  manifest  itself,  as 
we  see  it  in  infants,  in  some  imperfect  struggles;  so  I  sup- 
pose the  intellect  of  an  uneducated  mute  manifests,  in  some 
guttural  sounds,  a  tendency  to  conceive  words  on  the  occa- 
sions where  words  are  organically  conceived  by  persons 
who  are  not  mutes.  I  have  never  been  in  a  position  to 
observe  mutes,  and,  therefore,  speak  from  only  conjecture ; 
but  whether  they  thus  manifest  the  organic  tendency  or 
not  is  immaterial  to  my  purpose,  which  is  only  to  discrim- 
inate intellectually  conceived  words  from  the  organic  un- 
verbal impulse  from  which  the  conceived  words  proceed ; 
and  to  show  that  intellectually  conceived  words  possess  an 
unverbal  meaning  in  the  organism  of  the  intellect,  just  as 
verbal  execrations  and  imprecations  possess  an  unverbal" 


26  THE   MEANING   OF   WORDS. 

meaning  in  our  moral  organism.  In  both  cases  the  part 
which  is  principal  is  unverbal,  while  the  verbal  part  is 
subordinate.  The  verbal  part  may  be  Chinese,  Indian, 
Dutch,  etc.,  without  impairing  the  cogency  of  the  unverbal 
part;  and  probably  the  verbal  part  may  be  guttural,  sole- 
cistic,  and  incoherent,  without  impairing  to  the  speaker  the 
cogency  of  the  unverbal  part.  Some  men  are  so  stupid 
that  the  verbal  conceptions  of  their  intellect  are  as  unintel- 
ligible to  hearers  as  an  unknown  tongue ;  still  the  utterance 
seems  to  satisfy  the  intellects  of  the  speakers ;  and  how  far 
intellections,  even  thus  manifested,  differ  unverbally  from 
intellections  that  are  manifested  in  better  words  by  better 
cultivated  men,  may  be  problematical.  "We  never  estimate 
thus  the  intellectual  condition  of  stupid  or  illiterate  men, 
though  we  are  accustomed  to  interpret  somewhat  thus  in 
such  men,  and  in  all  others,  words  that  proceed  from  our 
internal  feelings.  The  words  rogue,  rascal,  etc.,  we  deem 
epithets  of  endearment  when  we  know  they  proceed  from 
feelings  of  affection.  Indeed,  the  feeling  of  love,  when  it  is 
extreme,  finds  often  in  its  struggles  for  utterance  no  words 
so  expressive  of  its  energy  as  those  which  literally  are  op- 
probrious. We  know,  also,  that  in  expressing  his  intellec- 
tual conceptions,  every  man  occasionally  utters,  inadver- 
tently, words  of  an  opposite  conventional  meaning  from 
what  he  intends;  still  the  mistaken  words  satisfy  the  organ- 
ism of  his  intellect,  as  well  as  a  correct  utterance.  When, 
too,  we  listen  to  persons  who  are  speaking  in  some  foreign 
language  that  is  unknown  to  us,  and  reflect  that  such  Ian- 


INTRODUCTORY  AND   EXPLANATORY.  27 

guages  are  numerous  to  the  extent  of  several  thousand, 
and  all  of  them  equally  satisfactory  to  the  intellects  of  the 
speakers,  we  may  well  infer  that  the  ultimate  significance 
of  the  utterances  is  not  dependent  on  the  sounds  that  ar,e 
uttered,  but  on  the  intellectual  organism  from  which  the 
sounds  proceed.  This  is  still  more  evident  from  the  trans- 
latability  of  every  language  into  the  words  of  every  other 
language,  and  which  manifests  that  the  words  of  all  lan- 
guages take  cognizance  of  like  things ;  and  what  is  thus 
like  must  be  unverbal,  for  it  is  not  verbal ;  and  must  be 
organic,  for  it  is  common  to  all  men  everywhere  and  at  all 
periods.  If  this  doctrine  be  not  true,  we  convert  into  mere 
words  all  knowledge  that  is  not  sensible  or  emotional ; 
that  is,  all  knowledge  that  can  be  manifested  in  words 
only ;  as,  for  instance,  all  doctrinal  theology,  natural  and 
revealed ;  words  conceived  by  the  intellect  in  thought  or 
otherwise^  being  no  more  significant  and  no  less  than 
words  uttered  audibly.  I  shall,  however,  speak  more  on 
this  subject  hereafter.  I  have  attempted  at  present  to  show 
only  that  all  intellectual  conceptions  can  be  discriminated 
from  words  as  well  as  sensible  things  and  internal  feelings. 
Intellectual  conceptions  are  discriminable  with  more  diffi- 
culty, because  a  large  number  of  them  consist  of  words ; 
but  an  unverbal  meaning  underlies  and  is  the  ultimate  sig- 
nification of  the  conceived  words  ;  just  as  the  internal  feel- 
ing that  dictates  the  execrations  of  anger,  underlies  and  is 
the  ultimate  unverbal  signification  of  the  verbal  execra- 
tions. 

4 


28  THE   MEANING   OF   WORDS. 

The  classification  of  unverbal  things  into  intellections,  sen- 
sations, and  emotions,  assimilates  to  the  analysis  of  chem- 
istry. 

§  1.  Having  thus  manifested  what  unverbal  things  are, 
and  shown  that  they  are  divisible  into  three  classes,  sensi- 
ble, intellectual  and  emotional,  I  mean  not  to  characterise 
any  one  of  the  three  classes  as  more  or  less  important  than 
any  other,  my  design  extending  no  further  than  to  so 
analyse  our  knowledge  that  we  may  discriminate  words 
from  unverbal  things ;  and  the  unverbal  things  of  one  of 
the  three  classes  from  the  unverbal  things  of  any  other  of 
the  classes. 

The  classification  which  I  have  attempted  to  apply  to  all 
unverbal  things  assimilates  to  the  analysis  of  chemistry. 
As  chemistry  shows  the  relation  which  all  compounded 
physical  things  bear  to  a  few  elemental  physical  things 
that  are  not  compounded,  so  I  have  shown  the  relation 
which  -words  bear  to  things  that  are  unverbal.  And  as 
chemistry  ends  its  analysis  when  it  has  analysed  compounds 
into  their  elements,  so  when  I  shall  have  analysed  any 
given  words  into  unverbal  things  my  analysis  will  end. 
The  elements  of  chemistry' — hydrogen,  nitrogen,  oxygen, 
etc. — you  can  examine  in  any  way  you  may  find  practica- 
ble ;  but  you  cannot  change  them  into  each  other  or  into 
any  physical  thing  more  simple.  They  practically  say  to 
chemists  as  God  said  to  Moses,  "I  am  that  I  am;"  that  is, 
they  alone  are  their  own  proper  expositor,  and  unresolva- 


INTRODUCTORY  AND  EXPLANATORY.         29 

ble  into  any  more  elemental  thing.  So,  after  I  have  shown 
that  the  word  memory  names  an  intellectual  thing,  and  you 
wish  to  know  further  what  the  said  intellectual  thing  is 
unverbally,  my  teachings  cannot  answer  your  question 
except  by  referring  you  to  your  intellect,'  which  alone  can 
present  the  intellection  to  you  unverbally  ;  and  when  it  is 
thus  presented,  and  you  shall  wish  to  question  it,  it  can 
answer,  like  the  elements  of  chemistry,  "I  am  that  I  am;" 
language  being  at  the  end  of  its  unverbal  signification 
when  its  meaning  is  traced  to  the  unverbal  things  to  which 
it  refers.  What  I  have  said  of  the  word  memory,  I  may 
repeat  of  every  other  word  which  signifies  an  intellection, 
as  thought,  idea,  etc.  When  you  know  the  unverbal  thing, 
impulse,  or  zest,  to  which  the  words  refer,  you  know  the 
word's  unverbal  meaning ;  and  I  have  accomplished  in  re- 
lation to  it  all  that  my  analysis  contemplates. 

§  2.  And  what  I  have  thus  said  of  words  which  signify 
intellections,  may  be  repeated  of  words  which  signify  inter- 
nal feelings,  as  love,  hate,  hope,  fear,  kindness,  jealousy, 
etc.  Each  of  the  words,  when  used  with  reference  to  any 
internal  feeling,  means  unverbally  the  feeling  to  which  it 
refers ;  and  when  your  consciousness  recognizes  the  feeling 
unverbally,  the  feeling  becomes  its  own  best  expositor ; 
and  language  in  relation  thereto  has  performed  its  office. 
The  like  may  be  said  of  words  which  signify  sensible 
things ;  as,  for  instance,  the  word  elephant.  What  your 
senses  perceive  when  an  elephant  is  exhibited  to  you,  con- 
stitutes to  you  the  unverbal  sensible  meaning  of  the  word 


30  THE   MEANING  OF  WORDS. 

elephant ;  and  the  like  may  be  said  of  every  other  word 
whose  unverbal  signification  is  sensible. 

The  unverbal  things  of  any  one  class  are  untransmutdble  into 
the  unverbal  things  of  any  other  class. 

§  1.  But  vain  will  be  the  foregoing  classific  discrimina- 
tion between  intellectual  conceptions,  sensible  perceptions, 
and  internal  feelings,  if  the  three  classes  of  unverbal  things 
differ  only  in  the  source  through  which  they  become  known 
to  me.  I  assume,  however,  much  more,  namely,  that  the 
unverbal  things  of  each  class  are  essentially  different,  and 
are  inconvertible  into  each  other ;  and  I  am  anxious  that 
these  tenets  shall  be  perceived  clearly,  because,  if  I  am  in- 
correct in  them,  my  entire  classific  superstructure  is  falla- 
cious and  worthless.  We  may  well  suspect  that  our 
Creator  is  too  skilful  to  create  more  than  one  set  of  organs 
to  perform  one  office ;  but,  irrespective  of  this  assumption, 
and  relying  wholly  on  what  we  may  discover  experiment- 
ally and  consciously,  I  postulate  that  our  sensible  organs, 
our  intellectual  organism,  and  our  internal  feelings,  yield 
respectively  knowledge  that  is  different,  each  of  the  three 
sets  yielding  us  knowledge  that  is  sui  generis.  The  senses, 
for  instance,  reveal  to  us  that  matter  is  divisible,  but  after 
the  sensible  division  proceeds  to  a  certain  extent,  we  find 
that  further  sensible  division  is  impossible ;  the  intellect, 
however,  can  and  will  continue  the  division  verbally,  and 
finds  that  matter  is  divisible  ad  infinitum ;  and  so  certain 
is  the  divisional  process  that  it  is  capable  of  mathematical 


INTRODUCTORY  AND  EXPLANATORY.  31 

demonstration.  Now  I  insist,  that  when  the  division  ceases 
from  being  sensible,  it  becomes  only  intellectual.  The  two 
''divisions"  are  verbally  homogeneous,  but  they  are  unver- 
bally  different;  one  being  a  sensible  perception  and  the 
other  an  intellectual  conception.  But  you  may  ask  me  what 
the  difference  is,  and  I  answer  that  it  is  unverbal;  hence 
I  cannot  tell  you  the  difference  in  words.  Our  knowledge 
is  at  the  end  of  its  analysis  when  it  is  traced  to  the  unver- 
bal things  of  which  it  is  composed.  The  intellectual 
division,  like  the  oxygen  of  chemistry,  is  unverbally  what 
it  is.  It  is  its  own  best  expositor,  and  sole  revealer.  So 
the  sensible  division  is  unverbally  what  it  is,  and  its  own 
proper  expositor  and  sole  revealer,  and  no  words  in  rela- 
tion thereto  can  aid  us  in  discovering  how  it  differs  unver- 
bally from  an  intellectual  division ;  the  mute  revelations 
of  our  intellect  and  our  senses  alone  can  discover  the  dif- 
ference. 

§  2.  The  generic  and  inconvertible  difference  which  thus 
exists  unverbally  in  things  that  are  verbally  homogeneous,  I 
claim  as  an  important  discovery ;  and  to  manifest  this  dis- 
covery, I  have  been  endeavouring  so  long  and  laboriously 
to  discriminate  words  from  their  unverbal  signification  ; 
and  the  unverbal  things  of  the  senses  from  the  unverbal 
things  of  the  intellect,  etc. ;  for  when  we  speak  of  them,  we 
are  constantly  liable  to  disregard  their  unverbal  differences ; 
by  reason  that  the  same  word  will  often  signify  the  unver- 
bal things  of  two  or  of  all  the  different  three  classes,  as  we 
have  evinced  in  the  word  division.  I  can,  for  instance,  see 


32  THE  MEANING  OF  WORDS. 

that  the  sun  shines,  and  I  can  see  that  the  three  angles  of  a 
triangle  are  equal  to  two  right  angles ;  but  in  the  first  case, 
the  word  "see"  signifies  a  physical  perception — a  sight; 
and  in  the  second  case  it  signifies  a  conception  of  the  intel- 
lect— an  intellection.  Again,  take  the  word  good  :  Thomas 
is  good,  an  apple  is  good,  an  argument  is  good ;  meaning,  un- 
verbally, some  benevolent  internal  feeling  which  influences 
Thomas,  some  desirable  physical  property  possessed  by  the 
apple,  and  some  intellectual  acuteness  contained  in  the  ar- 
gument. You  thus  perceive  that  we  possess  three  classes 
of  unverbal  things,  and  language  refers  to  them  all  indis- 
criminately; consequently  the  unverbal  things  of  each 
class  being  as  essentially  different  as  the  Dromios  of  Shak- 
speare,  nothing  is  more  important  to  an  unsophistical 
appreciation  of  verbal  learning  and  verbal  speculations 
generally,  than  to  understand  the  threefold  unverbal  char- 
acter of  nearly  every  word  ;  and  to  be  able  to  untwist  into 
its  respective  unverbal  strands  the  three-stranded  cord 
which  nearly  .every  word  may  be  called.  Nor  is  the  pro- 
cess difficult.  When  language  speaks  of  anything  that  our 
senses  cannot  perceive  unverbally,  language  is  speaking  of 
an  intellection,  how  much  soever  the  words  may  imply  that 
the  thing  is  physical ;  and  when  language  speaks  of  any 
internal  feeling  that  our  consciousness  cannot  recognize 
unverbally,  language  is  again  speaking  of  an  intellection, 
how  much  soever  the  words  may  imply  an  internal  feeling. 
Nothing,  therefore,  can  be  more  discriminable  from  each 
other  than  the  unverbal  things  of  the  three  classes. 


INTRODUCTORY   AND  EXPLANATORY.  33 

§  3.  But  I  must  not  precipitate  what  I  have  to  say  in 
relation  to  the  nature  of  words.  I  shall  speak  of  words 
presently.  I  desire  to  show  now  only  the  inconvertible 
difference  which  I  claim  for  the  perceptions  of  the  senses, 
the  conceptions  of  the  intellect,  and  for  our  internal  feel- 
ings. I  might,  perhaps,  safely  leave  the  inconvertible  dif- 
ference as  self-evident ;  but  Providence,  by  making  some 
men  blind  and  some  deaf,  enables  us  to  learn  experiment- 
ally the  inability  of  the  intellect,  and  the  inability  of  words, 
to  communicate  to  us  the  un verbal  information  which  we 
receive  through  those  senses ;  and  by  a  due  contemplation 
of  such  and  kindred  cases,  we  shall  more  readily  discover 
the  inconvertibility  into  each  other  which  I  claim  for  the 
three  classes  of  unverbal  things,  nanaely,  sensible  percep- 
tions, intellectual  conceptions,  and  internal  feelings.  If 
any  person  is  already  satisfied  in  relation  to  their  inconver- 
tibility into  each  other,  he  need  not  read  what  intervenes 
between  this  and  the  next  succeeding  lecture ;  but  if  he 
needs  more  light  on  the  subject,  the  following  considerations 
may  yield  it : — 

§  4.  Truth  possesses  often  two  aspects,  one  so  gross  that 
every  person  sees  it,  and  the  other  so  subtile  that  the  acute 
pass  it  unnoticed.  For  instance,  that  a  blind  man's  intel- 
lect cannot  reveal  colours  to  him  through  the  agency  of 
words,  or  through  any  other  agency,  is  obvious ;  while  the 
kindred  fact  that  no  sight  can  be  known  to  you  which  you 
have  not  seen,  has  been  denied  by  even  the  sagacious 

Hume.   He  says,  "  Suppose  a  man  is  acquainted  with  every 

2* 


34  THE  MEANING  OF   WORDS. 

colour  except  a  particular  shade  of  blue,  and  then  let  all 
the  shades  of  blue,  except  the  above,  'be  placed  before  him 
in  an  order  descending  gradually  from  the  deepest  blue  to 
the  lightest ;  and  he  will  be  able,  by  his  imagination,  to  ac- 
quire a  knowledge  of  the  absent  shade."  But  Hume  is 
wrong.  The  absent  shade  is  a  sight,  and  nothing  can  reveal 
it  unverbally  to  the  man  but  his  eyes. 

If  we  cannot  thus  learn  a  new  appearance,  can  we  not 
by  some  mental  elaboration  commix  known  sights  and  dis- 
cover the  effects  ?  No  ;  a  change  of  appearance  is  a  new 
sight,  and  irremediably  unknown  till  disclosed  by  our  eyes. 
When  a  milliner  wishes  to  know  how  a  ribbon  which  lies 
before  her  will  appear  on  a  hat,  she  trusts  not  to  her  intel- 
lect to  compound  the  two  known  appearances ;  but  from  a 
practical  acquaintance  with  the  limitation  of  her  faculties, 
applies  the  ribbon  to  the  hat.  So,  from  the  known  inade- 
quacy of  words  to  reveal  new  sights,  we  employ  pictures. 
But  a  person  who  never  saw  the  original,  will  receive  from 
its  representative  no  sight  except  that  of  the  painting. 
Let  a  youth  study  geography,  and  be  competent  to  desig- 
nate on  a  map  or  globe  every  kingdom,  and  to  tell  its  lati- 
tude, climate,  soil,  productions,  and  appearance;  his  knowl- 
edge is  precisely  what  he  displays ;  various  appearances  on 
maps,  globes,  and  pictures,  together  with  words  and  phrases 
which  he  has  learnt  to  associate  with  them.  If  he  thinks 
he  knows  unverbally  any  sight  which  he  never  experi- 
enced, a  visit  to  the  countries  he  has  been  taught  to  speak 
of  will  undeceive  him.  He  may  recognize  names  of  places, 


INTRODUCTORY   AND   EXPLANATORY.  35 

names  of  customs,  and  names  of  natural  productions ;  but 
the  sights  will  be  new.  All  the  ingenuity  of  man,  assisted 
by  painting,  sculpture,  and  eloquence,  cannot  teach  the 
brightest  understanding  the  exact  unverbal  appearance  of 
a  pin,  except  by  presenting  to  his  eyes  what  will  produce 
a  sight  that  in  every  respect  is  a  pin. 

On  the  organic  limitation  of  our  visual  perceptions,  to 
which  we  are  thus  adverting,  arises  the  efficacy  of  disguises. 
They  merely  introduce  a  new  ingredient  in  some  known 
appearance,  as,  for  instance,  a  black  wig  in  place  of  light 
hair.  The  change  of  appearance  produced  in  a  man  by 
death  is  often  only  an  alteration  of  colours ;  though  the 
change  renders  difficult,  in  many  cases,  an  identification  of 
the  body  by  former  familiar  acquaintances.  The  variety 
which  seems  endless  in  the  human  countenance,  is  the 
effect  of  a  different  grouping,  rather  than  any  different  for- 
mation of  the  features  and  hues  that  unite  in  the  counte- 
nance. The  toy  called  the  Chinese  puzzle,  also  the  ka- 
leidoscope, operate  on  the  above  organic  principle ;  and, 
with  changes  in  the  juxtaposition  of  a  few  pieces  of  wood 
or  coloured  glass,  produce  an  almost  endless  variety  of  dif- 
ferent sights,  the  knowledge  of  any  one  of  which  we  shall 
seek  in  vain  from  the  intellect,  assisted  by  looking,  no 
matter  how  long,  at  the  pieces  separately.  When  we  see 
an  Indian  with  a  daub  of  red  paint  on  his  cheek,  and 
when  we  read  in  the  Scriptures  that  women  were  accus- 
tomed to  tinge  their  eyes,  as  modern  women  formerly 
placed  small  black  patches  on  their  faces,  we  laugh  at  the 


3(J  THE   MEANING   OF   WORDS. 

custom,  and  ask  what  beauty  can  be  found  in  a  daub  of 
red  paint  or  a  piece  of  black  court-plaster.  The  beauty 
consists  not  in  these,  but  in  the  change  produced  in  the 
whole  countenance  by  the  new  addition,  and  which  change 
no  intellect  can  anticipate.  It  is  often  great,  though  the 
effect  may  not  accord  with  our  present  tastes. 

§  5.  That  the  intellect  can  reveal  to  me  no  sight  that 
seeing  has  not  informed  me  of,  is  a  physical  truth  which 
experience  will  substantiate,  and  I  advert  to  it  rather  than 
press  it  by  argument.  But  a  kindred  position  is  equally 
true  of  our  other  senses.  Let  an  epicure  prescribe  some 
unusual  mixture  of  known  ingredients,  and  after  his  imagi- 
nation has  feasted  on  the  compound,  let  him  present  it  to 
his  taste,  and  he  will  discover' the  inefficiency  of  his  intel- 
lectual foreknowledge.  No  brilliancy  of  imagination  nor 
acuteness  of  the  intellect  can  perform  the  office  of  any  of 
our  senses. 

§  6.  The  like  maybe  said  of  feelings.  A  person  who  has 
never  felt  pain  (if  we  can  conceive  such  a  being),  will  pos- 
sess no  correct  unverbal  meaning  of  the  word ;  and  he  who 
has  felt  no  greater  pain  than  a  tooth-ache,  may  be  told  of 
the  superior  agonies  of  the  gout,  but  he  will  not  be  able  to 
divine  the  feeling.  Language  can  refer  us  to  any  sensible 
knowledge  we  possess,  but  it  can  reveal  to  us  none  in  its 
unverbal  aspect  that  we  possess  not. 

§  7.  We  may  say  the  same  of  sounds.  If  I  have  never 
heard  a  cataract,  you  may  inform  me  what  the  sound  is 
like;  awl  if  I  have  heard  a  similar  sound,  I  shall  be  in- 


INTRODUCTORY  AND  EXPLANATORY.        37 

structed ;  but  the  intellect  can  effect  no  more  than  such  an 
approximation.  Should  you  wish  to  acquaint  a  child  with 
the  sound  of  a  cataract,  his  unverbal  conception  of  it  will 
be  very  erroneous ;  not  because  his  intellect  is  less  acute 
than  yours,  or  language  less  operative  on  him  than  on  you ; 
but  because  his  sensible  experience  is  less  than  yours,  and 
language  can  be  sensibly  significant  to  him  of  his  sensible 
experience  only.  If  he  has  heard  no  sound  more  consonant, 
you  must  refer  to  even  the  lowing  of  an  ox.  You  may 
qualify  the  comparison,  by  saying  the  cataract  is  awfully 
louder  ;  but  if  he  has  heard  nothing  louder,  the  qualifica- 
tion will  not  add  to  his  sensible  instruction,  except  that  it 
may  teach  him  intellectually,  that  he  is  still  ignorant  of  the 
correct  sound  of  a  cataract. 

But  cannot  the  letters  of  the  alphabet  be  combined,  so 
that  by  looking  at  the  combination,  my  intellect  can  teach 
me  a  sound  that  hearing  has  never  informed  me  of?  I 
may  combine  letters  so  as  to  denote  a  new  sound ;  but  the 
sound,  so  far  as  it  is  new,  will  be  unknown  to  me,  till  my 
organs  of  speech  have  uttered  the  combination,  and  thus 
made  my  hearing  acquainted  with  it.  Seeing  the  letters 
can  teach  us  a  new  sound,  no  more  than  it  can  teach  sound 
to  a  deaf  mute.  Nor  let  any  person  suppose  that  his  in- 
tellect can  compound  known  sounds,  and  thus  acquire  a 
sound  which  he  never  heard.  The  most  practised  musician 
can,  no  more  than  the  most  unskilful,  know  unverbally 
the  sound  which  will  be  produced  by  a  new  combination 
of  familiar  notes.  So  far  as  the  combinaticn  will  produce 


38  THE   MEANING  OF  WORDS. 

a  sound  that  he  never  heard,  so  far  the  effect  of  the  com- 
bination must  be  sensibly  unknown  to  him,  despite  all  the 
efforts  of  his  intellect.  The  power  of  written  characters,  to 
communicate  sounds  to  me,  is  limited  to  sounds  already 
known  by  me.  We  accordingly  find  when  an  Englishman 
attempts  to  learn  the  French  language  by  means  of  written 
directions  as  to  the  pronunciation,  he  will  still  utter  only 
English  sounds ;  though  to  a  Frenchman  the  written  direc- 
tions may  represent  French  sounds.  The  obstacle  to  the 
mere  Englishman  is  organic,  and  insurmountable  by  any 
visible  or  intellectual  contrivance  whatever. 

§  8.  From  the  inadequacy  of  language  to  teach  us  unver- 
bal  things  not  already  known,  arises  the  inefficacy  of  verbal 
instruction.  A  writing  master  may  direct  a  child  how  to 
make  a  perpendicular  mark ;  but  in  every  particular  in 
which  the  directions  refer  to  some  motion  which  the  pupil 
has  never  produced,  or  to  some  muscular  effort  that  he  has 
never  made,  the  directions  are  as  impotent  as  a  discourse 
on  colours  is  to  the  blind. 

Nearly  every  word  that  possesses  an  unverbal  meaning,  pos- 
sesses a  verbal  meaning  also. 

§  1.  That  the  sensible  significancy  of  a  man's  language 
is  limited  to  his  sensible  experience  would  be  readily  ad- 
mitted, were  we  not  embarrassed  with  one  difficulty. 
Bonfire  names  a  sight,  and  melody  a  sound.  If  these 
words  possessed  no  other  signification,  we  should  imme- 
diately understand  that  the  unverbal  import  of  bonfire 


INTRODUCTORY  AND  EXPLANATORY.        39 

must  ever  be  unknown  to  the  blind,  and  the  unverbal  im- 
port of  melody  unknown  to  the  deaf.  But  these  words, 
and  nearly  all  others,  name  words  also ;  and  till  you  un- 
derstand this,  you  will  not  understand  clearly  that  our 
senses  alone  can  reveal  to  us  the  sensible  signification  of 
any  word.  When  Locke  says  that  the  meaning  of  rainbow 
can  be  revealed  to  a  person  who  never  saw  one,  provided 
he  has  seen  red,  violet,  green,  etc.,  Locke  is  alluding  to  the 
verbal  meaning  of  rainbow.  This  meaning  can  be  known 
to  the  blind ;  and  I  once  saw  a  company  surprised  when  a 
blind  youth  was  exhibiting  what  was  esteemed  a  triumph 
of  education  over  natural  defects,  by  giving  in  words  a 
description  of  the  appearance  of  rainbows.  The  company 
knew  not  that  rainbow  possesses  two  significations;  one 
unverbal,  which  nothing  can  reveal  but  seeing,  and  the 
other  verbal,  that  can  be  learnt  by  hearing.  You  may 
suppose  that  we  differ  from  the  blind ;  and  that  a  verbal 
enumeration  of  the  colours  of  a  rainbow,  and  of  their 
figure,  size,  position  and  arrangement,  to  us  who  know  the 
sights  which  the  words  signify  unverbally,  would  reveal 
to  us  a  rainbow,  not  verbally  merely,  but  visibly.  Take, 
however,  any  one  of  the  colours,  say  red :  it  names  unver- 
bally not  one  sight  only,  but  numerous  sights.  Fire  is 
red,  blood  is  red,  my  hand  is  red,  bricks  are  red,  and  an 
Indian  is  red ;  which  of  these  unverbal  sights  is  he  to  ima- 
gine, when  you  speak  of  the  red  of  a  rainbow  ? 

The  same  remark  will  apply  to  the  other  colours,  and 
to  their  figure,  position  and  arrangement.     But  admit  that 


40  THE   MEANING   OF   WORDS. 

a  person  who  has  never  seen  a  rainbow,  shall  still  have 
seen  all  its  colours.  Admit  further,  that  when  you  enume- 
rate the  colours,  he  shall  guess  the  precise  red,  orange, 
yellow,  etc.,  to  which  you  refer ;  yet,  for  the  person  to  know 
how  the  colours  will  look  unverbally  when  they  are  com- 
bined, will  be  impossible ;  much  less,  how  they  will  appear 
unverbally  when  drawn  into  the  shape,  size  and  position 
of  a  rainbow.  If  he  has  seen  such  a  combination,  he  has 
seen  a  rainbow ;  but  if  he  has  not  seen  the  combination, 
language  is  inadequate  to  reveal  it.  After  the  most  copi- 
ous definition,  and  the  most  familiar  acquaintance  with  the 
sights  separately  that  are  referred  to  by  the  defining  words, 
a  person  will  be  conscious  of  a  new  sight  the  moment  he 
sees  a  rainbow. 

§  2.  Words  also  which  refer  to  intellections  and  to  inter- 
nal feelings,  possess  a  verbal  meaning  in  addition  to  the 
unverbal.  The  instructors  of  the  deaf  may  find  this  dis- 
crimination important.  If  they  wish  to  teach  a  deaf  mute 
the  signification  of  the  word  joy,  they  should  teach  him  its 
verbal  signification  and  its  unverbal.  The  verbal  is  easily 
taught,  but  the  unverbal  can  be  disclosed  by  only  making 
the  mute  apprehend,  by  any  method  you  can,  the  feeling 
within  him  which  joy  names.  To  understand  this  analytical 
discrimination  in  the  meaning  of  words  will  make  the 
mute's  knowledge  definite,  and  facilitate  his  acquisitions. 

§  3.  I  have  thus,  I  hope,  shown  that  our  knowledge  is 
not  a  cyclopedia  of  mere  words,  but  that  unverbal  things 
underlie  words  and  constitute  an  unverbal  meaning  to 


INTRODUCTORY   AND   EXPLANATORY.  41 

which  words  refer  for  all  the  unverbal  signification  the 
words  possess.  I  have  shown,  also,  that  unverbal  things 
are  not  homogeneous  when  examined  unverbally,  though 
our  knowledge  seems  to  be  homogeneous  when  it  is  deemed 
a  cyclopedia  of  mere  words.  Unverbal  things  are  not 
transrnutable  into  one  another  except  verbally — they  are 
revealed  to  us  by  our  senses,  our  intellect  and  our  internal 
feelings — and  each  of  these  three  sets  of  organs  furnishes 
us  with  unverbal  items  that  are  inconvertibly  different 
from  the  items  furnished  by  either  or  both  of  the  other  of 
the  said  three  sets  of  organs.  I  will  hereafter  deem  these 
doctrines  as  established  truths,  and  deem  every  item  of  our 
unverbal  knowledge  either  sensible,  intellectual  or  emo- 
tional. The  utility  of  the  discrimination  of  our  knowledge 
into  verbal  and  unverbal,  and  of  unverbal  things  into  three 
heterogeneous  classes,  I  will  now  endeavour  to  establish. 


PART    I. 

OF    THE    STRUCTURE    OF    LANGUAGE, 


LECTURE  II. 

THE  HETEROGENEITY  OF  UNVERBAL  THINGS  DISCRIMINA- 
TED FROM  THE  HOMOGENEITY  WITH  WHICH  THEY  ARE 
FALLACIOUSLY  INVESTED  BY  WORDS. 

CONTENTS. 

1.  "We  possess  but  one  set  of  words  with  which  to  speak  of  three  incon- 

vertibly  different  classes  of  unverbal  things. 

2.  The  verbal  homogeneity  must  be  discriminated  from  the  unverbal  di- 

versity, or  much  speculative  error  ensues. 

3.  We  mistake  the  homogeneity  of  words  for  a  homogeneity  of  unver- 

bal things. 

§  1.  We  have  seen,  by  the  preceding  introductory  lec- 
ture, that  while  we  contemplate  our  knowledge  through 
the  medium  of  words,  we  cannot  discriminate  what  is  intel- 
lectual from  what  is  sensible,  etc.  We  adduced  an  example 
of  this  indiscrimination  in  the  divisibility  of  matter ;  the 
sensible  divisibility  and  the  intellectual  divisibility  being 
verbally  homogeneous,  though  as  heterogeneous  unverbal- 
ly  as  oxygen  and  hydrogen.  While  we  deem  homogeneous 
the  sensible  divisibility  and  the  intellectual,  we  are  as  much 
astonished  at  the  logical  divisibility  ad  infinitum  of  matter, 
as  we  are  at  a  feat  of  unsuspected  jugglery ;  but  when  we 
discover  that  the  divisibility  is  generically  different  in  the 


46  THE   MEANING   OF   WORDS. 

two  cases,  our  astonishment  is  as  much  relieved  as  when 
we  find  that  the  handkerchief  which  the  juggler  cut  into 
pieces,  is  not  the  handkerchief  which  he  subsequently  re- 
stores to  us  uncut. 

The  above  is  only  an  example  of  the  fallacious  homo- 
geneity which  our  knowledge  assumes  continually  when 
contemplated  through  the  medium  of  words ;  and  we  shall 
find,  as  we  proceed  in  our  discussions,  that  to  discriminate 
the  generic  differences  that  pertain  to  unverbal  things,  and 
which  the  structure  of  language  leads  us  to  disregard,  will 
relieve  our  speculative  knowledge  and  our  logic  from 
sophistry,  mystery  and  perplexity ;  and  that  the  want  of 
such  discrimination  constitutes  the  least  suspected,  but  the 
greatest,  most  general,  and  most  surprising  error  of  the 
age.  If  any  person  will  refer  to  the  word  "matter"  in 
Rees's  New  Cyclopedia,  he  will  find  a  summary  of  what 
the  most  eminent  men  of  different  periods  have  said  of 
matter,  and  he  will  be  painfully  conscious  of  the  fog  which 
surrounds  the  subject  by  their  deeming  intellectual  con- 
ceptions homogeneous  with  sensible  things.  Acuteness  of 
intellect,  in  labours  thus  misdirected,  but  darkens  more 
elaborately  what  it  strives  to  elucidate.  The  indiscrimina- 
tion between  what  is  sensible  and  what  is  intellectual  con- 
stitutes the  radical  defect  of  all  metaphysics  and  all  logic, 
and  in  view  of  the  wreck  of  intellectual  effort  the  indis- 
crimination has  occasioned,  countless  volumes  that  have 
descended  to  us  through  the  course  of  ages,  and  to  which 
we  are  still  adding,  are  like  the  blood  on  the  hands  of 


OF  THE   STRUCTURE   OF   LANGUAGE.  47 

Macbeth,  "  a  sorry  sight !"  Indeed^  till  a  man  learns  to 
discriminate  the  generic  difference  between  things  sensible, 
intellectual  and  emotional ;  till  he  learns  to  regard  their 
verbal  homogeneity  as  only  a  quality  of  language;  his 
knowledge,  when  contemplated  through  the  medium  of 
words,  will  be  as  fallacious  as  a  child's  who  shall  not  dis- 
criminate the  generic  difference  between  the  events  of  the 
"  Arabian  Nights,"  and  the  events  of  history — a  difference 
that  consists  in  only  that  one  set  of  events  are  intellectual 
conceptions  ;  and  the  other  set,  sensible  performances.  But 
the  principle  is  too  complex  to  be  discussed  thus  in  gross, 
and  I  will  proceed  to  manifest  it  in  several  of  its  various 
phases,  but  commencing  with  the  most  simple  examples. 

Perhaps  nothing  are  deemed  more  unsuspectedly  homo- 
geneous than  our  thoughts,  and  to  their  verbal  homoge- 
neity pertains  much  of  the  mysteriousness  connected  with 
them.  A  little  reflection  will,  however,  enable  us  to  dis- 
cover that  thoughts,  instead  of  being  homogeneous,  can  be 
classified  into  six  strongly-marked  unverbal,  generic  diver- 
sities. Professor  Stewart  says,  "  Some  men,  in  even  their 
private  speculations,  not  only  use  words  as  an  instrument 
of  thought,  but  form  the  words  into  sentences."  What  is 
thus  alleged  is  true  of  all  men ;  but  the  remark  attaches  to 
only  one  kind  of  thoughts.  When  we  pronounce  million 
inaudibly,  it  is  a  thought ;  when  we  pronounce  it  audibly, 
it  is  a  word.  The  like  may  be  said  of  every  word.  We 
can  better  see  that  verbal  thoughts  are  only  inaudible 
words,  when  we  reflect  that  every  oral  word  consists  un- 


48  THE   MEANING  OF  WORDS. 

verbally  of  a  sound  and  certain  movements  of  the  breath, 
lips,  tongue,  and  other  vocal  organs.  This  analysis  dispels 
part  of  the  mystery  of  verbal  thoughts,  for  we  usually 
deem  a  word  nothing  but  sound ;  and  are  conscious  that 
our  verbal  thoughts  are  not  sounds. 

Verbal  thoughts  are,  un verbally,  a  movement  of  some  of 
the  vocal  organs,  and  occasionally  of  the  breath.  If,  for  in- 
stance, you  repeat  in  thought  the  alphabet,  you  will  occa- 
sionally detect  a  slight  agency  of  some  of  the  vocal  organs, 
especially  of  the  tongue.  The  more  freely  we  permit  the 
tongue's  movements,  the  more  distinctly  we  can  think  the 
alphabet.  If  you  stand  before  a  mirror  and  protrude  your 
tongue,  you  will  often  see  it  either  dilate  or  thicken,  as 
each  letter  is  pronounced  in  thought.  The  experiment 
must  be  made  with  letters  whose  articulation  is  lingual. 
And  again,  we  cannot  think  the  word  George  while  we 
are  speaking  the  word  Thomas ;  nor  can  we  pronounce  the 
word  Thomas,  while  we  are  thinking  George.  Utterance 
is  limited  also  to  successive  syllables,  and  verbal  thoughts 
are  similarly  limited  to  successive  syllables.  The  phrase 
"  Our  father,"  we  can  no  more  condense  into  one  thought, 
than  we  can  pronounce  the  words  in  one  articulation; 
hence,  though  verbal  thoughts  and  oral  words  are  not  iden- 
tities in  name,  the  similarity  between  them  is  close.  A 
deaf  mute  is  as  deficient  of  verbal  thoughts  as  he  is  of  oral 
words ;  nor  can  an  infant  possess  verbal  thoughts  till  he 
has  learned  to  speak.  A  Frenchman  thinks  French  words, 
and  an  Englishman  English.  An  uneducated  man 


OB^  THE   STRUCTURE   OF   LANGUAGE.  49 

thinks  ungrammatical  sentences,  and  a  rude  man,  vulgar 
sentences.  •  Professor  Blair  says  truly,  that  a  person  who 
is  learning  to  arrange  his  words  correctly,  is  learning  to 
think  correctly. 

§  2.  But  the  Professor's  remark  is  applicable  to  only 
verbal  thoughts,  and  to  them  I  alluded  in  my  introductory 
lecture  when  I  said,  "  that  ideas  are  often  composed  par- 
tially or  wholly  of  words."  When  the  intellect  conceives 
verbal  thoughts  in  explanation  of  oral  words,  we  call  the 
explanatory  thoughts  an  idea ;  but  they  are  only  the  sub- 
stitution of  one  set  of  words  for  another.  Such  substitution 
constitutes  an  artificial  circle  which  we  may  travel  around 
interminably  without  advancing  a  step  in  unverbal  knowl- 
edge ;  though  we  may  suppose  we  are  piling  Ossa  on  Pelion, 
erecting  a  new  Babel,  and  peering  therefrom  into  the  high- 
est heavens  that  our  intellect  conceives  to  exist.  Peer 
thus  we  may,  I  admit,  but  such  peerings  signify,  unver- 
bally,  the  subjective  conceptions  of  the  intellect,  not  what 
the  words  mean  unverbally  when  they  refer  to  sensi- 
ble things.  Of  such  verbal  conceptions  I  shall  speak  in 
another  place,  and  will  not  further  anticipate  the  topic 
here. 

§  3.  But  verbal  thoughts  are  only  one  kind  of  the  six 
generic  varieties  into  which  thoughts  are  divisible.  "We 
can  think  the  appearance  of  the  moon,  and  the  appearance 
is  a  visual  thought.  Visual  thoughts  possess  the  evanes- 
cence of  vision.  They  appear  and  vanish.  They  possess 
also  the  comprehensiveness  of  vision.  We  comprehend  in 


60  THE   MEANING   OF   WORDS. 

one  gaze  the  starry  firmament,  and  our  visual  thought  of 
the  firmament  is  as  capacious  as  the  gaze,  and  apparently 
as  remote  from  our  contact.  We  may,  in  some  instances, 
detect  a  slight  agency  of  the  eyes  in  the  production  of 
visual  thoughts.  We  keep  the  eyes  fixed,  and,  in  a  manner, 
direct  our  attention  to  the  eyes  when  we  want  to  recall  in 
visual  thought  some  absent  sight.  The  actor  who,  in  per- 
sonating Hamlet,  says,  "My  father!  I  think  I  see  him 
now,"  will  instinctively  stare. 

The  remaining  four  kinds  of  thoughts  are  characteris- 
tically sounds,  tastes,  feels,  and  smells.  When  I  recall 
in  thought  the  last  pressure  of  my  hand  by  an  absent 
friend,  the  pressure  rests  seemingly  upon  my  hand,  with 
the  contaction  which  pertains  to  jthe  sense  of  feeling, 
though  peculiarly  modified.  Smells,  when  recalled  in 
thought,  possess  the  limitation  that  pertains  to  the  percep- 
tion of  odours ;  for  we  can  no  more  combine  in  one  unver- 
bal  thought,  the  distinct  fragrance  of  a  rose,  and  the  fetor 
of  assafoetida,  than  we  can  realize  the  odours  separately  in 
one  inspiration.  We  also  snuif  up  the  air  when  we  en- 
deavour to  recall  un  verbally  some  absent  odour.  To  recall 
sounds  in  thought  conforms  so  nearly  to  actual  hearing, 
that  I  have  heard  a  musician  require  silence  from  hi? 
auditors  when  he  was  recollecting  a  tune.  Many  voice& 
uttered  confusedly  together,  can  be  recalled  in  thought  in 
one  clamour,  as  we  heard  them  ;  and  in  this,  the  thinking 
of  sounds  differs  characteristically  from  the  thinking  of 
words :  they  can  be  thought  of  in  only  the  syllabick  sue- 


OF  THE  STRUCTURE   OF  LANGUAGE.  51 

cession  of  oral  utterance.  Tastes,  when  recalled  in  thought, 
possess  the  singleness  which  attends  the  perceptions  of 
tastes.  Vinegar  and  water,  for  instance,  when  placed  to- 
gether in  the  mouth,  combine  to  form  a  single  taste,  and 
thought  cannot  present  us,  unverbally,  the  two  tastes 
simultaneously.  Some  acids  will  produce  a  flow  of  saliva, 
and  to  think  unverbally  of  the  acids  will  often  produce  a 
like  flow.  In  speaking  also  of  absent  luxuries  of  the 
palate,  we  often  say,  the  recalled  tastes  make  us  "smack 
our  lips,"  etc.  Our  forms  of  speech  exhibit  our  organiza- 
tion about  as  necessarily  and  as  accurately  as  wax  exhibits 
the  lineaments  of  the  seal  which  impresses  it ;  and  a  better 
philosophy  floats  in  our  colloquial  phraseology  than  phrase- 
ology receives  credit  for. 

§  4.  Whether  madness  uniformly  affects  alike  all  of  the 
six  kinds  of  a  maniac's  thoughts,  may  be  worth  the  exam- 
ination of  physicians.  When  the  late  Attorney-General 
of  the  United  States,  Mr.  Legare,  was  suffering  under  his 
last  illness,  he  called  for  water,  but  on  its  presentation  to 
him,  he  rejected  it,  saying  the  tumbler  was  full  of  ants. 
His  attendants  assured  him  that  the  glass  and  water  were 
pure,  and  that  the  apparent  ants  were  a  delusion  of  his 
sight.  He  then  drank  the  water.  This  supremacy  of  his 
intellect  over  his  visual  perceptions,  discriminates  such  a 
delusion  as  his  from  intellectual  insanity.  How  many  of 
the  senses  may  concur  in  any  delusion,  and  the  intellect 
retain  its  supremacy  over  the  deranged  senses,  may  be  de- 
serving of  note,  when  such  cases  can  be  observed.  A  lady 


52  THE   MEANING  OF  WORDS. 

has  been  long  an  inmate  of  the  Utica  Lunatic  Asylum,  who 
continually  hears  audible  words  which  her  intellect  deems 
the  conversation  of  invisible  people,  she  refusing  to  believe 
that  the  words  are  simply  a  derangement  of  her  hearing, 
and  hence  she  is  properly  accounted  intellectually  insane. 
A  paralysis  of  the  organs  of  speech  affects  verbal  thoughts 
nearly  as  much  as  it  affects  oral  words ;  while  the  other 
five  kinds  of  thought  are  unimpaired.  The  paralytic,  in  a 
case  like  the  above,  recognizes  by  sight  his  friends,  but  he 
cannot  recollect  their  names ;  he  recalls  in  visual  thought 
his  absent  friends,  with  a  like  inability  of  recollecting  their 
names. 

Every  person's  memory  is  perhaps  better  in  some  one  of 
the  six  classes  of  thoughts  than  in  the  others.  I  can  recollect 
sights  better  than  words.  Musicians  may  recollect  sounds 
better  than  words  or  sights.  The  recollection  of  words  is 
the  only  branch  of  memory  we  usually  cultivate  at  schools, 
and  this  limitation  may  be  a  defect  in  our  instruction. 
Practically,  we  are  well  aware  of  the  generic  diversity 
which  exists  in  our  thoughts  as  above  classified  into  six 
varieties.  I  heard  a  gentleman  refuse  to  look  on  his  de- 
ceased friend,  because  he  wished  to  think  of  his  friend  in 
no  other  way  than  as  he  appeared  when  alive.  The  re- 
mark surprised  no  one.  With  verbal  thoughts,  he  can 
think  of  the  deceased  in  any  state  of  decay  that  language 
can  express,  whether  he  view  him  or  not ;  but  with  visual 
thoughts,  he  can  think  of  only  the  sights  he  can  recall.  I 
shall  say  no  more  of  thoughts.  I  have  introduced  them  as 


OF  THE  STRUCTURE   OF   LANGUAGE.  53 

only  subsidiary  to  my  present  topic,  the  verbal  homoge- 
neity of  things  that  unverbally  are  heterogeneous. 

§  5.  The  fallacious  homogeneity  assumed  by  unverbal 
things  when  contemplated  verbally,  first  presented  itself 
to  me  in  a  physiological  examination  to  which  I,  many 
years  ago,  subjected  our  senses.  One  of  my  theorems 
affirmed,  that  "what  seeing  cannot  inform  me  of  is  not 
sight."  When,  for  instance,  an  infant  is  situated  in  a  dark 
room,  and  the  room  becomes  suddenly  illuminated  by  the 
introduction  therein  of  a  lighted  candle,  the  sensible  ap- 
pearances alone  will  not  teach  the  infant  that  the  candle 
and  the  illumination  are  connected  as  cause  and  effect ;  and 
what  is  thus  true  of  an  infant  is  equally  true  of  a  man  who 
shall  be  as  inexperienced  as  an  infant.  The  causal  con- 
nection, therefore,  which  in  such  a  case  exists  between  the 
illumination  and  the  candle,  is  not  a  sight,  or  seeing  could 
inform  the  infant  thereof.  Seeing  sees  only  the  sequence 
of  the  two  sensible  events,  the  introduction  of  the  candle 
and  the  illumination  of  the  room ;  and  after  a  thousand 
experiments  of  the  same  kind,  seeing  will  still  see  only 
the  sequence  of  the  two  sensible  events.  But  we  learn 
eventually  that  the  candle  and  the  illumination  of  the  room 
are  causally  connected,  and  if  the  knowledge  is  not  sight, 
the  knowledge  must  proceed  from  some  other  inlet  than 
the  senses ;  hence  gradually  arose  in  me  the  conception, 
(common  enough,  no  doubt,  in  many  men,)  that  our  causal 
knowledge  is  intellectual.  But  with  this  common  concep- 
tion arose  the  further  conception,  and  of  which  in  part  the 


54  THE   MEANING   OF   WOUD3. 

present  lecture  is  a  consequence,  that  language  yields  us 
no  intimation  that  a  causal  connection,  as  conceived  by  the 
intellect,  is  different  generically  from  a  sensible  connection, 
as  perceived  by  the  senses  in  the  links'  which  compose  an 
iron  chain.  While  the  unverbal  generic  difference  is  not 
recognized  between  the  two  verbally  homogeneous  connec- 
tions, nothing  but  confusion  must  ensue  from  any  verbal 
speculations,  like  those  which  Hume  rendered  famous,  in 
relation  to  the  connection  which  exists  between  cause  and 
effect.  The  connection  of  cause  and  effect  is  therefore  only 
a  conception  of  the  intellect ;  while  the  connection  of  two 
links  of  a  chain  is  a  perception  of  the  senses. 

Night  follows  day  sensibly,  and  day  follows  night ;  and 
after  Hume  had  denned  cause  and  effect  to  be  nothing  but 
invariable  sensible  succession,  the  question  has  been  often 
asked,  sportively  I  suppose,  whether  night  is  the  cause  of 
day,  or  day  the  cause  of  night.  The  question,  however 
intended,  is  useful,  for  if  the  words  cause  and  effect  possess 
a  sensible  meaning  only,  (an  invariable  sequence  of  two 
given  sensible  events,)  night  is  the  cause  of  day,  or  day  the 
cause  of  night.  But  the  intellect  sees  not  in  night  and  day 
the  relation  of  cause  and  effect,  hence  neither  is  deemed 
the  cause  of  the  other.  When,  however,  the  sun  arises 
and  daylight  succeeds  the  sun's  emergence,  our  senses  in- 
form us  of  only  the  two  sensible  events ;  but  in  addition  to 
these,  and  wholly  different  therefrom,  our  intellect  informs 
us  that  the  sun  is  the  cause  of  the  light. 

Lawyers,  whose  profession  is  employed  about  unverbal 


OF  THE  STRUCTURE   OF   LANGUAGE.  55 

differences  rather  than  verbal  homogeneities,  are  well 
versed  in  the  distinction  which  exists  between  sensible 
perceptions  and  intellectual  conclusions.  If  I  see  William 
stab  Peter,  and  see  Peter  fall  down  and  die  immediately 
thereafter,  seeing  perceives  only  the  sensible  facts ;  but 
whether  the  fall  of  Peter  and  his  death  were  effects  of  the 
stab,  are  intellectual  conclusions  which  may  be  decided 
better  by  a  surgeon  .of  practical  experience  who  was  not 
present  at  the  stabbing,  than  by  an  unprofessional  and  in- 
experienced man  who  saw  it.  If  a  witness,  misled  by  the 
homogeneity  of  language,  were  to  testify  that  he  saw 
"William  murder  Peter,  he  would  be  forthwith  told  to  tes- 
tify to  what  he  saw,  and  that  the  intellect  of  the  jury 
would  determine  whether  Peter  was  murdered,  and  whether 
William  was  the  murderer.  In  our  day,  many  people  will 
testify  that  they  have  seen  tables  gyrated,  and  heard  tables 
rapped,  by  the  spirits  of  the  dead.  Such  people  are  unaware 
of  the  generic  difference  between  what  is  sensible  in  such 
testimony,  and  what  is  intellectual.  In  all  that  is  sensible, 
(the  gyrations  and  raps,)  every  person  will  concur,  such 
concurrence  being  a  peculiarity  of  sensible  perceptions,  and 
unaffected  by  localities  or  periods  of  time ;  but  when  the 
intellect  superadds  a  conception  in  words,  of  some  modus 
operandi,  by  which  the  tables  are  gyrated  and  rapped,  the 
conceived  words  may  assume  some  three  thousand  and 
sixty  different  kinds  of  utterance,  that  being  about  the 
number  of  different  languages  which  are  said  to  exist  in 
the  world  at  the  present  day.  The  intellectually  conceived 


56  THE   MEANING  OF  WORDS. 

words  may  differ  also,  not  vernacularly  only,  as  above  sup- 
posed, but  every  man  of  the  millions  of  men  who  now 
occupy  the  earth,  may  express  his  intellectual  conceptions 
of  the  modus  operandi  of  table  rappings,  etc.,  in  words  dif- 
ferently collocated,  and  in  different  words,  according  to  his 
individual  intelligence,  experience,  ignorance,  credulity, 
etc.  To  recognize  the  difference  which  thus  exists  generi- 
cally  between  what  we  see  and  hear  in  relation  to  tables, 
and  what  the  intellect  will  conceive  to  be  the  cause  thereof, 
may  be  useful  in  dispelling  the  delusion  which  deems  ho- 
mogeneous the  intellectually  conceived  cause  and  the  sen- 
sibly perceived  movements  and  sounds.  I  could  easily  say 
more  on  the  subject,  and  especially  in  relation  to  the  ab- 
surdity of  the  popularly  assigned  cause,  but  it  is  not  pro- 
perly within  the  purview  of  my  discussions.  I  cannot, 
however,  refrain  from  adding,  that  such  gyrations  and  rap- 
pings  are  as  evincive  of  a  physical  cause,  as  the  appearance 
of  a  house  or  clock ;  and  for  precisely  the  same  reasons. 

§  6.  What  we  have  said  of  cause  and  effect  may  be  re- 
peated of  numerous  words  which,  like  them,  signify  intel- 
lectual conceptions,  though  language  fails  to  mark  the 
generic  distinction  between  them  and  sensible  perceptions. 
When  I  see  a  man  and  a  boy,  I  may  relate  the  event  in 
those  words ;  and  I  may  say,  also,  they  are  father  and  son. 
Verbally  the  two  expressions  are  homogeneous,  but  unver- 
bally  the  expressions  refer  to  generic  differences ;  the  man 
and  boy  being  sensible  perceptions,  while  the  relations  of 
father  and  son  are  intellectual  conceptions.  The  like  may 


OF  THE   STRUCTURE   OF   LANGUAGE.  57 

be  said  of  master  and  apprentice,  master  and  pupil,  master 
and  slave,  etc. ;  all  are  intellectually  conceived  relations, 
not  sensible  appearances.  So  when  we  see  a  man  placing 
one  tier  of  bricks  on  another  with  mortar  and  trowel,  we 
see  nothing  sensible  but  the  man  and  his  operations ;  but 
in  addition  to  these,  and  generically  different  and  separable 
therefrom,  the  intellect  sees  the  relation  of  building  and 
builder,  construction  and  constructor,  making  and  maker, 
design  and  designer.  When  I  see  one  man  whipping  an- 
other, my  senses  see  only  the  sensible  actions  and  the  sen- 
sible actors;  but  besides  these,  and  wholly  uncognizable 
by  my  senses,  my  intellect  may  see  in  the  two  men  and 
their  sensible  conduct,  the  relation  of  executioner  and 
criminal,  oppressor  and  oppressed,  tyrant  and  subject,  etc. 
Nothing  is  more  mysterious  to  us  than  Time,  still  its  supe- 
rior mystery  over  other  things  arises  from  our  unconscious- 
ness that  time  is  only  a  conception  of  the  intellect.  Our 
senses  perceive  objects  successively,  our  internal  feelings  fol- 
low each  other  successively,  our  thoughts  are  also  successive, 
and  from  all  these  experimental  successions  the  intellect 
conceives  the  notion  of  time  ;  but  if  we  endeavour  to  esti- 
mate time  as  something  different  from  an  intellectual  con- 
ception, especially  if  we  deem  it  homogeneous  with  sensibly 
perceived  objects,  we  of  course  convert  time  into  a  mystery. 
The  like  may  be  said  of  space.  What  is  sensibly  percep- 
tible in  space  is  no  way  mysterious,  but  what  we  conceive 
intellectually  of  space  is  very  mysterious,  when  we  deem 

the   conception  homogeneous   with  sensible   perceptions. 
X* 


58  THE   MEANING   OF  WORDS. 

"We  may  say  the  like  of  power,  quantity,  quality,  number, 
infinity,  omnipotence,  omnipresence,  omniscience,  etc. 
Whatever  is  sensibly  perceptible  in  relation  to  any  of 
them  is  no  more  mysterious  than  any  other  sensible  per- 
ception ;  but  what  we  conceive  intellectually  of  any  of 
them  is  very  mysterious,  when  we  deem  the  conception 
homogeneous  with  any  thing  that  is  sensibly  perceptible. 

When,  I  look  at  a  man  vigorous  in  health,  and,  perhaps, 
in  a  moment  or  more  thereafter  look  at  the  same  man  dead, 
my  intellect,  and  the  intellect  of  every  man,  savage  and 
civilized,  philosopher  and  clown,  will  organically  conceive 
from  the  change,  what  we  shall  in  vain  seek  physically, 
though  the  intellect,  as  in  cause  and  effect,  may  express  its 
conceptions  of  the  change  in  words  that  are  homogeneous 
with  sensible  perceptions;  as,  for  instance,  that  "the  vital 
spark  is  extinguished  that  burned  so  brightly  a  moment 
previously;"  that  "the  soul  which  was  united  with  the 
body  is  become  disunited  and  fled,"  etc.  Men  often  speak 
of  these  verbally  expressed  intellections  as  Hume  speaks 
of  the  connection  of  cause  and  effect,  and  deem  mysterious 
that  we  cannot  see  how  the  soul  is  united  to  the  body ;  as 
Hume  deemed  mysterious  that  we  cannot  see  the  connection 
between  cause  and  effect ;  but  we  cannot  see  how  the  soul 
is  united  to  the  body,  and  how  effects  are  connected  to 
causes,  for  the  words  refer  in  each  case  to  a  conception  of 
the  intellect,  not  to  any  thing  that  is  sensible.  The  ad- 
mission that  the  union  and  connection  cannot  be  seen, 
proves  that  they  are  intellectual.  We  are  organized  with 


OF   THE  STRUCTURE   OF   LANGUAGE.  59 

mental  as  well  as  sensible  inlets  of  knowledge,  and  if  we 
will  give  all  words  an  interpretation  that  refers  to  sensible 
perceptions,  (deeming  homogeneous  intellectual  concep- 
tions and  sensible  perceptions,)  the  resulting  verbal  mys- 
tery is  an  error  of  our  speculations,  and  nothing  more. 
Where  is  next  week  ?  said  a  child  to  me  lately  ;  and  truly, 
where  is  next  week  ?  If  we  look  for  it  sensibly,  our  ina- 
bility to  find  it  involves  much  mystery ;  but  next  week 
exists  in  only  the  intellect,  and  when  thus  considered,  its 
mysterious  undiscoverability  vanishes  with  the  delusion  on 
which  the  sensible  search  is  founded. 

§  7.  "We  place  an  acorn  in  the  ground  and  it  becomes  an 
oak;  we  eat  food,  and  it  sustains  life  and  increases  our 
strength ;  we  will,  and  our  limbs  obey  the  impulse ;  we 
sleep,  and  become  unconscious  ;  we  awake,  and  conscious- 
ness returns.  In  these  and  countless  other  cases,  the  parts 
which  are  sensible  in  the  performances  constitute  only  a 
portion  of  our  knowledge  thereof,  another  important  part 
being  intellectually  conceived;  but  the  intellectual  part 
being  conceived  in  words  that  express  also  sensible  percep- 
tions, we  recognize  not  the  generic  difference  which  pertains 
to  the  unverbal  meaning  of  the  words  in  these  different 
uses  of  them,  and  accordingly  deem  perplexingly  mysteri- 
ous that  we  cannot  discover  sensibly  the  parts  that  are  only 
intellectually  conceived.  If  we  reflect  on  the  words  that 
refer  to  the  intellectual  part  of  our  knowledge,  in  cases 
like  the  above,  we  shall  find  that  they  proceed  from  at- 
tempts of  the  intellect  to  assimilate  its  conceptions  to 


60  THE   MEANING   OF  WORDS. 

physical  operations ;  as,  for  instance,  when  the  senses  per- 
ceive, as  just  stated,  that  a  man  who  a  moment  ago  could 
walk,  speak,  and  argue,  is  now  dead — a  mass  of  inert  mat- 
ter that  will  speedily  decompose  and  corrupt — the  intellect 
will  assimilate  the  change  to  some  sensible  processes  that 
the  intellect  conceives  to  be  analogous ;  for  instance,  to  the 
extinction  of  a  candle,  ("  the  vital  spark  is  fled ;")  to  the 
stoppage  of  a  coach  by  the  removal  of  the  horses,  ("  the 
soul  is  departed  from  the  body ;")  to  the  fall  of  an  infant 
when  the  nurse  withdraws  its  support,  ("God  has  with- 
drawn His  sustaining  hand,")  etc.,  etc.,  to  the  end  of  the 
many  analogies  that  the  intellect  can  see  between  life  and 
death.  I  object  to  none  of  the  intellectual  assimilations, 
for  they  are  organic,  but  I  object  to  deeming  the  assimila- 
tions homogeneous  with  sensible  perceptions.  The  assimi- 
lations possess  a  subjective  meaning  in  our  organism,  not  an 
objective  meaning  in  sensible  things,  as  they  verbally  seem 
to  possess ;  hence  no  proper  reason  exists  for  surprise  and 
mystery  that  we  cannot  see  sensibly  what,  on  any  occasion, 
we  conceive  intellectually. 

If  you  scratch  ever  so  lightly  with  a  pin  at  the  end  of  a 
long  piece  of  solid  timber,  the  scratch  will  be  heard  by  any 
person  who  places  his  ear  at  the  other  end  of  the  timber. 
The  intellect  accounts  for  the  result  of  this  experiment  by 
conceiving  that  the  sound  passes  through  the  timber.  The 
passing  through  the  timber  thus  referred  to,  is  a  conception 
of  the  intellect,  but  it  is  po  way  discriminated  verbally 
from  a  physical  passage  through,  like  the  pnssngo  that 


OF  THE  STRUCTURE  OF  LANGUAGE.  61 

would  be  made  by  the  boring  of  an  auger,  or  like  the  pas- 
sage of  a  flow  of  water  through  a  pipe.  I  admit  that  the 
intellect  may  be  unable  to  account  for  the  experiment  with 
the  timber,  (that  is,  may  be  unable  to  assimilate  it  to  tan- 
gible operations,)  in  any  better  way  than  by  an  analogy 
with  the  passage  of  water  through  a  pipe ;  but  we  need  not 
deem  both  "  passing  through"  as  homogeneous  unverbally 
as  they  are  verbally.  Such  a  discrimination,  however,  we 
never  make,  but,  unwisely,  I  think,  employ  the  verbal 
equivoke,  to  excite  surprise  at  the  subtility  of  sound  which 
thus  can  glide  through  solid  timber  ;  we  are  surprised  be- 
cause we  mistake  an  intellectually  conceived  passage  for  a 
physical  passage.  So  when  the  electric  telegraph  trans- 
mits a  communication  over  a  thousand  miles  of  wire,  the 
transmission  from  one  end  of  the  wire  to  the  other  is  nearly 
instantaneous.  The  intellect  may  find  no  better  way  of 
assimilating  to  our  physical  operations  the  transmission, 
than  by  conceiving  that  an  electric  fluid  passes  or  flows  in- 
stantaneously from  one  end  of  the  wire  to  the  other;  but 
if  we  deem  such  intellectually  conceived  flow  and  passage 
homogeneous  with  a  physical  flow  and  passage,  (as,  for  in- 
stance, the  passage  of  a  stage-coach  over  a  turnpike,  or  the 
passage  of  a  cannon  ball  through  the  air,)  we  astonish 
ourselves  needlessly  and  fallaciously  by  confounding  in- 
tellectual conceptions  with  physical  things. 

If  the  conceptions  of  the  intellect  and  the  informations 
of  our  senses  possessed  no  other  evidences  of  their  hetero- 
geneity than  the  character  of  their  results,  as  in  the  above 


62  THE   MEANING  OF  WORDS. 

examples,  we  might  reasonably  suspect  that  some  delusion 
existed,  though  we  might  be  unable  to  tell  what  it  is;  just 
as  we  know  the  tricks  of  a  professed  juggler  to  be  decep- 
tive, though  we  may  be  unable  to  detect  the  deception. 
But  if  this  test  be  cogent  in  the  foregoing  examples,  what 
shall  we  say  to  speculations  like  the  following,  whose  mys- 
tery is  resolvable  in  no  other  way  than  by  the  radical  hete- 
rogeneity that  exists  un verbally  between  things  intellec- 
tually conceived  and  things  sensibly  perceived.  Doctor 
Nieuwentyt,  in  his  Eeligious  Philosophy,  Vol.  III.,  p.  865, 
thus  discourses  of  the  divisibility  of  the  particles  of  mat- 
ter : — He  has  computed  intellectually,  and  doubtless  with 
accuracy,  that  "  from  an  inch  of  candle,  vastly  more  par- 
ticles of  light  will  issue  during  its  consumption,  than  a 
thousand  times  a  thousand  millions  times  the  number  of 
sands  the  whole  earth  can  contain." 

Or,  take  what  is  daily  taught  in  our  schools,  that  light 
travels,  or  moves  consecutively,  from  the  sun  to  the  earth, 
with  a  velocity  equal  to  about  twelve  millions  of  miles  in 
a  minute ;  or,  as  it  is  often  stated,  a  million  of  times  more 
swiftly  than  the  flight  of  a  ball  fired  from  a  cannon.  I 
object  not  to  the  doctrine,  and  know  it  is  logically  satisfac- 
tory to  the  intellect ;  but  when  we  deem  the  intellectually 
conceived  consecutive  velocity  and  motion  of  light,  homo- 
geneous with  the  sensibly  perceived  consecutive  motion  of 
a  car  along  a  railroad,  or  even  of  a  cannon  ball,  we  are  fal- 
laciously confounding  intellectual  conceptions  with  physical 
perceptions.  The  phraseology  forms  no  part  of  my  objec- 


OF  THE   STRUCTURE   OF  LANGUAGE.  63 

tion,  whatever  form  the  phraseology  may  assume ;  but  I 
contend  that  a  generic  difference  exists  between  what  is  in- 
tellectually conceived  and  what  is  sensibly  perceived,  and 
that  a  disregard  of  the  unverbal  difference  is  a  needless 
verbal  mystification  and  obfuscation  of  what  Providence 
permits  us  to  know  clearly  in  its  unverbal  reality.  The 
generic  unverbal  difference  may  be  deemed  unimportant, 
between  what  we  conceive  intellectually  and  what  we  can 
perceive  sensibly ;  but  if  the  discrimination  be  unimportant, 
why  are  we  so  anxious,  as  we  seem  to  be,  to  identify,  for 
example,  the  intellectually  conceived  consecutive  motion 
of  light  with  sensibly  perceived  consecutiveness.  Of  our 
proneness  to  such  verbal  equivokes,  the  following,  which 
I  extract  from  a  highly  valuable  recent  periodical  publica- 
tion, is  only  a  common  example  in  its  kind,  though  pecu- 
liarly ingenious  in  its  matter.  It  is  designed  to  generically 
assimilate  to  physical  operations  the  intellectually  con- 
ceived consecutive  speed  of  light,  and  also  the  intellectu- 
ally conceived  distance  from  the  earth  of  the  sun  and  pther 
celestial  bodies: — 

u  Imagine,"  says  the  writer,  "  a  railway  from  here  to 
the  sun.  How  many  miles  is  the  sun  from  us  ?  Why, 
if  we  were  to  send  a  baby  in  an  express  train,  going 
incessantly  a  hundred  miles  an  hour,  without  making 
any  stoppages,  the  baby  would  grow  to  be  a  boy ;  the  boy 
would  grow  to  be  a  man ;  the  man  would  die  without  see- 
ing the  sun ;  for  it  is  distant  more  than  a  hundred  years 
from  us.  But  what  is  this  compared  to  Neptune's  distance  ? 


64  THE   MEANING  OF  WORDS. 

Had  Adam  and  Eve  started  by  our  railway  to  go  from 
Neptune  to  the  sun,  at  the  rate  of  fifty  miles  an  hour,  they 
would  not  have  got  there  yet,  for  Neptune  is  more  than 
six  thousand  years  from  the  centre  of  our  system." 

If  intellections  are  unverbally  homogeneous  with  sensi- 
ble things,  we  may  well  wonder  why  verbal  assimilations 
like  the  foregoing  so  surprise  and  amuse  us  that  we  employ 
them  as  piquantly  as  we  employ  ventriloquism  and  leger- 
demain. Astronomy  has  yielded  so  many  practical  benefits 
to  mankind,  that  it  can  well  dispense  with  any  eclat  that 
may  proceed  from  our  deeming  its  intellectual  conceptions 
homogeneous  unverbally  with  sensible  perceptions.  I  may 
say  the  like  of  chemistry,  whose  similarly  fallacious  verbal 
assimilations  I  shall  occasionally  advert  to ;  but  only  for 
the  purpose  of  illustrating  my  views  of  language ;  hence  if 
my  strictures  on  astronomy  and  chemistry  shall  themselves 
be  deemed  unsound,  as  they  may  be  from  my  defective 
knowledge  of  those  sciences,  my  strictures  will  still  be  use- 
ful to  the  end  for  which  alone  I  shall  introduce  them. 

§  8.  Our  dissatisfaction  with  intellectually  conceived  re- 
lations and  agencies,  till  the  intellect  can  in  some  way 
theoretically  materialize  them, — as,  for  instance,  our  dissat- 
isfaction with  the  intellectual  relation  of  cause  and  effect, 
till  we  can  theoretically  superadd  a  material  or  physical 
connection  between  the  cause  and  the  effect, — may  be  an 
inevitable  result  of  our  organization,  or  it  may  be  simply  a 
prejudice  resulting  from  our  sensible  employments.  "We 
satisfy  hunger  and  thirst  by  sensible  appliances;  we  move 


OF  THE  STRUCTURE  OF  LANGUAGE.  65 

by  sensible  operations ;  by  sensible  agencies  we  speak, 
hear,  see,  taste,  feel,  smell,  propagate  our  species,  construct 
ships,  houses,  and  innumerable  other  things,  fight  battles, 
and  employ  ourselves  incessantly ;  hence  when  a  spark 
produces  an  explosive  effect  on  gunpowder,  and  we  can 
perceive  only  a  sensible  juxtaposition  between  the  spark 
and  the  powder,  we  are  dissatisfied  till  the  intellect  will 
conceive  some  rationale  that  will  analogize  or  assimilate 
the  intellectually  conceived  action  of  the  spark  to  our  per- 
sonal sensible  agencies  in  the  production  of  effects. 

So  when  two  billiard  balls  rebound  upon  coming  in  con- 
tact with  each  other,  we  can  perceive  sensibly  nothing  but 
the  contact ;  but  in  addition  to  all  which  the  senses  can 
perceive,  the  intellect  of  every  beholder  will  conceive  some 
impulse  in  the  concussion,  analogous  to  the  sensible  force 
which  a  man  is  conscious  of  exerting  when  he  pushes  any 
thing  from  him,  or  hurls  a  stone  from  his  hand  ;  and  when 
we  see  a  needle  rush  towards  a  magnet,  the  intellect  will 
conceive  some  physical  emanation  from  the  magnet  which 
draws  the  needle  towards  the  magnet,  as  our  hand  draws 
sensibly  to  our  body  some  object  at  which  we  are  pulling ; 
and  when  we  stand  before  a  fire,  and  feel  warmth  or  heat, 
the  intellect  will  conceive  some  material  radiation  from  the 
fire  to  sensibly  connect  our  body  therewith,  and  thereby  to 
assimilate  the  effect  which  we  feel,  to  our  mode  of  operating 
by  sensible  contact ;  and  when  we  look  at  distant  hills, 
trees,  and  fields,  and  hear  distant  sounds,  the  intellect  will 
insist  on  theoretically  assimilating  the  organic  processes  of 


66  THE   MEANING  OF   WORDS. 

seeing  and  hearing  to  our  personal  processes  of  tangible 
contaction ;  and  hence  will  conceive  that  rays  of  light  radi- 
ate physically  from  the  distant  visible  object  to  the  retina 
of  the  eye,  and  that  appulses  of  air  from  the  distant  sonor- 
ous body,  strike  physically  the  tympanum  of  the  ear;  and 
when  water  rushes  up  a  tube  from  which  the  air  is  ex- 
hausted, the  intellect  will  insist  on  conceiving  some  mate- 
rial process  of  suction  in  the  vacuum,   analogous  to  the 
process  with  which  we  sensibly  suck  fluids  into  our  mouth ; 
or  some  process  of  material  pressure  on  the  water  analogous 
to  the  sensible  pressure  we  exert  upon  bodies  with  our 
hands  or  weight ;  and  when  we  look  at  the  sun,  moon,  and 
stars,  the  intellect  will  insist  on  attributing  to  them  tangi- 
bility, solidity,  and  other  constant  physical  properties  that 
are  found  in  the  bodies  which  we  handle;  and  when  a 
physician  administers  medicine,  his  intellect  will  insist  on 
conceiving  some  material  modus  operandi  by  which  the 
expected  result  in  the  patient  is  to  be  produced.     A  man 
can  no  more  prevent  his  intellect  from  conceiving  such 
material  machinery,  than  he  can  prevent  his  sight  from 
seeing  objects  that  are  before  it ;  or  prevent  his  ears  from 
hearing  sounds ;  but  he  is  not  compelled  to  deem  such  con- 
ceptions homogeneous  with  sensible  things.     Such  concep- 
tions constitute  the  theories  of  scientific   men,  and   the 
hypotheses  of  the  unscientific — the  theories  of  optics,  of 
acoustics,  of  medicine,  of  magnetism,  of  combustion,  of  the 
generation  of  a  foetus,  the  cosmogony  of  the  world,  the 
formation  of  metals,  the  alternation  of  the  seasons,  etc., 


OF  THE  STRUCTURE   OF  LANGUAGE.  67 

etc.,  through  the  whole  circle  of  speculative  knowledge ; 
and  I  believe  I  am  not  mistaken  in  assuming  that 
we  never  discriminate  such  conceptions  of  the  intellect 
from  physical  things ; — indeed  such  a  discrimination  would 
divest  the  conceptions  of  their  chief  charm,  the  fallacious 
homogeneity  constituting  a  sort  of  fairy  land  in  which  we 
delight  to  wander. 

That  theories  are  useful,  only  accords  with  the  general 
fact  that  our  intellect  is  adapted  to  our  physical  powers, 
as  our  physical  powers  are  adapted  to  the  material  uni- 
verse. If,  however,  we  mistake  for  physical,  the  intellec- 
tually conceived  emanations  from  magnets,  the  radiations 
of  caloric  from  fire,  of  rays  of  light  to  the  eye,  the  aerial 
appulses  to  the  ear,  the  pressure  on  water,  etc.,  we  are  not 
discriminating  the  heterogeneity  of  unverbal  things  from 
the  homogeneity  of  words. 

So  satisfied  are  we  with  the  self-sufficiency  of  sensible 
agency,  that  the  attempts  of  phrenologists  to  account  for 
intellectual  manifestations  by  sensible  organs,  is  deemed  a 
species  of  atheism  ;  though  our  sensible  organs  are  often  as 
apparently  perfect  after  death,  when  they  are  powerless, 
as  during  life,  when  they  are  powerful.  In  truth,  there- 
fore, our  sensible  powers  and  our  intellectual  are  alike 
wonderful.  They  are  severally  just  what  they  are,  and  as 
they  are ;  but  we  superadd  to  their  inevitable  wonder,  the 
unnecessary  wonder  that  we  cannot  find,  sensibly,  a  power, 
causation,  impulse,  vitality,  etc.,  that  are  only  intellectual ; 
and  that  we  cannot  find,  in  intellectual  operatic  :,  a  ma- 


68  THE   MEANING  OF  WORDS. 

chinery  that  is  sensible ;  results  which  ought  to  teach  us 
that  the  two  classes  of  things  are  different  and  inconverti- 
ble, except  verbally. 

In  the  conception  of  theories,  the  intellect  is  not,  how- 
ever, restricted  to  physical  agencies,  but  may  employ  an 
internal  feeling  as  the  agent,  if  the  intellect  can  discover 
an  analogy  between  the  effect  on  us  of  such  an  internal 
feeling,  and  the  conceived  efficiency  to  be  accounted  for ; 
"Let  there  be  light!  and  there  was  light,"  can  be  ac- 
counted for  satisfactorily  to  the  intellect,  by  its  deeming 
the  will  of  Deity  to  be  the  efficient  agent.  Horror  moves 
us  effectively,  and  hence  Nature's  horror  of  a  vacuum  ac- 
counted formerly  as  satisfactorily  to  the  intellect  for  the 
ascent  of  water  up  a  vacuum,  as  the  pressure  of  the  atmos- 
phere accounts  for  the  ascent  at  present.  So  the  intellect 
can  theoretically  account  for  the  instantaneous  transmission 
of  electricity  over  a  thousand  miles  of  wire,  by  conceiving 
that  electricity  possesses  the  nature  of  thought ;  indeed  I 
have  heard  its  operations  thus  accounted  for.  Such  a  con- 
ception assimilates  the  transmission  with  our  personal 
operations,  and  the  transmission  becomes  immediately  sat- 
isfactory. 

§  9.  I  have  now  completed  three  steps  in  my  progress. 
I  have  manifested  the  difference  that  exists  between  words 
and  unverbal  things;  I  have  shown,  also,  that  unverbal 
things  are  divisible  into  three  generically  and  inconvertibly 
different  classes,  sensible,  intellectual,  and  emotional ;  and 
lastly,  that  the  heterogeneity  of  unverbal  things  is  disre- 


OF  THE  STRUCTURE   OF  LANGUAGE.  69 

garded  by  language,  words  implying  a  homogeneity,  or  at 
least  manifesting  no  sign  of  the  generic  differences  that 
exist  in  unverbal  things.  To  the  steps  thus  accomplished 
I  wish  to  give  some  prominence  before  I  proceed  further, 
and,  therefore,  place  these  remarks  as  mile-posts,  to  prevent 
the  said  completed  steps  from  escaping  notice.  Any  reader 
who  comprehends  satisfactorily  the  said  three  accomplished 
steps,  may  proceed  at  once  to  the  next  succeeding  lecture ; 
the  intervening  remarks  being  chiefly  valuable  as  a  means 
of  illustrating  still  further  the  heterogeneity  which  lan- 
guage disregards  in  unverbal  things. 

§  10.  The  indiscrimination  which  is  thus  inherent  in 
language  encourages  various  speculative  errors,  as  I  have 
endeavoured  to  show ;  but  we  are  not  left  without  an  abil- 
ity to  discover  that  the  indiscrimination  is  not  an  unmiti- 
gated evil ;  indeed  we  can  find  that  it  is  attended  with 
utilities  which  more  than  compensate  for  its  evils  ;  and  that 
the  indiscrimination  is  founded  in  our  intellectual  organism, 
and  assimilates  with  all  other  evils  that  proceed  from  our 
organization,  in  being  unavoidable  rather  than  unneces- 
sary ;  for  instance,  sensible  things  we  can  exhibit  to  each 
other  unverbally,  and  the  unverbal  meaning  of  words  is 
learnt  by  children  through  the  means  of  such  exhibitions 
only;  but  intellectual  conceptions  we  cannot  exhibit  to 
each  other  unverbally,  hence  children  nor  men  could  ever 
learn  the  meaning  of  words  that  should  signify  intellections 
only.  The  intellect  is,  therefore,  compelled,  if  it  speak  of 
its  conceptions  at  all  to  other  men,  to  employ  words  that 


70  THE  MEANING  OF  WORDS. 

refer  to  sensible  things.  To  provide  for  this  dilemma,  the 
intellect  of  every  man  is  so  organized,  that  it  sees  an  analo- 
gy between  its  own  conceptions  and  sensible  things  ;  so  that 
when  you  tell  me  that  an  electric  fluid  passes  over,  or  flows 
through  a  telegraphic  wire,  my  intellect  recognizes  imme- 
diately the  intellection  to  which  the  language  refers.  Even 
a  deaf  mute  who  knows  no  language,  were  he  acquainted 
with  both  the  flowing  of  water  through  a  pipe,  and  the 
communication  of  written  messages  by  means  of  the  wires 
of  a  telegraph,  would  probably  recognize  intellectually  an 
analogy  between  the  two  processes  ;  and  if  this  conjecture 
be  correct,  it  evinces  that  the  sensible  flow  and  the  intel- 
lectual conception  are  spoken  of  by  the  same  words  from 
an  organic  tendency  of  the  intellect,  not  from  any  conven- 
tional usage.  Indeed,  the  usage  c&inot  be  conventional, 
the  same  kind  of  phraseology  being  common  to  all  lan- 
guages and  to  all  periods  of  time. 

§  11.  Internal  feelings  manifest  themselves  sensibly 
almost  as  distinctly  as  physical  objects ;  hence  we  can 
speak  of  internal  feelings,  love,  rage,  anger,  etc.,  without 
employing  therefor  words  that  signify  physical  objects. 
Internal  feelings  contrast  thus  very  observably  with  intel- 
lectual conceptions,  and  by  reflecting  on  the  difference  be- 
tween their  external  manifestibility  we  can  more  easily 
understand  why  we  speak  of  intellectual  conceptions  with 
words  that  signify  physical  objects,  and  adopt  a  different 
course  in  speaking  of  internal  feelings. 

So  knowable  by  sensible  signs  are  our  internal  feelings, 

'.  . 


OF  THE   STRUCTURE   OF   LANGUAGE.  71 

that  painters  depict  the  signs  on  canvass,  and  our  intellect 
recognizes,  in  brutes  and  in  even  inanimate  sensible  things, 
appearances  analogous  to  the  said  sensible  signs ;  hence  in 
all  periods  of  time,  and  in  all  languages,  we  find  such  ex- 
pressions as  violent  winds,  furious  storms,  hateful  weather, 
kind  showers,  vicious  horses,  stubborn  ropes,  frantic  tor- 
rents, impetuous  eloquence,  etc.  By  like  external  signs, 
deaf  mutes  can  be  taught  as  readily  the  unverbal  meaning 
of  the  words  rage,  love,  pride,  etc.,  as  the  mutes  can  be 
taught  the  unverbal  meaning  of  the  words  fire,  horse, 
cat,  etc. 

But  I  have  no  concern  with  either  intellectual  concep- 
tions or  internal  feelings,  except  to  explain  why  internal 
feelings  can  be  spoken  of  by  peculiar  words ;  and  why  the 
intellect  is  compelled  to  speak  of  its  own  conceptions  in 
words  whose  original  meaning  is  sensible  things.  I  will, 
however,  add  that  a  great  utility  is  discoverable  in  the  sen- 
sible external  manifestibility  of  our  internal  feelings.  We 
are  thereby  able  to  conserve  our  personal  safety  by  ascer- 
taining the  presence  in  brute  animals  and  in  our  human  asso- 
ciates, of  rage,  anger,  etc.,  before  we  become  injured  thereby. 
A  kindred  utility  attends  the  opposite  principle  of  the  un- 
discoverability  by  external  sensible  manifestations  of  our 
thoughts  and  other  intellections.  Every  man's  intellect  is 
thus  organically  able  to  think  and  conceive  with  perfect 
occlusion,  though  surrounded  by  multitudes  of  inquisitive 
observers.  The  benefit  which  we  derive  from  this  freedom 
of  thought  is  itself  sufficient  to  compensate  for  the  cousc- 


72  THE   MEANING  OF  WORDS. 

quent  evil  of  organically  thinking  and  conceiving  intellec- 
tually in  words  that  ordinarily  signify  sensible  things. 

§  12.  I  ought,  perhaps,  before  I  conclude  the  present 
topic,  to  advert  to  a  radical  difference  which,  besides  their 
heterogeneity,  exists  between  intellectual  conceptions  and 
internal  feelings ; — internal  feelings  exist  in  different  de- 
grees of  intensity  in  different  men,  and  are  more  excitable 
in  some  men  than  in  others ;  but  in  the  numerical  variety 
of  feelings  that  pertain  to  men,  any  two  men  are  like  pianos 
that  possess  the  same  number  of  keys,  and  consequently 
possess  latently  the  same  numerical  variety  of  sounds.  In- 
tellectual conceptions  are  different  in  the  above  respects. 
A  child  who  should  hear  at  the  end  of  a  stick  of  timber, 
the  scratch  made  with  a  pin  at  the  other  end,  would  not 
infer  intellectually,  that  the  sound  passed  through  the  tim- 
ber, as  water  passes  through  a  pipe,  if  he  had  never  seen 
such  a  passage  of  water ;  the  intellect  conceiving  theories 
from  only  the  sensible  facts  that  are  known  to  it ;  hence 
we  are  constantly  changing  our  theories  as  we  become  ac- 
quainted with  new  sensible  facts ;  and  hence  the  often  noted 
peculiarity  that  chemists  account  for  things  by  assimilating 
them  to  chemical  processes ;  mechanics  account  for  them 
by  mechanical  processes ;  mathematicians,  by  mathematical 
processes,  etc.,  etc.  In  constructing  theories  the  intellect 
obeys  an  organic  impulse,  but  the  form  of  the  theory  will 
depend,  as  above  stated,  on  the  accidental  knowledge  of 
the  theorist.  I  will  not  anticipate  what  I  shall  say  here- 
after when  I  shall  treat  particularly  of  "the  unverbal 


OF  THE   STRUCTURE   OF   LANGUAGE.  73 

meaning  of  intellectually  conceived  words,"  but  the  unver- 
bal  meaning  of  all  theories  is  subjective,  (in  the  intellect, 
not  in  the  objective  universe ;)  hence  the  accidental  verbal 
form  which  the  theory  on  any  subject  assumes  in  different 
men,  at  different  periods,  may  affect  the  practical  utility 
of  the  theory,  but  all  the  theories  will,  subjectively  con- 
sidered, possess  the  same  unverbal  meaning. 

From  the  foregoing  account  of  the  mode  in  which  the 
intellect  constructs  theories,  we  may  see  why  medical  theo- 
ries continue,  after  the  efforts  of  centuries,  to  be  but  little 
improved.  The  processes  of  generation,  the  functions  of 
vital  organs,  the  commencement  and  progress  of  diseases, 
are  manifestations  so  unique,  that  the  intellect  can  see  no 
analogy  between  them  and  any  different  operation ;  espe- 
cially none  between  them  and  tangible  operations,  which 
supply  our  most  satisfactory  theoretical  agencies.  This  is 
perhaps  an  insurmountable  obstruction  to  the  progress  of 
medicine  as  a  science,  and  compels  it  to  be  empirical.  Any 
way,  our  medical  practitioners  theorize  less  than  their  early 
predecessors,  without  having  yet  been  able  to  conceive  any 
substitute  for  theories  as  a  guide  to  medical  practice,  in 
advance  of  actual  experiments.  But  these  are  speculations 
only  incidental  to  a  correct  analysis  of  language  ;  and- hav- 
ing now  exhibited,  though  I  fear  too  desultority,  the  hete- 
rogeneity of  unverbal  things,  and  the  homogeneity  with 
which  language  invests  them,  I  will  proceed  to  the  consid- 
eration of  another  equally  important  and  equally  unde: 

tected  characteristic  of  words. 
4 


LECTURE  III. 

UNVERBAL   MULTIPLICITY  DISCRIMINATED   FROM   ITS 
FALLACIOUS  VERBAL   ONENESS. 

CONTENTS. 

1.  Names  analysed,  and  their  implied  oneness  found  to  be  a  conception 

of  the  intellect,  not  an  objective  oneness. 

2.  All  individuality  is  a  conception  of  the  intellect. 

8.  The  intellect  aggregates  sensible  perceptions  into  nominal  units. 

4.  The  intellect  aggregates  internal  feelings  into  nominal  units. 

5.  The  intellect  aggregates  its  own  conceptions  into  nominal  units. 

6.  The  intellect  aggregates  into  nominal  units,  its  own  conceptions,  asso- 

ciated with  certain  internal  feelings. 

7.  Of  nominal  units,  whose  unverbal  components  belong  to  two  or  more 

of  the  senses ;  or  whose  components  are  otherwise  heterogeneous. 

Of  Physical   Units. 

§  1.  The  views  of  language  presented  in  this  lecture,  like 
the  views  presented  in  the  former,  were  suggested  to  me 
many  years  ago  in  the  investigation  which  I  made  of  the 
powers  of  our  senses,  and  to  which  I  have  already  alluded. 
I  assumed  that  the  information  which  any  one  of  the 
senses  yielded  to  me,  cannot  be  yielded  by  the  other  senses 
singly  or  conjointly ;  still,  practical  results  contradicted  the 
assumed  truth.  Some  blind  men  can  recognize  colours  by 
the  sense  of  touch ;  some  have  lectured  and  written  books 
on  visual  subjects.  A  man  not  blind,  can  discern  a  globe 


OF  THE   STRUCTURE   OF  LANGUAGE.  75 

by  either  seeing  or  feeling,  and  can  recognize  an  orange  by 
either  the  taste,  the  smell,  the  sight,  or  the  feel ;  how  then 
is  the  assertion  true,  that  what  one  of  my  senses  informs 
me  of,  no  one  or  more  of  my  other  senses  can  inform  me 
of?  Two  senses  can  inform  me  of  the  same  globe,  and 
four  senses  of  the  same  orange.  The  dilemma  perplexed 
me  long,  till,  finally,  I  discovered  that  the  difficulty  lay  in 
language.  It  applies  the  word  orange  to  the  sensible  group 
(taste,  smell,  sight,  feel,)  that  four  of  my  senses  severally 
disclose  to  me;  hence  the  information  which  I  receive 
from  the  respective  four  senses  is  one  in  only  the  name 
orange,  that  is  applied  in  common  to  all  the  four  sensible 
revelations. 

To  relieve  myself  from  embarrassments  like  the  forego- 
ing, and  to  manifest  unmistakeably  in  future,  that  what 
any  one  of  my  five  senses  informs  me  of,  no  one  or  more 
of  my  other  senses  can  inform  me  of,  I  denominated 
as  sight  merely  every  information  that  I  received  from 
seeing;  as  feel,  every  information  I  received  from  the 
sense  of  feeling;  as  sound,  every  information  that  I  re- 
ceived from  the  sense  of  hearing ;  as  taste,  every  informa- 
tion I  received  from  the  sense  of  tasting ;  and  as  smell, 
every  information  I  received  from  the  sense  of  smelling. 
Instead,  therefore,  of  saying  that  both  seeing  and  feeling 
informed  me  of  a  globe,  (and  thereby  implying  that  what 
seeing  informs  me  of,  I  am  informed  of  by  feeling  also,)  I 
said,  seeing  informs  me  of  the  sight  globe,  and  feeling  in- 
forms me  of  the  feel  globe. 

. 


76  THE   MEANING   OF   WORDS. 

But  still  a  difficulty  arose ;  the  globe  is  only  one  thing, 
while  my  analysis  converts  it  into  two  things,  a  sight  globe 
and  a  feel  globe.  If  the  oneness  of  the  two  globes  is  sim- 
ply a  contrivance  of  language,  as  I  had  supposed  of  the 
orange,  all  languages  would  not  concur,  as  they  do,  in 
calling  the  sight  globe  and  the  feel  globe  one  thing.  The 
uniformity  seemed  too  extensive  to  be  conventional,  hence 
gradually  became  evident  to  me,  that  the  oneness  of  the 
globe,  not  being  sensible,  must  be  intellectual ;  the  intel- 
lect being  so  organized,  that  the  sight  globe  and  the  feel 
suggest  a  unit  to  the  intellect ;  and  language  so  constituted 
that  it  refers,  in  all  names  of  things,  to  the  intellectually 
conceived  unit. 

Besides,  if  the  oneness  were  only  verbal,  as  I  had  at  first 
supposed  it  was,  an  uneducated  deaf  mute  would  not  deem 
as  one  thing,  the  sight  globe  and  the  feel  globe ;  but  his  in- 
tellect conceives  the  two  to  be  a  unit,  as  completely,  no 
doubt,  as  ours.  The  organic  tendency  of  the  intellect  to 
thus  aggregate  sensible  multiplicity  into  intellectual  units 
is,  as  I  ultimately  discovered,  one  of  the  essential  founda- 
tions of  language,  names  referring  to  these  intellectual 
units ;  and  if  our  intellects  had  not  been  organized  to  thus 
conceive  units,  we  could  talk  of  an  army  no  way  but  by 
repeating  the  muster-roll ;  nor  would  that  have  sufficed — 
every  soldier,  George  or  Thomas,  or  whatever  may  be  his 
name,  being  himself  a  unit  only  intellectually ;  while  phy- 
sically, he  is  head,  arms,  face,  eyes,  hands,  and  other  mul- 
titudinous and  almost  innumerable  sensible  items. 


OF  THE   STRUCTURE   OF   LANGUAGE.  77 

§  2.  Arriving  thus  accidentally  and  gradually  at  the 
knowledge  that  names,  like  globe,  orange,  army,  etc.,  im- 
ply a  oneness  which  is  only  intellectual  and  subjective, 
while  the  objective  things  named  may  be  sensibly  multi- 
form, I  soon  found  that  the  analysis  would  unriddle  many 
questions  that  have  long  perplexed  metaphysics ;  for  in- 
stance, can  seeing  inform  us  of  distance  ?  When  distance 
is  analysed  as  above,  we  find  a  sight  distance,  a  feel  dis- 
tance, and  an  intellectual  conception  uniting  the  two; 
therefore,  whether  seeing  can  inform  us  of  distance,  depends 
wholly  upon  what  we  choose  to  deem  the  signification  of 
the  nominal  unit  distance.  If  we  limit  the  signification  to 
the  intellectual  unit,  we  may  maintain  that  neither  seeing 
nor  feeling  can  inform  us  of  distance ;  they  only  suggest 
distance  to  the  mind.  If,  again,  we  limit  the  meaning  of 
the  nominal  unit  to  the  feel  distance,  we  may  maintain  that 
feeling  can  inform  us  of  distance,  but  seeing  cannot.  The 
controversy  relates  not  to  unverbal  things,  but  to  the  defi- 
nition of  the  word  distance ;  a  question  over  which  we  pos- 
sess an  entire  control,  it  being  wholly  conventional  and 
verbal. 

What  we  have  said  of  the  nominal  unit  distance,  we  may 
repeat  of  the  nominal  unit  figure.  Can  seeing  inform  us  of 
roundness?  Roundness,  as  a  unit,  is  a  conception  of  the 
intellect,  while  sensibly  we  find  a  sight  roundness  and  a 
feel  roundness,  as  we  manifested  when  speaking  of  globe. 
If,  however,  we  choose  to  limit  the  meaning  of  the  word 
to  the  intellectual  unit,  we  may  mystify  ourselves  and 


78  THE   MEANING   OF  WORDS. 

others  by  affirming  that  neither  seeing  nor  feeling  can  re- 
veal to  us  roundness ;  or  we  may  limit  the  signification  of 
the  word  to  the  feel  roundness,  and  then  astonish  ourselves 
by  finding  that  seeing  cannot  inform  us  of  roundness. 

And  what  we  have  thus  said  of  distance  and  figure,  we 
may  repeat  of  the  nominal  unit  externality.  We  find  a 
sight  external,  a  feel  external,  and  an  intellectual  unit, 
which  the  intellect  forms  out  of  the  two  sensible  manifesta- 
tions ;  and  to  which  unit  the  word  external  is  commonly 
limited.  If,  therefore,  you  limit  the  word  external  to  the 
intellectual  unit,  (excluding  the  sight  and  the  feel,)  you 
may  mystify  yourself  with  the  discovery  that  the  earth  and 
nothing  therein,  possesses  an  existence  external  of  your 
intellect;  and  deem  this  stupid,  worthless,  though  some- 
what famous  verbal  equivoke,  a  great  psychological  mys- 
tery. Or  should  this  insidious  subtraction  of  two  things 
from  three,  and  finding  only  one  remain,  be  too  obviously 
simple  to  be  mystified,  you  may  include  the  feel  in  your 
definition  of  the  nominal  unit  external,  and  thereby  (still 
excluding  the  sight)  arrive  at  the  conclusion  that  seeing 
cannot  inform  us  of  externality ;  and  that  without  the  sense 
of  feeling  we  should  know  nothing  of  the  externality  of  the 
universe.  This  latent  verbal  criticism  constitutes,  in  some 
of  its  many  phases,  what  I  meant  when  I  said  in  my  first 
lecture  that  while  philosophers  are  investigating  and  de- 
termining the  meaning  of  words,  they  deem  themselves 
engaged  in  profounder  discussions. 

§  3.  The  nominal  unit  shadow  is  an  intellectual  unit 


OF  THE   STRUCTURE   OF  LANGUAGE.  79 

^ilso,  but  we  never  mystify  ourselves  in  relation  thereto, 
for  it  is  as  much  a  unit  sensibly  as  it  is  nominally  and  in- 
tellectually. The  like  may  be  said  of  echo  and  of  light ;  but 
the  greater  number  of  nominal  units  are  severally  an  intel- 
lectual aggregation  of  different  and  often  numerous  sensible 
items ;  and  we  may  greatly  mystify  ourselves  if  we  look 
sensibly  for  their  oneness  which  is  intellectual.  A  city,  for 
instance,  composed  of  a  hundred  thousand  inhabitants,  and 
ten  thousand  houses,  is  as  much  a  nominal  unit  as  a  sha- 
dow ;  but  if  we  seek  the  city,  deeming  it  some  sensible  unit 
that  conforms  in  oneness  to  the  city's  oneness  which  is  in- 
tellectual, we  may  deem  the  ill  success  of  our  fallacious 
sensible  search  a  great  mystery.  So,  if  we  seek  in  man  for 
some  physical  or  sensible  unit  which  shall  conform  in  one- 
ness to  man's  nominal  oneness,  we  are,' in  like  manner, 
seeking  physically  for  what  is  not  physical  but  intellectual. 
Such  searches  are  deemed  neither  fallacious  nor  futile,  and 
much  has  been  written  to  determine  in  what  part  of  physi- 
cal man  his  oneness  consists.  If  you  cut  off  Peter's  arms, 
the  remainder  of  Peter  will  be  a  man.  Take  off  his  legs, 
and  his  remainder  is  still  a  man  ;  how  much,  therefore,  say 
such  inquirers,  and  what  must  you  take  away  from  Peter 
before  the  remainder  will  cease  from  being  a  man? — 
thereby  evidently  mistaking  the  nominal  oneness,  which  is 
only  intellectual,  for  a  physical  mystery. 

The  nominal  unit  matter  is  mysterious  from  a  like  mis- 
apprehension of  the  nature  of  its  oneness.  All  we  know 
thereof,  say  philosophers,  is  the  sensible  properties  of  mat- 


80  THE   MEANING   OF   WORDS. 

ter;  what  the  unit  matter  itself  is,  remains,  like  man's 
oneness,  among  the  unsolvable  mysteries  of  life.  Why  ? 
Because,  in  neither  case  can  our  senses  discover  any  such 
unit.  Of  course  they  cannot,  for  it  is  not  sensible,  but  only 
intellectually  conceived.  But  how  do  I  know  the  unit 
matter  is  merely  an  intellection  ?  Because,  what  our  senses 
cannot  discover,  cannot  be  sensible,  and  must  of  necessity  be 
intellectual,  if  we  know  it  at  all.  Well  did  Bishop  Berkely 
say,  in  reference  to  speculations  of  this  kind,  whose  latent 
verbal  sophistry  he  saw  partially,  that  men  first  raise  a 
smoke  or  dust,  and  then  complain  that  they  cannot  see. 
The  delusion  by  which  the  intellectually  conceived  unit 
matter  is  thus  looked  for  among  the  sensible  items  which 
compose  the  physical  meaning  of  the  word  matter,  and  the 
intellectually  conceived  unit  man  among  the  various  phy- 
sical parts  which  compose  the  physical  meaning  of  the 
word  man,  is  analogous  to  the  ancient  puzzle,  denominated 
sorites :  a  heap  of  wheat  is  exhibited  to  a  person,  and  you 
proceed  with  him  among  the  individual  grains  to  look  for 
the  heap  itself.  You  take  up  a  grain  and  ask  him  if  that 
is  the  heap  ?  You  proceed  thus  with  every  grain,  till  the 
whole  will  be  exhausted,  without  finding  the  heap,  for  the 
heap  alluded  to  is  an  intellection. 

What  is  individuality,  what  is  magnetism,  what  is  vital- 
ity, what  is  madness,  what  is  fever,  what  is  gravity,  what 
is  electricity,  etc.  ?  The  questions  are  asked  continually, 
and  they  presuppose  that  each  of  the  nominal  units  names 
a  physical  unit,  to  whose  mysterious  subtility  (not  to  the 


OF  THE  STRUCTURE   OF  LANGUAGE.  81 

fallaciousness  of  the  search)  is  attributed  the  sensible  un- 
discoverability  of  the  unit  in  each  case.  "Whether  medical 
science  suffers  or  not  by  deeming  fever  and  each  other 
nominal  disease  a  physical  unit,  merits  the  consideration 
of  physicians.  Many  medical  theories  seem  to  owe  their 
origin  to  this  error.  But  not  only  fever  in  general  is  not 
a  physical  unit,  the  particular  fever  of  Thomas  is  not  a 
physical  unit.  It  consists  physically  of  many  sensible  man- 
ifestations ;  and  if  we  would  escape  delusion,  we  must  deem 
their  nominal  oneness  the  result  of  only  an  organic  opera- 
tion of  our  intellect ;  an  operation  which  is  as  useful  as  it 
is  inevitable ;  but  we  need  not  gratuitously  engraft  on  the 
utility  a  mischievous  error,  by  deeming  the  oneness  physi- 
cal when  it  is  only  intellectual. 

What  we  have  said  of  fever,  we  may  repeat  of  contagion. 
The  oneness  which  pertains  to  contagion  is  only  intellec- 
tual. The  contagiousness  of  cholera  generally,  and  the 
contagiousness  of  any  single  case  of  cholera,  are  severally 
alike  in  oneness ;  but  the  sensible  unverbal  manifestations 
that  the  intellect  thus  aggregates  in  each  case  into  a  verbal 
unit,  may  be  more  multiform  in  one  case  than  in  another, 
and  they  may  differ  otherwise.  Even  the  contagiousness 
of  a  single  case  during  its  whole  continuance,  is  less  a  unit 
physically  than  its  contagiousness  on  any  given  moment ; 
hence  to  investigate  the  contagiousness  of  cholera,  and  to 
proceed  by  supposing  that  the  contagiousness  possesses  un- 
verbally  the  oneness  which  the  word  contagiousness  pur- 
ports, is  like  seeking  for  magnetism  as  a  physical  unit 
4* 


82  THE   MEANING  OF  WORDS. 

among  all  un verbal  magnetic  phenomena.  It  is  seeking 
objectively  in  unverbal  nature  for  a  unit  that  exists  only 
subjectively  in  the  intellect. 

The  health  of  a  country  is  as  much  an  intellectual  unit 
as  the  health  of  Thomas.  Unverbally  the  oneness  of  the 
two  cases  is  incalculably  dissimilar.  Even  Thomas's  gen- 
eral health  during  a  year  is  less  an  unverbal  unit,  than  his 
health  at  the  present  moment.  The  saltness  of  the  ocean 
is  an  intellectual  unit,  and  the  saltness  of  any  given  drop 
of  the  ocean  is  another ;  but  the  saltness  of  the  ocean  is 
sensibly  multiform,  while  the  saltness  of  the  drop  is  as 
much  a  unit  sensibly  as  intellectually.  The  oneness  of 
an  army  is  intellectually  as  much  a  unit  as  the  oneness  of 
Napoleon  who  commands  it ;  while  sensibly  their  oneness 
is  very  dissimilar. 

I  trust  the  examples  given  are  sufficient  to  manifest  that 
the  name  of  every  physical  thing  implies  a  oneness  which 
is  only  intellectual ;  and  that  when  we  mistake  the  nominal 
oneness  for  a  sensible  or  physical  oneness,  we  are  deluding 
ourselves  with  an  indiscrimination  as  bewildering  as  it  is 
fallacious.  These  remarks  are  applicable  to  all  names  of 
physical  things,  from  the  universe,  which  is  the  most  com- 
prehensive of  nominal  units,  to  a  shadow,  that  is  as  much  a 
unit  physically  as  it  is  intellectually  and  nominally. 

Of  Moral  Units. 

§  1.  But  all  nominal  units  are  not  intellectual  aggrega- 
tions of  sensible  manifestations.  Most,  if  not  all  those 


OF  THE  STRUCTURE  OF  LANGUAGE.  83 

which  we  have  been  considering,  are  such  ;  and  I  have, 
therefore,  denominated  them  physical  units.  But  as  the 
intellect  creates  such  physical  units  out  of  certain  sensible 
manifestations,  so  the  intellect  creates  the  nominal  unit 
love  out  of  certain  unverbal  manifestations  of  our  internal 
feelings ;  and  this  unit  love,  with  all  other  units  that  relate 
to  our  internal  feelings,  I  shall  denominate  moral  units,  and 
sometimes  emotional  units.  If  we  turn  from  words  to  un- 
verbal things,  we  find  that  a  man  may  be  said  to  love 
music,  his  dog,  his  horse,  his  wife,  his  dinner,  his  child,  his 
business,  and  innumerable  other  physical  things.  He  may 
love  reflection,  metaphysics,  mathematics,  and  numerous 
other  intellectual  things.  He  may  love  ease,  excitement, 
pleasure,  revenge,  and  numerous  other  internal  feelings; 
but  if  amid  the  numerous  and  divers  unverbal  feelings  to 
which  we  thus  apply  the  word  love,  we  look  for  love 
itself,  and  suppose  it  to  be  some  mysterious  unverbal  unit, 
we  are  looking  objectively  for  what  is  only  a  subjective 
creation  of  the  intellect.  That  every  language  contains 
the  nominal  unit  love,  is  scarcely  to  be  doubted,  and  the 
coincidence  is  conclusive  that  the  intellect  conceives  the 
unit  by  an  organic  necessity ;  but  if  we  mistakenly  deem 
this  intellectual  conception  a  mysterious  emotional  unit,  or 
a  unit  of  any  kind,  except  in  the  conception  of  the  intel- 
lect, we  are  needlessly  mystifying  our  knowledge,  and  it 
is  sadly  thus  mystified,  unless  I  greatly  misjudge. 

§  2.  What  we  have  said  of  love  we  may  repeat  severally 
of  envy,  hate,  malice,  hope,  fear,  conscience,  piety,  religion, 


84  THE  MEANING  OF  WORDS. 

faith,  kindness,  passion,  rage,  charity,  and  every  other  nom- 
inal unit  that  refers  to  internal  feelings.  Every  man's  con- 
sciousness, embracing  his  knowledge  of  his  own  personality 
through  the  course  of  his  past  life,  is  supposed  to  possess 
as  much  un verbal  oneness  as  it  possesses  nominal  oneness; 
while,  like  each  of  the  former  units,  it  is  the  name  of  an 
intellectual  aggregation  of  multitudinous  units,  just  as  the 
wealth  of  a  man  is  the  name  of  his  aggregate  pecuniary 
possessions. 

But  the  mystery  which  proceeds  from  mistaking  the  true 
unverbal  character  of  the  implied  oneness,  is  greatly  aggra- 
vated when  we  endeavour  to  find  a  corresponding  unit 
anywhere  except  in  the  organism  of  our  intellect;  and 
especially  when,  in  any  case,  we  imagine  that  the  intellec- 
tually conceived  unit  is  physical.  Such  speculations  are, 
however,  no  way  uncommon.  In  treatises,  for  instance, 
which  have  been  written  on  our  passions,  appetites,  emo- 
tions, etc.,  the  multitudinous  internal  feelings  which  give 
significancy  to  the  word  love,  are  enumerated,  not  as  the 
meaning  of  the  word  love,  but  as  the  propensities  of  a 
mysterious  unit  love,  who  holds  his  seat  in  the  heart.  So 
in  some  treatises  on  our  intellectual  powers,  wisdom,  rea- 
son, judgment,  conscience,  and  numerous  kindred  intellec- 
tually conceived  nominal  units,  are  crowded  into  the  head, 
where,  as  on  invisible  tripods  and  in  specific  localities, 
they  sit  and  hold  dominion  over  the  conduct,  thoughts, 
mid  feelings  of  the  man  in  whom  they  are  situated. 

.°>.  To  a  person  who  is  destitute  of  internal  feelings,  (if 


OF  THE  STRUCTUEE   OF  LANGUAGE.  85 

we  may  for  illustration  imagine  such  a  person,)  the  nomi- 
nal units  love,  hope,  fear,  etc.,  would  possess  but  little 
un verbal  meaning ;  as  also  joy,  sorrow,  anger,  jealousy, 
hunger,  thirst,  sleepiness,  weariness,  vigour,  lassitude,  etc. 
The  words  would  not,  however,  be  destitute  of  unverbal 
meaning  to  him,  because  nearly  every  such  nominal  unit 
includes  within  its  signification  some  sensible  external  ac- 
tion or  appearance,  which  enables  us  to  determine  by 
looking  at  a  man,  that  he  is  sleepy,  faint,  angry,  jealous, 
envious,  hungry,  etc.  By  means  of  these  external  exhibi- 
tions, a  man  who  should  be  void  of  internal  feelings,  might 
discourse  about  love,  anger,  envy,  etc. ;  as  a  man  void  of 
the  sense  of  taste  could  talk  of  the  deliciousness  of  peaches, 
oranges,  grapes,  etc.,  his  words  referring  to  the  appearance 
of  the  fruits ;  or,  as  a  man  void  of  sight  could  talk  of  the 
delightfulness  of  sunshine,  his  words  referring  to  the 
warmth  of  the  sunbeams. 

Of  intellectual  operations  aggregated  into  nominal  units. 

§1.1  could  easily  give,  to  any  extent,  examples  of  units 
that,  like  the  foregoing,  the  intellect  forms  out  of  our  in- 
ternal feelings.  I  have  designated  them  moral  units,  moral 
being  usually  applied  to  the  branch  of  our  organization  that 
is  neither  physical  nor  intellectual.  But  the  intellect  con- 
verts also  into  units  its  own  operations,  and  to  these  I  now 
wish  to  direct  your  attention.  I  hope  you  understand 
what  has  already  been  said,  and  you,  doubtless,  understand 
numerous  operations  that  you  see  daily,  and  numerous 


86  THE   MEANING  OF  WORDS. 

things  that  you  feel  hourly,  and  numerous  griefs  and  joys 
that  you  are  conscious  of;  but  the  understanding  itself,  as 
a  unit,  is  only  a  nominal  creation  which  the  intellect  forms 
in  contemplation  of  the  various  unverbal  acts  of  under- 
standing to  which  I  have  referred.  The  intellect,  likewise, 
(of  which  I  speak  so  often  as  a  unit,)  is  itself  only  an  intel- 
lectually conceived  aggregation  in  all  that  relates  to  its 
oneness,  as  separate  and  different  from  the  various  intellec- 
tual operations  that  we  are  conscious  of  experiencing.  The 
like  may  be  said  of  mind,  sagacity,  judgment,  reflection, 
reason,  wisdom,  wit,  cunning,  and  all  other  nominal  units 
that  refer  to  unverbal  intellectual  operations,  and  whose 
names  occupy  no  small  space  in  our  dictionaries. 

§  2.  What  is  truth  ?  said  Pilate.  His  question  implies 
that  he  deemed  truth  a  unit,  and  the  question  is  supposed 
to  be  as  proper  and  profound  now  as  Pilate  deemed  it ; 
truth  being  still  deemed  a  mysterious  unit.  If,  however, 
we  turn  from  words  to  unverbal  things,  we  find  many  and 
different  truths.  That  a  line  not  longer  than  an  inch,  may 
be  divided  ad  infinitum,  is  a  mathematical  truth ;  that  I  am 
speaking,  is  a  physical  truth;  that  honesty  is  the  best 
policy,  is  an  ethical  truth ;  that  you  have  felt  grief,  is  a 
moral  truth;  that  an  unsupported  stone  will  fall  to  the 
earth,  is  an  experimental  truth ;  that  heaven  and  earth  shall 
pass  away,  is  a  religious  truth ;  and  that  the  matter  of  a 
grain  of  sand  may  be  logically  divided  interminably  with- 
out arriving  at  a  residue  which  cannot  be  further  divided, 
is  a  logical  truth.  We  may  enumerate  millions  of  truths; 


OF  THE  STRUCTURE   OF   LANGUAGE.  87 

but  if  we  look  among  them  for  truth  itself  as  a  unit,  we 
are  looking  for  a  figment  which  the  intellect  forms  organi- 
cally and  of  necessity ;  and  which  unit  is  subjective,  not  ob- 
jective, in  the  organism  of  the  intellect  alone,  not  in  objec- 
tive things. 

Nominal  units  that  are  partly  intellectual  and  partly  moral. 

Before  I  close  in  relation  to  nominal  units,  I  must  speak 
of  some  whose  signification  is  not  wholly  sensible  manifes- 
tations, nor  wholly  emotional  manifestations,  nor  wholly 
intellectual  manifestations  ;  but  internal  feelings,  associated 
with  intellectual  conceptions.  I  allude  to  Deity,  immor- 
tality, eternity,  heaven,  hell,  angel,  resurrection,  soul,  and 
numerous  other  kindred  nominal  units.  The  existence  of 
such  nominal  units  in  all  languages,  and  in  all  periods  of 
time,  is  proof  unequivocal  that  the  intellect  is  organized  to 
conceive  them  ;  and  hence  that  they  all  possess  a  subjective 
reality  in  human  nature.  Of  their  conception  by  the  intel- 
lect, and  their  unverbal  signification,  I  shall  speak  in  an- 
other place;  but  at  present,  I  speak  of  them  in  relation 
only  to  their  nominal  oneness,  in  contrast  with  their  un- 
verbal multiplicity. 

All  the  last  mentioned  nominal  units  derive  their  chief 
cogency  from  certain  internal  feelings  which  may  be  desig- 
nated as  religious  feelings,  and  which,  in  some  cases,  con- 
stitute the  entire  objective  signification  of  the  intellectually 
conceived  units.  Such  feelings  are  as  indissolubly  a  part 
of  every  man's  organism  as  hope,  fear,  doubt,  conviction, 


88  THE  MEANING   OF  WORDS. 

confidence,  uncertainty,  etc.  The  whole  history  of  man 
manifests  the  existence  of  religious  feelings,  and  every  par- 
ticular man's  consciousness  demonstrates  their  existence 
occasionally.  A  man  may  not  at  all  times  be  under  the 
influence  of  religious  feelings,  any  more  than  he  is  at  all 
times  under  the  influence  of  hope,  fear,  love,  or  aversion ; 
but  he  is  always  liable  to  the  excitation  of  religious  feel- 
ings, as  he  is  to  any  of  his  other  feelings. 

When  we  are  unacquainted  with  the  above  twofold 
character  (intellectual  and  moral)  of  the  nominal  units  we 
are  speaking  of  in  the  present  section,  we  may  be  surprised 
at  the  levity  with  which  some  persons  regard  them,  in 
contrast  with  the  awe  with  which  other  men  regard  them. 
A  principle  analogous  to  this  we  may  discover  in  the  differ- 
ent appreciation  which  different  persons  evince  towards 
the  nominal  units  spectre,  ghost,  apparition,  spirit,  etc. 
These  nominal  units  are  often  associated  with  an  internal 
feeling  that  renders  each  of  the  nominal  units  a  subject  of 
awe  or  fear  ;  while  to  other  men  they  are  associated  with 
no  such  feeling,  and  may  be  contemned.  But  even  the 
nominal  units  ghost,  spectre,  etc.,  seem  not  wholly  crea- 
tions of  the  intellect,  but  to  be  organically  associated  with 
the  feelings  of  fear ;  and  whether  any  effort  of  any  man's 
intellect  can  at  all  times,  and  in  all  places,  wholly  discon- 
nect the  feeling  of  fear  from  the  intellectual  unit  ghost, 
etc.,  is  very  questionable.  "We  are  apt  to  attribute  the 
connected  fear  to  tales  which  are  told  us  in  our  infancy ; 
but  the  foundation  exists  in  our  intellectual  and  moral  or 


OF   THE   STRUCTURE   OF   LANGUAGE.  89 

ganisms,  and  an  uneducated  deaf  mute,  devoid  of  all  lan- 
guage, may  experience  unverbally  both  the  intellectual 
impulse  or  state,  from  which  the  nominal  unit  ghost,  etc., 
proceeds,  and,  in  association  therewith,  the  internal  feeling 
of  fear. 

Of  nominal  units,  whose  components  belong  to  two  or  more  of 
the  senses,  or  whose  components  are  otherwise  generically 
diverse. 

§.  1.  I  have  said  all  that  I  deem  necessary  to  manifest 
the  un verbal  multiplicity,  etc.,  of  nominal  units.  The  dis- 
tinction is  of  the  utmost  practical  importance,  and  the  fault 
is  our  own  if  we  continue  to  mystify  and  perplex  ourselves 
by  seeking  objectively  a  oneness  that  is  only  subjective ; 
seeking  in  unverbal  things,  a  oneness  that  is  only  verbal ; 
seeking  physically,  a  oneness  that  is  only  intellectually 

f  conceived.  If  any  person  is  tired  of  the  subject,  he  can 
omit  what  intervenes,  and  proceed  directly  to  the  next  suc- 
ceeding lecture;  but  if  he  can  endure  a  continuance  of 
the  subject,  I  want  to  add  a  few  remarks  on  several  colla- 
teral topics,  and  especially  in  relation  to  nominal  units,  like 
globe,  orange,  external,  etc.,  of  which  I  spoke  at  the  com- 
mencement of  this  lecture,  and  which  intellectually  aggre- 
gate unverbal  things  that  are  revealed  to  us  by  more  than 
one  of  our  senses ;  and  whose  nominal  oneness  is  conse- 
quently peculiarly  puzzling  when  we  seek  it  sensibly.  I 
want  to  suggest  a  mode  to  speculatists,  by  which  the  gene- 
ric diversity  in  the  unverbal  components  of  any  such  nomi- 


90  THE   MEANING  OF  WORDS. 

nal  unit  may  become  sensibly  apparent.  The  alphabet  is 
a  nominal  unit,  and  possesses  as  much  intellectually  con- 
ceived oneness  as  the  letter  A ;  but  even  the  letter  A  pos- 
sesses less  sensible  oneness  than  nominal  oneness ;  for  it 
names  four  different  sounds.  Orthoepists  designate  which 
of  the  four  sounds  the  letter  A  denotes  in  any  given  use 
of  it,  by  plying  over  the  A  some  character  which  conven- 
tionally reveals  the  intended  sound.  Philosophers  might 
adopt  a  like  contrivance  when  using  any  nominal  unit 
that  aggregates  objects  generically  different.  I,  might  de- 
note intellection ;  S,  sight ;  F,  feel ;  T,  taste  ;  L,  smell ;  D, 
sound;  G,  internal  feeling.  For  instance,  thickness  is  a 
nominal  unit,  but  sensibly  I  can  feel  thickness  and  I  can 
see  thickness;  consequently,  the  intellectually  conceived 
nominal  unit  thickness  names  a  sensible  duality.  We, 
however,  possess  an  entire  control  over  the  definition  of 
the  word  thickness,  and  can  define  it  to  signify  the  feel 
thickness,  excluding  the  sight  thickness.  This  definition 
is  as  good  as  any  other  when  we  understand  the  intended 
limitation ;  but  we  may  convert  such  a  limitation  into  a 
puzzle  when  the  limitation  is  not  avowed.  Professor  Eeid 
thus  puzzled  himself,  as  follows : — He  says,  "  When  I  look 
at  a  book,  it  seems  to  possess  thickness  as  well  as  length 
and  breadth ;  but  we  are  certain  the  visible  appearance 
possesses  no  thickness,  for  it  can  be  represented  exactly  on  a 
piece  of  flat  canvass."  Now,  if  he  had  placed  the  letter  F 
over  the  word  thickness,  so  as  to  denote  he  was  limiting 
the  word  to  the  feel  thickness,  he  would  have  seen  the 


OF  THE  STRUCTURE  OF   LANGUAGE.  91 

quibble  which  arises  from  saying  we  can  represent  thick- 
ness on  a  piece  of  flat  canvass.  We  cannot  represent  the 
fed  thickness  on  the  flat  canvass;  we  can  represent  the 
sight  thickness  only,  which  is  just  what  we  see  when  we 
look  at  the  canvass. 

§  2.  That  seeing  cannot  communicate  unverbally  to  us 
the  feel  thickness,  may  be  an  interesting  item  of  experi- 
mental knowledge,  indicatory  of  the  general  truth  that 
each  of  the  senses  yields  us  unverbal  information  that  no 
one  or  more  of  the  other  senses  can  yield  us  ;  but  we  need 
not  give  the  tenet  an  artificial  and  sophistical  piquancy,  by 
limiting  the  unverbal  signification  of  the  word  thickness  to 
the  feel,  and  then  asserting  that  thickness  is  invisible.  No 
trick  of  legerdemain  is  superior  in  deception  to  such  a 
dodge,  if  we  may  thus  designate  what  is  performed  igno- 
rantly.  The  feel  thickness,  Ihe  sight,  and  the  intellection 
which  unites  the  sight  and  feel,  are  three  different  items 
of  our  unverbal  knowledge,  and  entitled  to  equal  honour. 
"We  may,  if  we  choose,  restrict  the  word  thickness  to  the 
feel,  and  assert  that  the  sight  is  no  part  of  thickness  ;  but 
unverbal  things  are  no  party  to  our  verbal  disquisitions. 
They  exhibit  themselves  just  as  our  senses  and  our  intel- 
lect discover,  unaffected  by  our  speculations,  unchanged 
by  our  definitions. 

Hume  announces  a  like  unconscious  quibble,  when  he 
says,  "  The  table  (S)  which  we  see,  seems  to  diminish  (S) 
as  we  recede  from  it,  but  the  real  table  (F)  suffers  no  dimi- 
nution." (F)  The  whole  zest  of  the  proposition  consists 


92  THE  MEANING  OF  WORDS. 

in  the  sensible  duality  of  each,  of  the  nominal  units  table 
and  diminution.  That  the  sight  table  exhibits  a  visible 
diminution  (S),  while  the  feel  table  suffers  no  tactile  dimi- 
nution (F),  are  no  contradiction  of  each  other,  the  oneness 
of  the  table  being  only  intellectual  and  nominal,  not  sen- 
sible ;  and  we  may  say  the  like  of  the  diminution.  That 
the  sight  diminution  and  the  feel  undiminution  can  exist 
thus  together,  is  a  physical  fact  of  much  interest ;  but  we 
can  make  a«  mystery  of  it  only  when  we  play  at  bo-peep 
with  words,  by  neglecting  to  discriminate  the  intellectually 
conceived  oneness  of  diminution,  and  its  physical  duality. 

The  sight  crooked,  and  the  feel  straight,  can  also  exist 
together,  as  we  may  learn  experimentally  if  we  will  im- 
merse a  straight  (F)  stick  in  water,  leaving  a  portion  of  its 
length  unimmersed.  The  experiment  is  interesting,  but 
we  can  make  a  juggle  of  it  t>y  neglecting  to  discriminate 
that  stick,  which  is  a  nominal  unit,  is  a  physical  duality ; 
and  that  crooked  and  straight  are  severally  but  nominal 
units,  while  sensibly  each  is  a  duality.  "With  a  proper 
discrimination  between  the  nominal  oneness  and  the  sensi- 
ble duality,  no  contradiction  exists  when  the  sight  crooked 
will,  under  given  circumstances,  appear  in  association  with 
the  feel  straight.  If  we  suppose  that  the  sight  crooked 
must  always  be  accompanied  with  the  feel  crooked,  and 
the  feel  straight  with  the  sight  straight,  the  error  is  in  our 
inexperience,  not  in  our  senses  or  in  unverbal  things. 

If  a  piece  of  gold  is  held  in  front  of  a  mirror,  the  mirror 
will  exhibit  the  sight  gold  separated  from  the  feel.  If  you 


OF  THE   STRUCTURE  OF  LANGUAGE.  93 

look  at  a  candle,  and  press  with  your  finger  against  the 
external  angle  of  one  of  your  eyes,  you  will  experience 
the  sight — two  candles,  unaccompanied  by  the  feel,  two. 
If  you  look  at  the  sun,  and  then  close  your  eyes  ;  or,  with- 
out looking  at  the  sun,  if  you  press  for  a  moment  rather 
painfully  against  either  of  your  eyes,  you  will  see  various 
colours,  unaccompanied  by  any  of  the  tangible  objects 
with  which  colours  are  generally  associated.  If  you  whirl 
your  body  and  produce  dizziness,  every  object  on  which 
you  look  will  exhibit  the  sight  rotation,  unaccompanied 
by  the  feel.  If  you  cross  the  third  and  fourth  fingers  of 
your  right  hand,  and  rest  the  tips  of  the  crossed  fingers  on 
a  bullet,  you  will  experience  the  feel,  two  bullets,  unac- 
companied by  the  sight  two.  If  a  wine-glass  be  half  filled 
with  cotton  wool,  and  immersed  (in  an  inverted  position) 
in  a  bowl  of  water,  the  cotton  will  exhibit  the  sight  wet, 
as  you  slowly  emerge  the  wine-glass ;  while  to  the  feel,  the 
cotton  will  be  dry ;  and  a  wheel  can  whirl  so  rapidly  and 
evenly,  as  to  present  the  feel  motion,  without  the  sight. 

In  concluding  this  topic,  I  will  add  only,  that  the  art  of 
painting  consists,  principally,  in  exhibiting  sights  separated 
from  their  usually  attendant  feels ;  the  sight  prominence, 
without  the  feel  prominence;  the  sight  distance,  without 
the  feel  distance ;  the  sight  shape,  without-the  feel  shape. 
The  art  of  manufacturing  perfumery  consists  in  separating 
the  smell  rose,  jessamine,  etc.,  from  the  sights  and  feels 
with  which  the  smells  are  naturally  associated.  Ventrilo- 
quism and  mimickry  consist  in  separating  sounds  from  the 


94  THE   MEANING  OF  WORDS. 

sights  and  feels  with  which  the  sounds  are  naturally  asso- 
ciated. Sleight  of  hand  and  natural  magic  are  either  the 
apparent  or  actual  separation  of  sights,  feels,  etc.,  which 
nature  generally  associates.  Usually  some  sight  separated 
from  its  associated  feel,  as  when  a  Juggler  apparently 
places  (S)  a  ball  under  a  cup,  but  places  (F)  it  not  under ; 
and  finally,  novels,  and  other  imaginative  verbal  composi- 
tions, may  be  characterised  as  collections  of  nominal  units, 
separated  from  all  the  sensible  things  with  which  the 
nominal  units  are  usually  associated. 

§  3.  But  though  the  sensible  items  are  separable  of 
each  group  which  the  intellect  constitutes  into  a  nominal 
unit,  still  so  reliably  uniform  are  the  groups  (as  to  the 
several  items  of  which  each  group  is  composed),  that  when, 
for  example,  we  see  space,  we  know  immediately  that  our 
hand  will  encounter  no  resistance  in  passing  through  it; 
and  when  we  look  at  glass,  we  know  that  our  hand  will 
encounter  resistance ;  and  when  I  see  ice  of  a  given  ap- 
pearance, I  know  it  will  sustain  my  weight,  and  I  venture 
on  it  fearlessly ;  but  when  I  see  water,  I  know  it  will  not 
sustain  me,  and  I  avoid  it  carefully.  Our  sensible  percep- 
tions constitute  thus  an  unverbal  language  common  to  all 
men,  and  more  important  by  far  than  Latin  and  Greek ; 
and  equally  with  Latin  and  Greek,  an  acquired  language, 
though  not  a  conventional  language.  A  noise  which  to  me 
originally,  and  which  to  an  infant  is  still  a  mere  sensation 
of  hearing,  will  communicate  to  me  what  animal  or  thing 
causes  it,  whether  the  cause  is  located  in  the  room  where  I 


OF  THE   STRUCTURE   OF  LANGUAGE.  95 

am  sitting,  or  in  a  room  below  me,  or  above — in  the  clouds 
or  in  the  street ;  and  whether  the  noise  is  associated  with 
danger  or  mirth.  The  noise  is  become,  without  any  con- 
ventionality, a  natural  word,  whose  meaning  I  have  learnt 
experimentally,  and  whose  meaning  is  understood  equally 
by  men  of  all  nations.  An  ignorance  of  this  unverbal 
language  by  children  produces  much  of  the  intellectual 
difference  that  exists  between  them  and  adults ;  and  which 
we  erroneously  attribute  to  immaturity  of  intellect,  it  being 
a  mere  deficiency  of  sensible  experience.  A  child  who 
is  just  beginning  to  walk,  will  step  off  a  table  if  you  place 
him  on  one,  the  appearance  of  vacancy  yielding  him  no 
intimation  that  it  cannot  sustain  him ;  and  when  he  begins 
to  run  in  the  streets,  horses  and  approaching  carriages  ap- 
pear to  his  sight  as  they  appear  to  yours,  but  the  sights 
yield  him  no  intimation  that  he  will  be  run  over  unless  he 
change  his  position.  Should  he  select  a  peach  from  a  bas- 
ket, he  will  not  see,  as  you  can,  which  is  ripe  and  good 
flavoured,  but  probably  select  one  which  is  big,  but  which 
you  see  is  decayed  or  otherwise  undesirable.  We  exclaim 
against  his  stupidity,  but  his  defect  is  organic,  and  no  bril- 
liancy of  native  powers  can  spontaneously  supply  the 
experimental  knowledge  of  which  he  is  deficient.  "We 
may  tell  him  to  grasp  the  moon,  and  we  may  smile  when 
he  reaches  forth  his  tiny  arm  to  obey  our  bidding ;  but 
seeing  can  yield  a  priori  no  intimation  of  what  the  arm  can 
reach,  or  what  it  cannot,  except  in  cases  which  his  intellect 
sees  to  be  analogous  to  cases  which  he  has  experienced. 


96  THE  MEANING  OF  WORDS. 

The  sight  of  red-hot  iron,  which  so  palpably  admonishes 
us  to  beware  of  a  contact  with  it,  might  tempt  a  child  to 
touch  it ;  and  he  will  see  nothing  in  the  point  of  a  needle 
to  indicate  to  him  that  a  pressure  against  it  is  more  to  be 
avoided  than  a  pressure  against  a  bullet.  A  blind  man, 
who  should  be  suddenly  restored  to  sight,  would,  in  the 
same  way,  see  in  a  stone  wall  no  indication  of  its  impassa- 
bility  to  his  hand ;  and  see  in  space,  no  indication  that  his 
hand  will  encounter  from  it  no  resistance.  Such  a  man 
would  continue  to  grope  his  way  by  means  of  a  stick  till 
he  had  acquired  a  knowledge  of  the  unverbal  language 
of  which  I  am  speaking ;  so  as  to  know,  by  the  appear- 
ance, where  he  can  tread  safely,  and  where  he  can  move 
unobstructedly.  Every  feel,  taste  and  smell,  is  a  natural 
word  as  much  as  the  sights  and  sounds  of  which  we  have 
been  speaking.  To  feel  the  point  of  a  needle  and  to  feel  a 
bullet  will  originally  no  more  indicate  the  sights  with 
which  the  point  and  bullet  are  respectively  associated,  than 
the  sound  of  a  Greek  word  will  indicate  to  an  untaught 
man  the  English  word  which  is  its  synonyme. 

§  4.  Men,  however,  doubtless  differ  from  each  other  in 
the  facility  with  which  they  acquire  a  knowledge  of  this 
natural,  unverbal,  and  unconventional  language;  and  on 
this  difference  depends  much  of  what  we  call  dullness  of 
apprehension  and  stupidity.  Men  differ  also  from  each 
other  in  the  extent  of  their  knowledge  of  this  unverbal  lan- 
guage. A  physician  can  ascertain,  somewhat,  the  condition 
of  a  patient's  lungs  and  heart  by  the  sound  which  the 


OF  THE    STRUCTURE   OF  LANGUAGE.  97 

lungs  create  in  respiration,  and  which  the  heart  produces 
in  its  palpitations ;  but  should  a  man  who  is  not  a  physician 
hear  the  sounds,  he  would  derive  from  them  no  informa- 
tion. Every  mechanic  is  acquainted  with  items  of  the 
foregoing  unverbal  language  that  are  unknown  to  other 
men.  Some  men,  by  looking  for  the  first  time  at  a  picture, 
can  tell,  almost  unmistakably,  the  master  who  painted  it ; 
some,  by  the  ring  of  mixed  metals,  can  tell  the  constituents 
of  the  compound ;  and  some,  by  looking  at  cloth,  can  tell 
its  durability. 

§  5.  The  world,  at  different  periods,  has  understood  this 
unverbal,  unconventional  language  in  varying  quantities. 
Liquids  long  expanded  and  contracted  in  bulk,  ere  men 
learnt  from  the  visible  contractions  and  expansions,  that 
heat  and  cold  were  indicated  thereby;  and  the  pulse 
knocked  at  our  wrists  for  ages,  with  varying  rapidity  and 
intensity,  ere  men  discovered  the  vital  messages  the  knocks 
were  unverbally  telling.  Galvani  was  not  the  first  person 
to  whom  the  quivering  limbs  of  frogs  spoke  unverbally ; 
he  was  only  the  first  person  who  understood  their  mute 
revelations ;  and,  doubtless,  around  us  continually  are  in- 
numerable unverbal  utterances  that  keep  repeating  impor- 
tant signs  that  are  still  unintelligible  to  us.  Geology  is 
among  the  latest  systematic  translations  that  men  have 
made  out  of  Nature's  unverbal  dictionary  ;  though  the  sen- 
sible signs  which  compose  geology  are  as  old  as  man  him- 
self. Finally,  the  unverbal  language  of  which  I  have  been 
speaking  has  never  received  the  consideration  which  it 


98  THE   MEANING  OF  WORDS. 

merits,  and  never  has  been  taught  in  the  way  which  would 
lead  men  to  further  increase  their  knowledge  thereof. 
Possibly  every  sensible  perception  is  a  word  in  the  above 
sense,  and  to  investigate  its  meaning  may  lead  to  greater 
utilities  than  the  interpretation  of  any  Egyptian  hiero- 
glyphic. I  will  dismiss  the  subject  with  only  one  more 
remark  : — When  a  house  is  kindling  with  fire  at  midnight, 
the  fact  can  be  un verbally  disclosed  to  us  by  the  smell, 
the  sound,  and  the  sight,  in  advance  of  the  more  fatal  in- 
formation by  the  feel ;  so  the  approach  towards  us  of  a 
person  concerns  frequently  our  safety,  and  it  can  scarcely 
be  effected  so  stealthily  as  not  to  cause  some  sound,  some 
visual  shade,  or  some  aerial  trepidation  that  will  admonish 
us  of  the  approach ;  now  the  remark  which  I  wish  to  make 
is,  that  a  like  multiplicity  of  signs,  variously  modified, 
seem  to  attend,  somewhat  peculiarly,  physical  operations, 
whose  occurrence  concerns  our  personal  safety.  Whether 
a  like  analogy  attends  poisonous  plants  and  minerals,  so 
that  their  presence  may  be  discovered  by  signs  numerous 
in  proportion  to  the  malignity  of  the  poison,  I  know  not ; 
though  something  similar  thereto  is  discoverable  in  the 
sounds  produced  by  rattlesnakes. 

§  6.  Having  thus  seen  that  sensible  things  are  perceived 
by  us  in  groups  of  so  uniform  an  association,  that  when  I 
perceive  any  one  of  a  group,  the  perception  becomes  to  me 
an  unverbal  sign  of  the  remainder  of  the  group,  we  may 
readily  understand  why  many  persons  when  they  see  an 
ignus  fatuus,  or  any  other  unusual  sight  of  fire,  unassociated 


OP  THE  STRUCTURE   OF  LANGUAGE.  99 

with  a  feel,  are  alarmed  at  the  absence  of  the  feel.  The 
alarm  is  founded  on  the  indiscrimination  which  prevails 
generally  between  the  intellectual  oneness  of  fire,  and  its 
sensible  duality;  hence  the  absence  of  the  feel  seems  to 
prove  not  merely  that  the  phosphorescent  fire  is  not  the 
unit  fire  which  possesses  both  a  sight  and  a  feel,  but  that 
it  is  fire  portentously  disembodied  of  its  feel,  and  become  a 
species  of  ghost. 

The  effect  of  novelty  in  sensible  associations,  as  above 
exemplified,  is  organic,  or  the  effect  would  not  be  apparent, 
as  we  find  it  is,  in  all  men  and  in  all  periods  of  the  world. 
Novelty,  though  thus  agitative  of  our  feelings,  is  not  agi- 
tative  of  the  intellect,  and  we  are  able  to  discover  a  happy 
utility  in  this  organic  exemption  from  agitation  of  the  in- 
tellect. By  the  passiveness  of  the  intellect,  we  are  fitted 
to  derive  knowledge  from  sensible  revelations  of  every  de- 
scription, and  by  the  excitability  of  fhe  feelings,  we  are 
induced  to  pay  special  attention  to  novelties ;  and  to  ascer- 
tain whether  they  are  apparent  only,  or  real,  necessary  or 
contingent,  etc.  The  effect  of  novelty  ceases,  also,  on 
our  feelings,  as  soon  as  it  has  accomplished  its  organic 
duty.  "When  we  become  familiar  with  phosphorescent  ap- 
pearances, etc.,  we  contemplate  them  with  feelings  entirely 
tranquil. 

§  7.  But  the  error  of  imputing  to  sensible  things  the 
oneness  that  is  only  intellectual,  and  which  error  thus 
alarms  us  when  we  experience  in  separation  a  portion  of 
the  sensible  items  that  are  usually  aggregated  by  the  intel- 


100  THE   MEANING  OF   WORDS. 

lect  into  a  unit,  is  productive  of  another  error  that  ought 
to  be  understood;  for  instance,  should  you  place  in  the 
hands  of  an  inexperienced  person  a  bladder  inflated  with 
air,  and  another  bladder  filled  with  sand,  he  will  suppose 
that  the  contents  of  both  possess  visibility.  He  will  not 
pretend  to  decide  whether  the  contents  of  both  are  sapid  or 
odorous ;  but  he  will  be  positive  of  the  visibility  ;  for  he 
has  always  found  visibility  associated  with  tangibility,  and 
he,  therefore,  supposes  the  two  as  much  a  sensible  unit  as 
they  are  an  intellectual  unit.  Under  the  like  indiscrimi- 
nation we  look  at  the  sun,  moon,  and  stars ;  and  seeing  in 
them  shape  and  visibility,  deem  them  also  tangible ;  just  as 
though  tangibility,  visibility,  and  shape,  were  a  physical 
unit,  instead  of  being  only  an  intellectual  unit. 

I  admit  that  the  appearance  of  these  celestial  bodies  is 
strongly  presumptive  of  their  tangibility,  and  that  our  in- 
tellect is  organically  compelled  to  conceive  that  they  are 
tangible ;  but  let  us  not  make  our  knowledge  less  definite 
than  Providence  enables  us  to  make  it ;  especially  as  Prov- 
idence, perhaps  purposely  to  give  us  a  clue  to  the  triplicity 
of  our  organization,  and  the  consequent  conglomerate  na- 
ture of  words,  presents  us  with  just  about  enough  anoma- 
lous sensible  disassociations  to  enable  us  to  unravel  the 
three-plied  cord  with  which  unverbal  things  are  intellectu- 
ally tied  together  by  language  into  nominal  units. 

§  8.  I  have  now  completed  all  I  deem  necessary  to  say 
in  relation  to  the  unverbal  duality  or  rnultifariousness  of 
nearly  every  nominal  unit ;  but  in  dismissing  the  subject,  I 


OF  THE   STRUCTURE   OF  LANGUAGE.  101 

will  state  briefly  how  we  acquire  nominal  units,  and  though 
the  information  is  not  necessarily  connected  with  my  dis- 
cussions, the  utility  of  the  information  may  justify  the 
digression.  We  are  prone  to  suppose  that  when  our  eyes 
are  kept  open,  nothing  more  is  necessary  to  the  perception 
of  all  visible  things  within  the  range  of  our  vision ;  but 
this  is  a  mistake.  Were  an  unprofessional  man  to  attempt 
the  dissection  of  a  human  body,  he  would  see  in  it  but  the 
few  nominal  units,  skin,  flesh,  bones,  etc.,  while  a  profes- 
sional surgeon  will  see  all  the  units,  whose  names  fill  a 
large  anatomical  dictionary.  To  have  these  multifarious 
units  manifested  to  him  unverbally,  constitutes  much  of  a 
surgical  student's  professional  education.  Even  now,  after 
all  the  sensible  inspection  to  which  the  human  body  has 
been  for  ages  subjected,  we  occasionally  hear  of  some 
newly  discovered  unit ;  as,  for  instance,  the  sensible  dis- 
coveries in  the  structure  of  the  brain  by  Gaul  and  Spurz- 
heim.  The  surface,  likewise,  of  the  earth  exhibits  to  com- 
mon observers  but  little  more  sensible  diversity  than  is 
referred  to  by  the  nominal  units  ground,  stones,  trees, 
shrubs  and  plants ;  while  educated  men  see  in  it  the  multi- 
farious units  which  constitute  the  nomenclature  of  mineral- 
ogy and  botany.  These  sciences  are  new,  and  like  phre- 
nology, which  is  more  recent,  were  created  by  the  discovery 
of  units  which  our  predecessors  never  saw,  though  as 
palpably  before  their  eyes  as  before  ours. 

§  9.  Every  man's  intellect  individuates  (conceives  units) 
in  a  ratio  compounded  of  the  familiarity  of  his  senses  with 


THE  MEANING  OF  WORDS. 

the  objects  inspected,  and  of  the  familiarity  of  his  intellect 
with  the  process  of  individuation  ;  hence  children  individu- 
ate less  than  adults,   being  in  most  cases  obstructed  by 
both  sensible  unfamiliarity  and  intellectual  inexperience. 
When,  therefore,  we  travel  with  our  children,  we  are  con- 
tinually calling  their  attention  to  objects  which  will  other- 
wise escape  their  observation.     We  attribute  their  heed- 
lessness  to  immaturity  of  age,  but  a  vigorous  man  would 
individuate  as  imperfectly  as  a  child  were  he  as  little  accus- 
tomed to  the  practice,  and  surrounded  by  objects  as  new. 
We  can  discover  this  in  a  man  who  suddenly  obtains  sight 
after  being  connaturally  blind.     In  his  first  views  he  indi- 
viduates neither  persons,  chairs,  tables,  carpets,  walls,  etc., 
but,  like  an  infant,  he  sees  perhaps  the  whole  as  a  unit. 
We  are  often  told  by  persons  who  never  analyse  words 
into  unverbal  things,  and  never  discriminate  the  generic 
differences  of  unverbal  things,  that  a  restored  blind  man 
affirmed  that  everything  seemed  to  touch  his  eyes.     He 
may  have  so  affirmed,  but  the  affirmation  meant  nothing 
but  an  attempt  of  his  intellect  to  account  theoretically  for 
the  new  perception.     Even  all  of  us  account  for  visual 
perceptions  in  the  same  way,  our  intellect  organically  in- 
sisting that  some  rays  must  pass  from  the  visible  object 
and  touch  the  retina  of  the  eye ;  and  thus,  like  the  above 
restored  blind  man,  we  assimilate  vision  to  tactile  percep- 
tions ;  no  other  mode  of  perception  being  satisfactory  to 
our  prepossessions  in  favour  of  tactile  operations.     Lord 
Montboddo  made  the  required  contact  by  conceiving  that 


OF  THE  STRUCTURE  OF  LANGUAGE.  103 

the  soul  goes  forth  from  the  eye  and  touches  the  object 
which  is  seen  ;  for  how  can  any  one  object  operate  on  an- 
other, we  say,  except  by  contact. 

§  10.  The  effectiveness  with  which  we  individuate  when 
surrounded  by  unaccustomed  objects,  is  so  well  known 
practically,  that  when  we  are  walking  with  a  friend  around 
his  grounds,  he  will  habitually  direct  attention  to  objects 
that  he  may  deem  most  worthy  of  our  notice.  By  the 
same  principle,  when  we  see  a  large  panorama,  the  first 
view  is  confused,  and  individuations  present  themselves 
only  gradually.  After  a  man  has  viewed  daily  such  a  pic- 
ture for  months,  he  will  not  see  all  the  units  which  the 
artist  can  see  who  designed  and  executed  the  painting. 
Also  on  this  principle,  likenesses  are  said  to  grow  on  us 
when  viewing  the  portrait  of  an  acquaintance ;  for  after  we 
have  once  individuated  the  points  of  resemblance,  we  recur 
to  them  again  readily  whenever  we  look  at  the  portrait.  I 
have  found  much  difficulty  in  making  children  see  the 
eyes,  nose  and  mouth,  which  most  persons  see  in  the  full 
moon  ;  but  after  these  units  have  been  once  intellectually 
individuated  in  several ty,  the  child  sees  them  again  readily 
whenever  the  moon  presents  them.  The  difficulty  lies 
in  only  the  first  individuation,  thus  evincing  that  the 
obstruction  is  not  in  the  object  seen,  but  in  our  organiza- 
tion. 

§  11.  The  unaptness  of  very  young  children  to  individ- 
uate is  further  discoverable  in  their  usual  inability  to 
recognize  in  a  portrait  the  person  portrayed.  The  portrait 


104  THE  MEANING  OF  WORDS. 

will  be  seen  by  them  as  a  unit  in  which  they  will  include 
the  back  ground  and  picture  frame ;  but  if  they  should  see 
only  the  whole  face  as  a  unit,  they  would  not  be  likely  to 
recognize  the  likeness,  which  probably  is  discoverable  in 
only  some  of  the  features  individaally.  Nor  is  this  the 
whole  of  the  difficulty ;  for  when  a  very  young  child  looks 
at  the  person  who  is  portrayed,  the  child  will  not  necessa- 
rily individuate  the  face  as  a  unit,  but  he  may  include 
some  part  of  the  body  and  dress.  That  such  are  the  early 
individuations  of  children  is  known  by  the  fact  that  a 
change  of  head-dress,  and  sometimes  of  a  gown,  will  pre- 
vent an  infant  from  recognizing  its  nurse  or  mother.  The 
like  difficulty  obstructs  a  child  when  we  endeavour  to 
teach  him  by  sight,  the  alphabet.  The  A,  which  seems  so 
distinct  to  us,  is  to  him  only  a  part  of  a  unit  whose  whole 
may  include  much  of  the  surrounding  concomitants.  No 
contrivance  of  ours  can  obviate  his  difficulty,  though  we 
attempt,  more  empirically,  however,  than  scientifically,  to 
give  prominence  to  the  letter  that  we  desire  him  to  learn, 
placing  it  on  a  square  of  wood,  ivory,  etc.,  or  by  some 
other  contrivance.  Men  experience  a  like  difficulty  when 
they  hear  an  unaccustomed  language.  The  words  seem  all 
the  same  sound,  till  we  acquire  by  time  an  ability  to  indi- 
viduate their  sonal  differences. 

The  individuations  of  men,  at  all  periods  of  maturity,  are 
much  influenced  by  accustomed  occupations.  A  landscape 
painter  will  individuate  picturesque  views  where  an  agri- 
culturist will  see  nothing  but  qualities  of  soil;  and  a 


OF  THE  STRUCTURE   OF   LANGUAGE.  105 

butcher  nothing  but  the  marketable  condition  of  the  cattle 
that  are  grazing  in  the  fields. 

§  12.  The  progress  of  individuations,  of  which  a  few  in- 
stances are  above  referred  to,  and  the  unverbal  language 
of  sensible  perceptions,  still  more  briefly  referred  to  pre- 
cedingly,  were  both  indicated  to  me  incidentally  while 
investigating,  as  I  have  heretofore  stated,  the  powers  of 
our  respective  senses ;  and  indeed,  to  those  investigations, 
began  in  early  life  and  continued  to  this  time,  I  have  de- 
rived all  the  views  of  language  that  I  possess ;  and  very 
much  other  knowledge  that  I  suppose  to  be  useful.  I 
commenced  the  investigations  with  no  definite  intention, 
except  an  assumption  that  as  our  objective  knowledge  of 
the  external  universe  is  derived  entirely  from  our  senses, 
an  experimental  and  minute  analysis  of  the  operations  of 
the  senses  must  be  useful.  I  state  the  fact,  and  present 
some  of  the  results,  from  a  belief  that  such  sensible  inves- 
tigations are  too  much  neglected,  and  in  the  hope  that 
benefits  may  result  from  directing  the  attention  thereto  of 
persons  possessing  leisure ;  the  mode  in  which  our  intellect 
creates  nominal  units  being  not  properly  the  concern  of  our 
present  disquisitions,  but  only  the  mode  in  which  we  shall 
interpret  them,  so  as  not  to  deem  their  oneness  unverbal, 
when  it  is  only  verbal,  etc. 
5* 


LECTURE  IV. 

VEEBAL  IDENTITY   ANALYSED    INTO    UNVERBAL 
DIVERSITY. 

CONTENTS. 

1.  Identity  is  a  subjective  conception  of  the  intellect,  not  an  objective 

perception  of  the  senses. 

2.  Physical  things  that  are  nominally  identical,  are  identical  in  only  the 

conception  of  our  intellect 

3.  Intellectual  things  that  are  nominally  identical,  are  identical  in  only 

the  conception  of  the  intellect. 

4.  Internal  feelings  which  are  nominally  identical,  are  identical  in  only 

the  conception  of  the  intellect. 

5.  Language  is  founded  on  the  two  intellectual  organic  processes  of  cre- 

ating nominal  units  and  verbal  identities. 

6.  The  latent  defects  which  are  inherent  in  logic,  by  reason  of  the  fore- 

going properties  of  words,  and  Logic's  disregard  of  unverbal  hetero- 
geneities. 

Verbal  identity  analysed  into  unverbal  diversity. 

§  1.  Having  in  my  last  lecture  shown  that  we  impute  to 
nominal  units  a  oneness  that  is  intellectual  only,  I  shall 
now  show  that  we  impute  to  them  an  identity  that  is  also 
intellectual  only.  This  truth  was  suggested  to  me,  like 
the  former,  during  my  investigations  of  the  powers  of  our 
senses,  to  which  I  referred  in  my  last  lecture.  In  those 
investigations  I  assumed  that  every  sight  is  unknown  to 


OF   THE   STRUCTURE   OF   LANGUAGE.  107 

me  which  my  seeing  has  not  informed  me  of;  that  every 
feel  is  unknown  to  me  that  my  feeling  has  not  informed 
me  of;  and  I  assumed  the  like  of  the  information  of  each 
of  my  other  senses.  Still  these  apparently  obvious  truths 
were  contradicted  the  moment  I  designated  the  information 
of  my  senses  by  other  names  than  sights,  sounds,  feels,  etc., 
for  I  cannot  say  that  the  sight  of  snow  is  unknown  to  me, 
except  the  snow  that  I  have  seen  ;  that  the  sight  of  oranges 
is  unknown  to  me,  except  the  oranges  that  I  have  actually 
seen ;  that  the  appearance  is  unknown  to  me  of  lions,  ex- 
cept of  the  few  that  I  have  seen,  etc.  Endeavouring  to 
reconcile  this  contradiction  between  positions  that  seemed 
equally  irrefragible,  I  found  that  all  lions  are  identical; 
hence  when  I  saw  one  lion,  I  in  effect  saw  every  lion  ;  and 
when  I  saw  one  orange,  I  in  effect  saw  every  orange. 

But  this  explanation  was  soon  refuted  by  reflection,  for 
the  name  lion,  etc.,  is  applied  to  countless  individuals  who 
differ  from  each  other  in  size,  colour,  and  innumerable 
other  sensible  manifestations ;  hence  my  original  assump- 
tion was  still  uncontradicted  that  every  sight  is  unknown 
to  me  which  my  seeing  has  not  informed  me  of;  the  ap- 
pearance of  a  lion,  orange,  etc.,  which  I  have  not  seen, 
being  not  necessarily  known  to  me  by  means  of  the  lion, 
etc.,  which  I  have  seen.  The  name  man,  also,  is  applied  to 
many  hundreds  of  millions  of  the  earth's  inhabitants  who 
differ  in  complexion  through  countless  gradations,  from 
negro  black,  to  albino  white.  Nor  is  the  difference  of  com- 
plexion merely  white,  black,  brown  and  red,  as  language 


108  THE   MEANING   OF  WORDS. 

implies,  the  word  white  being  applied  to  snow,  silver,  water, 
the  moon,  the  floor,  and  other  countlessly  diverse  appear- 
ances ;  and  the  like  may  be  said  of  black,  brown,  red,  etc. ; 
hence  the  unverbal  differences  of  man's  complexion,  are 
almost  as  numerous  as  the  persons.  Men  differ,  also,  from 
each  other,  not  merely  in  complexion,  but  in  features, 
stature,  hair,  age,  sex,  structure,  knowledge,  etc. ;  and  each 
of  these  words  is  applicable,  like  the  word  white,  to  multi- 
tudinous unverbal  diversities ;  to  say  nothing  of  countless 
unverbal  differences  in  men,  that  have  received  no  nominal 
designation.  In  short,  no  two  men  are  so  much  alike  un- 
verbally  as  to  prevent  them  from  being  discriminated  from 
each  other  by  the  appearance ;  no  two  speak  so  much  alike 
as  to  prevent  them  from  being  discriminated  by  the  voice ; 
no  two  sympathise  so  much  alike  as  not  to  differ  in  their 
sympathies,  appetites,  and  passions ;  and  no  two  think  so 
much  alike  as  not  to  differ  in  their  thoughts  and  other  in- 
tellectual conceptions.  Still  they  are  all  nominally  men,  and 
thus  all  nominally  identical.  One  may  occupy  an  imperial 
throne,  and  possess  refinement,  elegance,  and  knowledge ; 
another  may  wallow  in  a  gutter,  intoxicated,  ignorant, 
stupid,  and  ragged ;  but  in  language  like  that  of  Burns,  a 
man  is  a  man  for  all  that ;  and  in  this  judgment,  every- 
body's intellect  irresistibly  concurs,  thereby  implying  that 
a  mysterious  identity  exists  that  is  supreme  over  all  physi- 
cal, moral,  and  intellectual  diversities. 

What,  then,  is  the  identity  between  this  multitude  of 
nominal  units,  man,  who  severally  differ  thus  from  each 


OF  THE  STRUCTURE   OF   LANGUAGE.  109 

other  sensibly,  morally,  and  intellectually  ?  At  one  time 
I  supposed  the  identity  was  only  conventional,  and  that 
we  arbitrarily  designate  alike  all  the  unverbally  diverse 
individuals  referred  to.  But  how  came  we  to  apply  the 
same  name  to  beings  so  diverse  ?  A  reason  for  the  desig- 
nation must  have  preceded  the  designation,  for  it  is  applied 
to  these  unverbally  different  beings  in  all  languages,  and 
has  been  so  applied  in  all  ages ;  and,  therefore,  is  too  gen- 
eral for  any  conventional  origin ;  finally,  I  saw  that  as  men 
are  not  identical  in  unverbal  manifestations,  the  nominal 
identity  must  be  only  an  organic  conception  of  the  in- 
tellect. 

When  we  become  satisfied  that  the  nominal  identity  is 
an  intellection,  we  can  analyse  it  no  further.  We  are,  in 
respect  to  it,  at  the  ultimate  reach  of  our  unverbal  analysis, 
like  a  chemist  when  he  has  analysed  a  compound  into  its 
ultimate  elements.  We  may,  indeed,  investigate  the  ex- 
tent to  which  men  approximate  to  the  possession  in  com- 
mon of  the  same  unverbal  physical  things ;  and  the  extent 
to  which  all  men  agree  unverbally  in  moral  and  intellec- 
tual manifestations;  but  if  we  endeavour  to  discover 
sensibly,  in  different  men,  the  identity  which  is  implied 
between  them  by  the  name  man,  we  are  seeking  sensibly 
for  what  is  only  an  intellectual  conception,  and  our  search 
is  organically  absurd  and  fallacious. 

What  we  have  thus  said  of  man,  we  may  repeat  seve- 
rally of  horse,  elephant,  eagle,  dog,  tree,  shrub,  whale, 
heat,  cold,  blood,  light,  air,  water,  fire,  and  every  other 


110  THE   MEANING  OF  WORDS. 

nominal  unit.  Each  of  the  names  identifies  innumerable 
individuals  that  differ  unverbally  from  each  other,  the 
intellect  alone  converting  them  into  identities.  In  the  crea- 
tion of  such  identities,  the  intellect  obeys  an  organic  neces- 
sity which  is  as  active,  I  have  no  doubt,  in  an  uneducated 
deaf  mute  as  in  us ;  though  in  him  the  identity  possesses 
not  the  objective  definiteness  which  it  acquires  in  us  from 
its  connection  with  an  oral  name.  Could  we  realize  how 
the  intellect  of  a  mute  conceives  unverbally  such  identities, 
we  should  understand  more  definitely  than  we  now  do,  the 
intellectual  organism  which  gives  equal  significance  to  any 
given  conception,  whether  it  be  expressed  in  Dutch  or 
English,  in  manual  signs,  or  possibly  in  what  may  sound 
to  us  unmeaning  gabble  in  idiots. 

§  2.  By  means  of  the  organic  action  of  the  intellect 
which  thus  verbally  identifies  sensible  and  other  diversities, 
the  inhabitants  of  different  countries  who  have  never  seen 
the  same  horses,  the  same  trees,  birds,  houses,  etc.,  are  en- 
abled, when  conversing  together,  to  understand  each  other 
with  sufficient  accuracy  for  all  ordinary  purposes ;  unverbal 
things  of  the  same  name  conforming  to  each  other  with  a 
degree  of  unverbal  similitude,  that  approximates  somewhat 
to  the  verbal  identity.  I  lately  in  France  saw  a  vegetable 
differing  in  appearance  from  any  I  had  ever  seen.  I  ac- 
cordingly asked  the  usual  question,  What  is  it  ?  and  was 
told  it  was  a  melon.  The  answer  gave  me  much  informa- 
tion by  reason  of  my  knowledge  of  American  melons,  and 
the  further  knowledge  (or  perhaps  intuition)  that  the 


OF  THE  STRUCTURE  OF  LANGUAGE.  Ill 

verbal  identity  would  be  accompanied  with  unverbal  simi- 
larities. 

We  see  in  this  intuitive  principle  of  interpretation  a 
reason  for  the  anxiety  usually  manifested  by  sick  persons 
and  their  friends,  fo  know  the  name  of  the  patient's  dis- 
ease— a  desire  most  urgent,  probably,  among  persons  who 
mistake  verbal  identities  for  unverbal  identities.  Modern 
physicians,  on  whom  experience  forces  a  knowledge  of  the 
sensible  diversity  that  exists  among  diseases  that  are  nom- 
inally identical,  are  often  unwilling  to  announce  to  a 
patient  the  name  of  his  disease, — diseases  nominally  iden- 
tical being  accompanied  in  different  patients  with  fewer 
unverbal  similarities  than  perhaps  any  other  nominal 
identities ;  and  even  the  same  person  will  be  affected  diffe- 
rently at  different  times  by  re-attacks  of  the  same  nominal 
disease.  Still  some  unverbal  similarities  must  exist  among 
diseases  verbally  identical,  or  physicians  could  derive  no 
knowledge  from  experience.  The  unverbal  similarities  of 
the  same  nominal  disease  in  different  patients  is,  however, 
in  some  few  diseases,  nearly  as  complete  as  the  nominal 
identity  of  the  disease ;  and  in  such  diseases,  experience 
yields  its  usual  benefits,  and  medical  science  exhibits  its 
most  reliable  ministrations. 

Different  verbal  identities  exhibit  different  degrees  of  unverbal 
similitudes. 

§  1.  What  we  have  said  of  the  unverbal  diversity  that 
exists  in  diseases  of  the  same  name,  is  measurably  applica- 


112  THE  MEANING  OF  WORDS. 

ble  to  every  drug  of  the  same  name,' — no  two  masses  of 
calomel,  rhubarb,  etc.,  possessing  as  much  sensible  simila- 
rity as  they  possess  nominal  identity.  The  sensible  simi- 
larities approximate  usefully  to  the  nominal  identity,  but 
sufficient  diversities  exist  to  embarrass  medical  practice. 
Physicians  are  embarrassed  in  their  speculations,  as  well 
as  in  their  medical  practice,  by  the  unverbal  diversities  of 
verbal  identities.  The  contagiousness  of  cholera,  in  different 
cases,  possesses  only  a  nominal  identity,  while  unverbally 
the  contagiousness  may  possess  endless  diversities.  Even 
the  contagiousness  of  Peter's  cholera  to-day,  may  differ  un- 
verbally from  the  contagiousness  of  his  cholera  to-morrow ; 
nothing  being  necessary  to  warrant  the  application  of  the 
word  contagiousness  to  any  disease  at  any  time,  but  that 
the  intellect  of  the  observer  shall  observe  in  the  disease 
something  analogous  to  what  it  has  observed  in  some  other 
case  that  is  deemed  contagious.  We  can  learn  from  the 
controversies  of  physicians  nothing  so  positive,  as  that  the 
sensible  manifestations  denominated  contagiousness,  are  so 
diverse  in  diseases  of  different  names,  and  in  diseases  of 
any  one  name  at  different  times  of  its  occurrence,  that  to 
verbally  allege  contagiousness  of  any  given  nominal  dis- 
ease, will  communicate  to  the  hearer  but  little  definite 
unverbal  information. 

Leaving  medicine  and  its  concomitants,  we  shall  find 
that  no  unverbal  things  which  are  verbally  identical, 
possess  as  much  unverbal  similarity  as  verbal  identity ;  but 
though  the  diversity  is  thus  general,  it  varies  in  degree  in 


OP  THE  STRUCTURE  OF  LANGUAGE.  113 

different  cases.  The  sensible  similarity  in  two  drops  of 
water  is  infinitely  greater  than  the  sensible  similarity  of 
two  men,  of  whom  one  shall  be  an  uneducated  negro,  and 
the  other  an  educated  European.  But  the  sensible  simila- 
rity of  the  two  men  is  much  greater  than  the  sensible 
similarity  of  two  fish,  of  which  one  shall  be  a  shark,  and 
the  other  an  anchovy,  while  the  sensible  similitude  of  the 
two  fish  is  greater  than  the  sensible  similitude  of  matter  in 
the  form  of  a  rock,  and  matter  in  the  form  of  a  sunbeam. 

§  3.  Natural  History  is  irremediably  defective  to  the 
extent  that  the  nominal  identity  of  animals  of  any  given 
name  conflicts  with  their  sensible  diversities.  We  can 
construct  no  natural  history,  except  by  speaking  of  lions 
as  identities,  horses  as  identities,  whales  as  identities,  etc. ; 
but  we  shall  gain  in  unverbal  accuracy  by  understanding 
that  the  unverbal  objects  thus  grouped  into  nominal  iden- 
tities, are  identical  in  only  the  conception  of  the  intellect ; 
and  this  remark  applies  not  merely  to  classifications  like 
the  above  which  the  intellect  makes  spontaneously,  but  to 
classifications  which  are  made  by  naturalists  artificially,  on 
any  basis  whatever. 

Books  of  travels  are  subject  to  a  like  irremediable  defect. 
A  traveller  describing  verbally  what  he  saw  in  strange 
countries,  can  make  himself  intelligible  unverbally  to  his 
readers  only  by  means  of  the  intellectual  identities  to 
which  the  traveller's  verbal  trees  will  refer ;  and  his  verbal 
rocks,  men,  and  animals,  etc. ;  but  the  sensible  diversities 
which  exist  among  things  nominally  identical,  make  all 


114:  THE   MEANING  OF  WORDS. 

descriptive  verbal  narratives  very  fallacious.  When  this 
inherent  defect  is  attempted  to  be  remedied  by  pictorial 
representations  in  books  of  travels,  the  defect  is  less  effec- 
tually remedied  than  persons  usually  suppose.  A  picture 
can  communicate  to  a  spectator  no  sight  which  the  spec- 
tator has  never  seen,  except  the  picture  itself  may  be  such 
a  sight ;  but  in  every  sensible  particular  in  which  the  por- 
trayed view  or  object  differs  un verbally  from  the  picture, 
the  portrayed  object  cannot  be  revealed  by  the  picture. 
The  difficulty  is  organic,  and  cannot  be  surmounted. 

§  4.  The  grouping  of  unverbal  things  by  the  intellect 
into  nominal  identities,  enables  us  with  a  few  names  to 
discourse  intelligibly  of  innumerable  unverbal  individuali- 
ties ;  the  word  man,  for  instance,  names,  as  we  have  already 
said,  many  hundred  millions  of  diverse  individuals ;  and 
the  words  dog,  tree,  fever,  grass,  meat,  drink,  etc.,  name 
severally  numerous  and  at  least  equally  diverse  individ- 
uals. If  the  diverse  unverbal  individuals  referred  to  by 
each  name,  man,  dog,  etc.,  could  not  have  been  thus 
grouped  into  identities  by  the  intellect,  and  we  could 
speak  of  them  by  only  giving  a  different  name  to  each  in- 
dividual, language  would  have  been  either  impossible,  or 
limited  to  the  designation  of  a  few  individuals  known  in 
common  to  the  interlocutors ;  as  now  when  we  speak  to  each 
other  of  particular  individuals,  we  can  speak  of  only  such 
as  we  can  bring  to  each  other's  knowledge,  as  Mr.  A.,  and 
Mrs.  B.,  etc. ;  hence  we  discover  the  very  interesting  and 
important  fact,  that  language  is  constructed  on  two  intel- 


OF  THE  STKUCTURE   OF   LANGUAGE.  115 

lectual  processes — the  creation  of  verbal  units,  (as  we  mani- 
fested in  the  last  lecture,)  and  the  creation  of  verbal  identi- 
ties, asmanifested  in  the  present  lecture.  By  the  creation  of 
nominal  units,  the  illimitable  multitudes  of  unverbal  things 
are  grouped  into  a  manageable  number  of  nominal  units ; 
and  by  the  creation  of  verbal  identities,  the  illimitable  unver- 
bal diversities  of  the  nominal  units,  (no  two  spears  of  grass 
being  unverbally  alike,)  are  abridged  into  some  few  thou- 
sand verbal  identities ;  the  total  number  of  words,  for  all 
purposes,  that  compose  the  English  language,  being  only 
about  sixty  thousand,  though  it  is,  perhaps,  the  most  copi- 
ous of  existing  languages. 

And  we  may  note  as  also  deserving  our  recognition,  that 
the  above  two  processes  (the  creation  of  nominal  units 
and  the  creation  of  verbal  identities)  are  no  contrivances 
of  man,  no  mere  conventionality  of  language,  but  proceed 
from  an  organic  impulse  of  the  intellect.  The  organic 
proneness  of  the  intellect  to  note  similarities  as  identities, 
rather  than  to  note  diversities,  is  readily  seen  in  children. 
After  learning  the  word  cow  and  the  animal  so  named, 
they  will  apply  the  word  to  horses  as  well  as  cows ;  and 
the  child's  familiarity  with  animals  must  be  long  estab- 
lished before  he  will  discriminate  between  cows,  oxen,  and 
bulls.  Nor  must  we  deem  such  indiscrimination  peculiar 
to  children.  "When  a  man  who  is  unaccustomed  to  rural 
objects,  sees  a  flock  of  sheep,  they  will  look  identically 
alike,  though  the  shepherd  who  attends  the  flock,  will 
know  them  individually,  as  accurately  as  he  can  discrim- 


116  THE  MEANING  OF  WORDS. 

inate  individual  men  -among  his  human  acquaintances. 
We  may  note  the  same  organic  proneness  to  identify  rather 
than  discriminate,  when  we  look  at  clouds,  and  grotesquely 
form  thereout  mountains,  camels,  lions,  whales,  etc.,  no 
man  ever  thinking  what  the  clouds  are  not  like,  but  only 
what  they  are  like.  So  the  first  impression  of  every  man 
when  he  looks  at  a  portrait,  is  not  whom  it  is  not  like,  but 
whom  it  is  like ;  and,  indeed,  we  may  say  of  pictures  as 
we  have  said  of  words,  that  if  the  organic  tendency  of  our 
intellect  had  been  to  discover  diversities  rather  than  simil- 
itudes, we,  probably,  should  have  possessed  no  art  of  por- 
traiture. 

The  discrimination  of  diversities  is  further  unlike  the 
perception  of  similitudes  by  requiring  usually  an  effort  of 
the  will ;  hence  dull,  sleepy,  and  stupid  people,  discrimi- 
nate differences  less  than  persons  who  are  deemed  brilliant. 
The  perception  of  discriminations  may  be  improved  by 
keeping  the  intellect  attentive  thereto,  and  the  power  is  well 
worth  our  cultivation.  I  know  a  man  of  ordinary  discern- 
ment who  sat  for  many  years  by  a  wood  fire,  which  was 
supported  on  a  pair  of  brass  andirons,  and  he  had  never 
seen  that  the  andirons  were  not  matched,  till  a  casual  ac- 
quaintance directed  his  attention  to  a  prominent  visible 
diversity  in  them. 

Unverbal  diversity  of  intellectual  units  that  are  verbally  iden- 
tical. 

§1.1  have  probably  said  enough  to  evince  the  un verbal 


OF  THE  STRUCTURE   OF  LANGUAGE.  117 

diversity  that  exists  in  sensible  units  that  are  verbally 
identical.  I  desire  to  show  a  like  unverbal  diversity 
among  intellectual  units  that  are  verbally  identical.  Every 
man  possesses  some  wisdom,  but  if  we  seek  in  the  several 
wisdoms  of  all  men  for  an  unverbal  identity,  except  sub- 
jectively in  the  conception  of  the  intellect  from  which 
alone  the  verbal  identity  proceeds,  we  are  puzzling  our- 
selves by  mistaking  the  nature  of  the  identity.  Without 
this  organic  intellectual  identification  of  unverbal  simila- 
rities or  analogies,  we  could  possess  no  such  general  word 
as  wisdom ;  let  us,  therefore,  accept  the  benefit  thankfully 
without  making  the  verbal  identification  of  unverbal  diver- 
sities a  speculative  delusion,  through  ignorance  of  a  dis- 
tinction which  our  intellect  enables  us  to  understand. 
And  not  only  is  the  wisdom  of  different  men  not  identical, 
except  verbally,  but  the  wisdom  of  Thomas  to-day,  and 
his  wisdom  yesterday,  are  only  verbally  identical,  and 
may  be  unverbally  very  diverse.  And  what  we  have  said 
of  wisdom  we  may  repeat  of  wit,  judgment,  sagacity,  cun- 
ning, discrimination,  reflection,  anticipation,  ratiocination, 
reason,  to  the  end  of  the  vocabulary  of  intellectual  person- 
ages and  processes.  Each  word  names  countless  unverbal 
diversities,  which  the  intellect  alone  identifies.  The  diver- 
sities, however,  which  each  word  identifies,  never  perplex 
us  practically;  the  intellect  of  any  man  knowing  what 
unverbal  thing  to  name  wit,  judgment,  cunning,  etc.,  as 
readily  as  it  knows  what  unverbal  things  are  fish,  insect, 
or  vegetable,  etc. 


118  THE  MEANING  OF  WORDS. 

Diversity  of  internal  feelings  that  are  verbally  identical. 

§  1.  I  have  shown  sufficiently,  I  suppose,  that  all  intel- 
lectual things  which  are  verbally  identical,  are  generally 
diverse  from  each  other.  I  will,  therefore,  proceed  to 
show  the  like  of  our  internal  feelings,  and  that  the  anger 
of  Thomas,  and  the  anger  of  James,  which  are  verbally 
identical,  are  identical  in  only  the  conception  of  the  intel- 
lect. Even  the  anger  of  Thomas  to-day,  and  his  anger 
yesterday,  are  only  verbally  identical,  while  un verbally 
they  may  differ  much  from  each  other.  The  love,  also, 
which  I  feel  for  my  dog,  my  children,  property,  country, 
etc.,  are  verbal  identities.  They  possess  a  sufficient  analogy 
to  each  other  to  induce  the  intellect  to  deem  them  identi- 
ties, under  the  common  name  love;  just  as  the  intellect 
sees  in  a  shark,  an  anchovy,  and  an  eel,  a  sufficient  analogy 
to  deem  them  identities,  under  the  common  name  fish ;  but 
we  shall  be  deluded  in  either  case,  if  we  deem  the  verbal 
identity  anything  more  than  a  conception  of  the  intellect. 

"We  may  apply  the  foregoing  remarks  severally,  to  all 
other  verbal  identities  formed  of  our  internal  feelings,  as 
pride,  pity,  vanity,  glory,  shame,  generosity,  patriotism, 
goodness,  etc.  If  we  contemplate  our  emotional  manifes- 
tations ever  so  superficially,  we  must  see  the  great  diversity 
that  exists  unverbally  in  the  goodness  of  a  good  ship,  a  good 
horse,  a  good  road,  a  good  man,  and  so  of  every  other  ver- 
bally identical  goodness;  to  say  nothing  of  the  diversity 
which  exists  unverbally  among  a  thousand  horses  that  are 


OF  THE  STRUCTURE   OF   LANGUAGE.  119 

severally  good,  a  thousand  ships,  etc.  Such  identities  pro- 
duce no  practical,  and  but  little  speculative  difficulty,  their 
unverbal  diversity  being  obvious ;  unless  a  man  more  curi- 
ous than  ordinary,  begins  to  speculatively  inquire  in  what 
the  identity  exists  of  these  several  goods ;  and  fails  to  dis- 
cover that  it  exists  in  merely  an  analogy  which  the  intellect 
discovers  between  them ;  and  which  it  discovers  so  organi- 
cally, that  we  know  as  instantaneously  what  to  designate 
good,  as  we  know  instantly,  without  any  previous  ac- 
quaintance, what  to  designate  as  a  metal  or  a  tree. 

§  2.  I  will  only  remark  further,  on  the  present  topic, 
that  the  difficulty  which  men  experience  in  disclosing  to 
each  other  the  precise  unverbal  feeling  that  they  are  expe- 
riencing on  any  occasion,  compels  us  to  give  the  same 
name  to  very  diverse  feelings ;  while  the  facility  with  which 
we  can  exhibit  to  each  other  sensible  objects,  enables  us  to 
give  the  same  name  to  only  very  close  resemblances ;  com- 
pare, for  instance,  the  slight  sensible  difference  between 
any  two  scarlets,  with  the  great  emotional  difference  that 
exists  between  the  pity  you  feel  for  your  sick  child,  and 
the  pity  you  feel  for  a  wounded  fly.  Verbally  the  two 
pities  are  as  identical  as  the  two  scarlets. 

Verbal  identities  among  things  other  than  units  or  individ- 
ualities. 

§  1.  Most  of  the  unverbal  identities  to  which  I  have  as 
yet  alluded,  are  what  grammarians  term  nouns,  and  what 
I  in  a  former  lecture  called  nominal  units  or  individuali- 


120  THE  MEANING  OF  WOEDS. 

ties.  But  the  intellect  converts  into  verbal  identities,  not 
nouns  only,  but  qualities,  actions,  and  relations  of  various 
kinds,  etc.  Sugar  is  sweet,  honey,  fruit  of  many  kinds, 
etc.,  are  all  sweet ;  but  if  we  look  for  the  identity  of  the 
several  sweets,  except  in  the  organic  perception  of  the  in- 
tellect to  which  alone  the  verbal  identity  owes  its  origin, 
we  shall  not  understand  language  correctly.  So  fire  is  hot, 
sunshine  is  hot,  our  hands  are  sometimes  hot,  the  atmos- 
phere may  be  hot,  etc. ;  but  if  we  look  for  the  identity  of 
these  several  hots,  except  in  the  intellect,  in  whose  concep- 
tion alone  the  identity  exists,  we  shall  not  find  it. 

In  the  creation  of  such  verbal  identities,  the  intellect 
obeys  an  organic  impulse  which  is  irresistible ;  and  the  in- 
tellect seems  equally  compelled  to  subsequently  aggregate 
such  identities  into  nominal  units ;  as,  for  instance,  to  ag- 
gregate the  several  hots  into  the  nominal  unit  caloric,  and 
the  several  sweets  into  the  nominal  unit  sweetness,  and 
certain  particular  sweets  into  a  unit  under  the  name  of 
saccharine ;  but  when  we  fail  to  understand  that  such  verbal 
identities  and  nominal  units  are  intellectual,  not  physical, 
we  needlessly  neglect  a  discrimination  which  also  the  intel- 
lect is  organized  to  make.  The  conception  of  the  identity 
and  the  unit  are  both  useful,  but  a  correct  understanding 
of  the  identities  and  units  is  equally  useful,  our  organiza- 
tion evolving  utilities  in  all  its  capabilities. 

§  2.  But  not  only  the  sweets  of  sugar,  honey,  fruit,  etc., 
are  only  verbally  identical,  but  some  unverbal  diversity 
may  exist  in  the  sweet  of  different  sugars,  as  it  certainly 


OP  THE  STRUCTURE  OF  LANGUAGE.  121 

exists  in  the  sweet  of  different  oranges,  different  apples, 
etc.  The  like  may  be  said  of  the  identity  of  every  nominal 
quality.  Snow,  salt,  silver,  glass,  water,  the  moon,  my 
hand,  and  this  paper,  are  all  verbally  white,  for  the  intel- 
lect sees  an  analogy  in  their  appearance ;  and  to  that  intel- 
lectual conception  the  word  white  refers ;  but  if  you  seek 
among  the  numerous  whites  for  a  sensible  identity  that 
shall  conform  to  the  verbal  identity,  your  search  is  falla- 
cious. Even  the  white  of  different  waters,  different  glasses, 
or  different  snows,  is  not  usually  in  any  one  class  of  the 
articles  as  complete  unverbally  as  verbally. 

Perhaps  every  man  will  occasionally  think  of  his  per- 
sonal identity  and  sameness.  He  is  conscious  that  he  is 
the  same  being,  now,  perhaps,  decrepit  and  old,  that  was 
once  an  infant,  once  a  youth,  once  a  vigorous  man.  He  is 
the  same  man,  who  is  kind  and  amiable  to  his  wife  and 
children,  and  perhaps  harsh  and  hateful  to  other  persons. 
He  is  the  same  man,  who  was  once  innocent  and  happy ; 
now  perhaps  guilty  and  unhappy.  He  exhibits  his  por- 
trait, and  beholders  smile  when  he  assures  them  it  was 
once' a  correct  delineation.  He  looks  in  a  mirror  and  is 
himself  shocked  at  the  change  which  time  has  produced  in 
him;  he  reflects  on  his  feelings  and  is  surprised  how 
calmly  he  contemplates  events  that  once  overwhelmed  him 
with  grief;  and  how  indifferent  he  feels  towards  death  and 
other  future  contingencies  that  once  agitated  him  with  ap- 
prehensions. He  is  changed  in  his  physical  aggregate,  and 
in  every  physical  particular — he  is  changed  morally  in  the 


122  THE  MEANING  OF  WORDS. 

intensity  of  every  feeling,  and  intellectually  in  almost 
every  opinion ;  still  lie  can  no  more  doubt  his  sameness 
and  identity  amidst  these  changes,  than  he  can  doubt  his 
present  existence.  His  sameness  is  an  undiscoverable  and 
perplexing  mystery  while  he  attempts  to  discover  it  phy- 
sically; but  it  ceases  from  being  mysterious  when  he 
knows  that  it  is  only  a  conception  of  his  intellect,  and 
hence  that  it  no  way  conflicts  with  the  countless  sensible 
diversities  he  has  suffered.  Indeed,  the  only  proper  mys- 
tery to  every  man  is  his  own  organization,  for  all  other 
mysteries  are  solvable  thereby  as  in  the  foregoing  example. 
His  own  organization  is  somewhat  like  the  ocean.  He  can 
account  for  rivers,  creeks,  and  springs,  by  the  descent  of 
rain  from  the  clouds,  and  he  can  account  for  the  rain  in 
the  clouds  by  evaporations  from  the  ocean ;  but  the  ocean 
yields  no  explanation  of  its  own  exhaustless  fullness,  roll- 
ing and  heaving  incessantly,  and  leaving  nothing  for  us 
but  to  note  and  wonder. 

§  3.  The  verbal  identity  which  exists  thus  between 
qualities,  etc.,  that  are  very  diverse  unverbally,  we  often 
employ  to  add  a  piquancy  to  our  intellectual  speculations. 
Stone,  we  say,  is  material,  air  is  material,  light,  water, 
earth,  and  iron,  are  severally  material.  We  are  then 
taught  to  wonder  and  admire  that  sunbeams  thus  identical 
with  iron  and  stone,  can  fall  with  a  velocity  unparalleled, 
and  from  a  height  of  millions  of  miles,  and  not  merely 
leave  our  houses  unbattered,  but  leave  us  unconscious  of 
the  blows  which  are  inflicted  on  even  our  eyes.  Now  I 


OF  THE  STRUCTURE  OF  LANGUAGE.  123 

would  ask  why,  in  such  recitals,  are  we  fond  of  directing 
our  attention  to  the  velocity  of  light  and  the  height  from 
which  it  falls.  Our  motive  clearly  is  to  thereby  manifest 
that  our  eyes  ought  to  be  hurt.  But  why  ought  they  to  be 
hurt  ? — simply  because  we  identify  light  with  stone.  With 
the  intellectual  identification  of  the  two,  I  wage  no  con- 
troversy ;  but  I  would  fain  dispel  the  error  which  proceeds 
from  not  discriminating  unverbal  differences  in  things  ver- 
bally identical.  The  verbal  equivoke  is  pleasing  to  the 
feeling  of  wonder  in  I  suppose  every  man  ;  but  as  we  no 
longer  tolerate  necromancy,  except  when  it  is  avowed  to 
be  sleight  of  hand,  I  think  we  ought  no  longer  to  tolerate 
intellectual  identities  to  be  presented  to  us  as  physical 
identities.  Let  us  enjoy  all  the  benefits  that  proceed  from 
the  organism  by  which  our  intellect  identifies  verbally, 
diversities  that  are  unverbal;  but  let  us  not  vitiate  the 
benefits  by  unnecessarily  disregarding  generic  and  other 
unverbal  diversities  in  things  verbally  identical. 

I  lately  saw  a  book  intended  for  the  instruction  of  youth, 
in  which  the  reader's  curiosity  is  sought  to  be  excited  by 
the  information  that  he  and  iron  possess  many  qualities  in 
common,  as  colour,  form,  substance,  mobility,  etc.  So  far 
as  the  qualities  are  verbally  identical,  the  child  knows  the 
identity  ;  but  so  far  as  you  want  him  to  deem  the  identity 
physical,  instead  of  an  intellectual  conception,  you  are  de- 
luding him  with  an  equivoke.  Youth  are  taught  that 
plants  are  male  and  female.  The  verbal  identity  thus  es- 
tablished between  plants  and  animals,  is  a  conception  of 


124  THE   MEANING  OF  WORDS. 

the  intellect,  founded  on  certain  analogies  which  the  intel- 
lect organically  sees  between  plants  and  animals,  and  I 
admit  they  are  many,  and  highly  deserving  of  observation ; 
but  when  we  desire  a  youth  to  confound  the  intellectually 
conceived  verbal  identity  with  a  physical  identity,  we  are 
creating  an  interest  for  botany  at  the  expense  of  his  and 
our  own  understanding.  The  difference  is  just  what  it  is 
between  intellectually  conceived  vegetable  sexuality  and 
animal  sexuality.  By  commenting  on  the  verbal  identity 
of  the  two  sexualities,  I  desire  not  to  commit  the  error  that 
I  am  seeking  to  dispel ;  that  is,  I  desire  not  that  their  dif- 
ference shall  be  estimated  by  my  words,  or  by  any  words, 
but  simply  by  the  unverbal  differences  that  are  discovera- 
ble between  them ;  and  especially  by  not  confounding  the 
information  we  receive  from  our  intellect  and  the  informa- 
tion we  receive  from  our  senses ;  the  two  informations 
being  generically  different. 

§  4.  Leaving  as  sufficiently  explained,  the  verbal  iden- 
tity of  qualities  of  the  same  name,  I  will  examine  the 
verbal  identity  of  certain  relations  which  grammarians  call 
prepositions.  Colour  is  on  (Sight)  grass;  a  carpet  is  on 
(Feel)  the  floor;  a  fragrance  is  on  (Smell)  a  leaf;  a  word  is 
on  (Intellection)  my  tongue ;  an  eclipse  is  on  (Sight)  the 
moon  ;  a  burden  is  on  (G)  my  conscience.  That  the  intel- 
tellect  insists  on  thus  identifying  these  sensible  diversities, 
arises  from  the  beneficial  organic  necessity  of  which  we 
have  already  spoken  as  one  of  the  essential  bases  of  lan- 
guage. Still  we  need  not  vitiate  this  benefit  by  deeming 


_^    .  OF   THE  STRUCTURE  OF   LANGUAGE.  125 

the  verbal  identity  antagonistic  to  the  unverbal  diversity 
of  the  several  cases :  puzzling  ourselves  to  discover  physi- 
cally how  colour  can  be  on  grass  as  a  carpet  is  on  a  floor. 
Professor  Stewart,  labouring  under  this  puzzle,  says,  "  The 
bias  of  every  person  is  certainly  to  deem  that  the  green 
colour  of  grass  is  spread  on  grass  as  a  carpet  is  spread  on  a 
floor."  The  bias  is,  I  admit,  general,  and  as  inevitable  as 
general,  and  as  unsophistical  as  inevitable,  for  it  is  intel- 
lectual ;  and  signifies  merely  that  in  the  conception  of  our 
intellect  the  colour  of  grass  bears  the  same  relation  to  the 
grass  as  a  carpet  bears  to  a  floor  on  which  it  is  spread ;  but 
the  conception  involves  no  negation  of  the  physical  diffe- 
rences that  can  be  discovered  in  the  two  cases ;  as,  for  in- 
stance, that  the  carpet  can  be  felt  as  something  apart  from 
the  floor,  while  the  colour  cannot  be  felt  apart  from  the 
grass.  Unverbal  sensible  diversities  result  necessarily 
from  the  diversity  of  our  senses ;  and  when  we  subsequently 
arraign  the  sensible  diversities  at  the  bar  of  our  intellect, 
and  confront  them  with  their  verbal  identity,  as  conceived 
by  our  intellect,  we  are  trying  the  sensible  diversities  by 
standards  that  pertain  to  the  intellect,  and  to  which  the 
sensible  diversities  owe  no  fealty. 

I  at  one  time  thought  that  language  is  chargeable  with 
originating  misconceptions  like  the  foregoing,  and  that  we 
ought  to  have  designated  by  different  names  the  sight  on, 
and  the  feel  on,  etc. ;  but  the  difficulty  underlies  language, 
or  all  languages  would  not  make  identities  of  such  sensible 
differences.  A  deaf  mute  who  knows  no  language,  will 


126  THE   MEANING  OF  WORDS. 

intellectually  deem  the  colour  of  grass  to  bear  the  same  re- 
lation to  the  grass,  as  a  carpet  bears  to  the  floor  over  which 
it  is  spread ;  and  he  may  not  understand  that  the  identity 
of  the  relation  in  the  two  cases,  is  only  a  conception  of  the 
intellect ;  hence  when  he  reflects  that  the  carpet  can  be  felt 
apart  from  the  floor,  while  the  colour  cannot  be  felt  apart 
from  the  grass,  his  intellect  may  not  discern  that  the  phy- 
sical diversity  of  the  two  cases  is  no  antagonist  of  the  in- 
tellectual identity. 

What  I  have  thus  said  of  the  numerous  unverbal  diver- 
sities that  the  intellect  verbally  identifies  by  means  of  the 
word  on,  I  might  repeat  of  the  numerous  other  unverbal 
diversities  that  the  intellect  verbally  identifies  by  means 
of  the  words  here,  there,  out,  in,  etc.  My  hand  is  in  a 
glove,  a  haze  is  in  the  atmosphere,  heat  is  in  fire,  an  odour 
is  in  roses,  hardness  is  in  iron,  sweetness  is  in  sugar,  a 
thought  is  in  my  mind,  etc.,  etc. ;  but  I  will  refrain  from 
the  repetition,  nor  will  I  show  that  every  verb  and  parti 
ciple  identifies  verbally  unverbal  things  that  are  diverse, 
precisely  as  the  above  prepositions  on  and  in,  identify  ver- 
bally what  un verbally  are  diverse ;  for  if  what  I  have  al- 
ready said  is  not  sufficient,  I  cannot  make  plainer  that  the 
unverbal  diversities  which  exist  in  things  verbally  identi- 
cal are  not  contradicted  by  their  verbal  identity ;  the  ver- 
bal identity  being  subjective  and  relating  to  the  intellect, 
while  the  unverbal  diversities  are  objective,  and  relate  to 
unverbal  things.  Such  of  my  readers  as  comprehend  this 
puzzling  distinction,  may  omit  what  intervenes,  and  pro- 

« 


OF  THE   STRUCTURE   OF  LANGUAGE.  127 

ceed  to  the  next  succeeding  lecture  ;  though  the  interven- 
ing remarks,  especially  those  on  the  inherent  defects  of 
logic,  will  well  repay  the  labour  of  a  perusal,  unless  I 
misjudge  the  amount  of  knowledge  which  exists  on  the 
nature  of  language  ; — I  much  solicit  a  perusal  of  the  whole. 
§  5.  I  will,  therefore,  close  the  present  lecture  by  ex- 
hibiting a  few  miscellaneous  verbal  identities,  whose  un- 
verbal  meanings  are  not  merely  diverse,  but  heterogeneous. 
Lecture  II.  treated  of  things  that  are  verbally  homogene- 
ous, but  un verbally  heterogeneous;  and  I  shall  now  re- 
produce some  of  the  examples  which  I  therein  adduced, 
though  I  shall  now  produce  them  to  exhibit  their  verbal 
identity  in  contrast  with  their  generic  diversity.  The 
passage,  for  instance,  of  light  from  the  sun  to  the  earth  is 
an  intellectual  conception,  not  a  sensible  perception,  like 
the  passage  of  a  steamboat  from  Albany  to  New  York. 
Our  senses  perceive  that  light  ensues  on  the  earth  when 
the  sun  rises  above  the  horizon ;  but  we  see  only  the  sen- 
sible sequence  of  the  sun  and  light,  not  any  passage  sepa- 
rately of  the  light,  as  we  see  the  passage  separately  of  a 
steamboat  through  the  water.  No  man  can,  however, 
prevent  his  intellect  from  identifying  the  two  passages; 
but  when  we  permit  the  verbal  identity  to  mystify  and 
delude  us  by  our  deeming  the  identity  objective  instead 
of  subjective,  we  become  astonished,  and  may  even  thereby 
well  suspect  that  we  have  wandered  from  the  sober  realities 
of  the  senses,  into  the  fairy  land  of  the  intellect.  But  as 
we  compare  together  the  physical  passage  of  a  steamboat, 


128  THE   MEANING  OF  WORDS. 

etc.,  and  the  intellectually  conceived  passage  of  light,  for 
the  purpose  of  astonishing  ourselves  by  the  contrast,  why 
should  we  not  relieve  the  astonishment,  by  showing  that 
the  two  passages  are  only  verbally  identical,  though  un- 
verbally  diverse ;  one  being  sensible,  and  the  other  intel- 
lectual. Just  as  well  may  we  mystify  ourselves  by  asking, 
how  the  soul  is  united  to  the  body  ?  how  heat  and  light 
are  united  in  flame  ?  how  coldness  and  hardness  are  united 
in  ice  ?  how  the  movements  of  a  man's  limbs  are  united  to 
his  volition  ?  how  effects  are  united  to  causes  ?  how  sweet- 
ness is  united  to  sugar,  and  an  echo  united  to  a  sound? 
Well,  all  these  questions  have  been  asked  from  the  earliest 
periods  of  speculative  inquiry,  and  they  are  still  asked. 
The  difficulty  is  just  like  the  foregoing.  Two  links  of  an 
iron  chain  are  united  by  a  sensible  union,  but  the  union 
of  the  soul  to  the  body,  etc.,  is  an  intellectual  conception. 
If,  however,  we  suppose  that  the  intellectual  identification 
of  the  two  unions  authorizes  us  to  seek  in  the  soul  and 
body,  etc.,  for  a  physical  union,  like  what  our  senses  per- 
ceive in  two  links  of  a  chain ;  or  to  make  a  mystery  of  our 
inability  to  discover  sensibly  such  a  union ;  we  are  utterly 
misunderstanding,  not  language  only,  but  our  perceptive 
organization. 

The  error  assumes  a  thousand  different  phases,  and  I  am 
striving  only  to  manifest  it,  not  to  chronicle  the  errors  in 
detail.  We  teach  a  child  that  certain  stars  are  suns.  We 
court  his  belief  that  the  identity  is  not  intellectual  merely, 
but  as  unverbal  as  verbal,  despite  the  sensible  diversity, 


OF  THE  STRUCTURE  OF  LANGUAGE.  129 

which  only  gives  a  zest  to  the  sophistical  identity.  Our 
inability  to  account  for  the  luminousness  of  certain  stars, 
except  by  assimilating  them  with  the  sun,  induces  the  in- 
tellect to  make  the  assimilation;  and  we  possess  other 
inducements ;  but  the  assimilation,  however  induced,  is  in- 
tellectual, and  will  excite  no  feeling  of  surprise  in  any 
person  when  thus  understood.  Beyond  all  natural  visi- 
bility and  all  telescopic,  other  suns  we  say  exist,  orb  above 
orb  without  end ;  still  wishing  the  child  to  continue  the 
erroneous  indiscrimination  between  the  verbal  identity 
which  is  intellectual,  and  the  unverbal  diversity  that  is 
physical.  With  the  logic  that  produces  such  intellections 
I  have  no  controversy ;  though  I  ought  to  say  here  as  a 
complement  of  former  incidental  remarks  on  the  same  sub- 
ject, that  the  defect  of  logic  consists  in  its  taking  no  cogni- 
zance of  the  heterogeneity  which  exists  in  the  unverbal 
meaning  of  words.  This  defect  renders  the  conclusions  of 
logic  wholly  unreliable  in  all  speculative  disquisitions  not 
purely  intellectual ;  and  of  this  I  will  subjoin  an  ex- 
ample in  the  succeeding  paragraph,  which  quotes  Zeno's 
celebrated  paradox  in  relation  to  motion.  Nothing  can  be 
more  practically  important  than  for  us  to  understand  the 
foregoing  inherent  defect  of  logic;  and  I  believe  it  has 
heretofore  escaped  detection.  Till  a  man  understands  it, 
he  is  in  constant  danger  of  becoming  the  victim  of  some 
speculative  delusion.  Creation  needs  no  logical  equivokes 
for  its  exaltation,  nor  the  perversion  of  reason  for  its  glory, 

We  tell  a  youth  that  the  earth  travels  with  various  velo 
6* 


130  THE   MEANING  OF  WOKDS. 

cities,  and  gyrates  in  different  circles;  but  the  youth  is 
deceived  by  the  verbal  identity,  when  he  believes  that 
the  intellectually  conceived  gyrations  and  velocities  are 
unverbally  identical  with  physical  gyrations  and  velo- 
cities ;  and  that  he  is  physically  whirled  through  space 
momentarily,  some  thousand  miles  in  one  direction,  and 
some  seventeen  miles  in  another. 

Zeno's  celebrated  paradox  respecting  motion,  to  which  I 
alluded  above,  is  as  good  an  example  as  I  can  adduce,  of 
the  wonders  we  may  logically  produce  by  not  discriminat- 
ing unverbal  diversities  among  things  verbally  identical ; 
for  instance,  admit  that  a  tortoise  is  a  mile  before  Achilles, 
and  that  Achilles  runs  a  hundred  times  faster  than  the 
tortoise,  yet  Achilles  will  never  overtake  the  tortoise, 
though  he  continue  the  chase  forever ;  "  because,"  says 
Zeno,  "  when  Achilles  has  run  the  mile,  the  tortoise  will 
have  moved  forward  the  hundredth  part  of  a  mile ;  and 
while  Achilles  runs  the  hundredth  part  of  a  mile,  the  tor- 
toise has  moved  forward  the  ten-thousandth  part  of  a  mile ; 
so  that  it  is  not  yet  overtaken.  In  the  same  manner  whilst 
Achilles  passes  over  the  ten-thousandth  part  of  a  mile,  the 
tortoise  moves  on  the  millionth  part  of  a  mile,  and  is  not 
yet  overtaken ;  and  so  on  ad  infinitum."  The  millionth 
part  of  a  mile  leaves  them  asunder  say  about  the  fifteenth 
part  of  an  inch,  which  is  a  physical  distance ;  hence  the 
tortoise  is,  as  stated,  not  yet  physically  overtaken.  But 
the  next  nominal  progression  will  create  a  necromantic 
quibble,  unless  we  see  that  the  words  no  longer  retain  a 


OF  THE  STRUCTURE  OF  LANGUAGE.  131 

physical  meaning,  but  are  speaking  of  intellectual  concep- 
tions ;  for  instance,  Achilles  is  distant  from  the  tortoise  the 
fifteenth  part  of  an  inch,  and  the  tortoise  is  not  yet  over- 
taken ;  but  while  Achilles  pursues  the  tortoise  along  this 
fifteenth  part  of  an  inch,  the  tortoise  will  move  forward 
the  fifteen-hundredth  part  of  an  inch  ;  and  is,  therefore,  by 
the  terms  of  the  proposition,  not  yet  overtaken.  But  the 
fifteen-hundredth  part  of  an  inch,  or  some  more  comminuted 
progression,  will  possess  only  an  intellectual  signification ; 
and  if  we  deem  it  a  physical  separation  between  Achilles 
and  the  tortoise,  we  are  deluded  by  the  verbal  identity 
that  exists  among  things  unverbally  and  generically 
diverse. 

In  the  same  intellectual  way,  no  limit  exists  to  the  di- 
visibility of  matter;  for  every  nominal  whole  possesses 
intellectually  two  nominal  halves,  and  each  nominal  half 
becomes  immediately,  when  separately  considered,  an  in- 
tellectual whole,  endued  with  nominal  halves ;  and  so  ad 
infinitum.  The  logic  is  incontestible,  and  the  conclusion 
is  true  intellectually,  and  true,  physically  also,  while  the 
words  possess  any  sensible  signification ;  but  after  a  cer- 
tain number  of  sensible  divisions  of  any  sensible  thing, 
the  word  half  will  refer  to  neither  a  sight  nor  a  feel,  and 
will  become  as  physically  insignificant,  and  as  purely  an 
intellectual  conception  only,  as  the  insensible  distance 
which  separates  Achilles  from  the  tortoise ;  hence  the  de- 
fect is  alike  in  the  logic  of  both  propositions.  So  little 
understood,  however,  is  the  defect,  that  the  infinite  divisi- 


132  THE   MEANING  OF  WORDS. 

<l 

bility  of  matter  is  treasured  as  a  physical  truth ;  while 
Zeno's  kindred  problem,  (from  interfering  more  grossly 
with  our  physical  experience,)  is  called  a  quibble. 

The  intellect  may  imagine  a  circle  that  shall  be*  ver- 
bally larger  than  the  orbit  described  by  the  earth  in  its 
annual  revolutions,  still  no  part  of  the  imagined  verbal 
circumference  can  be  verbally  a  straight  line;  for  no 
proposition  in  mathematics  is  more  logically  satisfactory, 
than  that  a  nominal  straight  line  cannot  constitute  a 
nominal  circle ;  hence  we  arrive  logically  at  the  intellec- 
tual conclusion,  that  a  curve  may  expand  ad  infinitum 
without  becoming  straight ;  though  at  every  verbal  ex- 
pansion of  the  curve,  it  approximates  intellectually 
towards  verbal  straightness.  In  view  of  this  logical  pro- 
cess Hume  says,  "the  demonstration  seems  as  unexcep- 
tionable as  that  which  proves  the  three  angles  of  a  trian- 
gle to  be  equal  to  two  right  angles ;  though  the  latter 
opinion  is  natural  and  easy,  and  the  former  big  with  con- 
tradiction and  absurdity.  Eeason  here  seems  thrown  into 
a  kind  of  amazement,  which,  without  the  suggestion  of 
any  sceptic,  gives  her  a  diffidence  of  herself,  and  of  the 
ground  on  which  she  treads.  She  sees  a  full  light,  but  it 
borders  upon  the  most  profound  darkness.  Between  them 
she  is  so  dazzled  and  confounded,  that  she  can  scarcely 
pronounce  with  certainty  concerning  any  object." 

But  the  difficulty  vanishes  if  we  discriminate  the 
unverbal  diversity  that  exists  among  verbal  identities, 
and  which  diversity  logic  disregards.  Mathematicians 


OF  THE  STRUCTUEE  OF  LANGUAGE.  133 

are  correct  physically,  so  long  as  the  words  which  they 
employ  refer  to  sensible  existences ;  but  when  they 
speak  of  a  curve  which  can  neither  be  seen  nor  felt,  it  is 
a  verbal  curve  minus  a  physical  curve ;  and  the  proposition 
is  like  the  problem  of  Zeno — that  is,  the  names  curve, 
circle,  etc.,  refer  to  only  intellections.  If  we  deem  them 
unverbally  identical  with  the  physical  things  of  the  same 
name,  we  are  confounding  things  that  are  unverbally  di- 
verse. When  we  see  a  juggler  cut  a  hole  out  of  our  hand- 
kerchief, and  subsequently  restore  to  us  the  handkerchief 
uncut,  we  know  he  has  deluded  us,  though  we  may  be 
unable  to  discover  how ;  so  when  we  see  the  logical  pro- 
cesses to  which  Hume  refers,  we  ought  to  know  that  some 
delusion  exists,  though  we  should  be  unable  to  explain 
what  the  delusion  is.  The  subject  merits  any  amount  of 
further  illustration,  but  I  am  attempting  the  manifestation 
of  only  principles. 


PAET    II. 


OF    THE    ITNFALLACIOTTS    INTERPRETATION 
OF    LANGUAGE. 


LECTURE  V. 

OP  THE   UNVERBAL  SIGNIFICATION"  OF  WORDS. 

CONTENTS. 

1.  The  nominal  identity  of  any  two  or  more  unverbal  things  must  be  in- 

terpreted by  their  unverbal  diversity. 

2.  The  verbal  homogeneity  of  any  two  or  more  unverbal  things  must  be 

interpreted  by  their  unverbal  heterogeneity. 

3.  The  nominal  oneness  of  any  verbal  thing  must  be  interpreted  by  its 

unverbal  multiplicity. 

Of  the  unverbal  signification  of  verbal  identities. 
§  1.  I  have  completed  all  I  contemplate  saying  on  the 
structure  of  language,  and  I  am  to  speak  now  of  the  inter- 
pretation of  words  into  unverbal  things ;  remembering 
always,  that  I  have  nothing  to  say  about  language,  except 
in  its  relation  to  unverbal  things.  The  word  man  is  applied 
to  many  hundred  millions  of  individuals  who  severally 
differ  from  each  other.  Their  verbal  identity  proceeds 
from  an  organic  contrivance  of  the  intellect,  and  the  con- 
trivance is  one  of  the  essential  foundations  of  language ; 
but  we  must  necessarily  reverse  this  intellectual  contri- 
vance when  we  want  to  know  what  the  word  man  means 
unverbally  in  any  particular  application ;  that  is,  the  man 
himself,  unverbally,  is  the  only  proper  exponent  of  the 


138  THE   MEANING  OF  WORDS. 

verbal  manhood  which  our  intellect  gives  him  in  common 
with  hundreds  of  millions  of  other  individuals.  Courts 
and  juries  are  often  engaged  in  deciding  whether  a  person 
is  sane  or  insane.  If  the  intellect  of  the  triers  sees  an  iden- 
tity between  the  person's  conduct,  etc.,  and  other  conduct 
which  they  deem  insane,  he  will  be  adjudged  insane  ;  but 
after  this  decision,  we  must  interpret  his  adjudged  verbal 
insanity  by  his  unverbal  conduct,  etc.,  if  we  would  know 
what  the  verbal  insanity  signifies  unverbally  in  the  given 
case.  Ten  thousand  men  may  severally  be  insane  at  the 
same  time  and  place,  but  the  identity  of  their  insanity  is 
only  an  intellectual  conception ;  while,  unverbally,  their 
insanity  may  differ  in  every  individual.  Every  man  is 
verbally  a  sinner,  but  this  general  admission  refers  to  only 
an  intellectual  identification ;  if  you  would  know  what  sin 
is  unverbally  in  any  given  instance,  the  instance  alone 
with  its  unverbal  utterance  can  yield  the  only  proper 
answer. 

Water  is  fluid,  air  is  fluid,  quicksilver,  light,  blood, 
electricity,  lightning,  ether,  magnetism,  fused  iron,  are  all 
fluid.  The  word  fluid  is-  correctly  applied,  for  the  intellect 
discovers  among  the  unverbal  things  thus  referred  to,  a 
similarity  which  justifies  the  application  to  them  of  the 
word  fluid ;  and  we  may  apply  the  word  whenever  our  in- 
tellect discovers  that  the  name  is  appropriate ;  but  we 
must  not  afterwards  interpret  the  unverbal  fluidity  by  the 
name  which  we  thus  attach  .to  it ;  but  the  name  must,  in 
every  case,  be  interpreted  by  the  unverbal  fluidity  to  which 


UNFALLACIOUS  INTERPRETATION  OF  LANGUAGE.     139 

it  is  attached.    Like  remarks  are  applicable  to  every  word. 

Again,  when  we  employ  the  word  water  to  designate 
the  colour  of  a  diamond,  the  word  means  the  unverbal 
colour  to  which  the  word  refers ;  and  the  unverbal  colour 
is  the  only  proper  exponent  of  the  meaning  of  the  word. 
When  a  physician  says  your  blood  is  watery,  the  word 
means  the  unverbal  things  to  which  he  refers ;  and  till  you 
are  made  acquainted  with  them,  you  will  not  understand 
the  physician's  unverbal  meaning,  though  you  may  know 
the  unverbal  meaning  of  watery  in  every  other  use  of  it 
Why  the  colour  of  a  diamond  should  be  designated  by  the 
word  water,  my  intellect  readily  understands,  for  it  sees 
an  analogy  between  the  colour  of  a  diamond  and  water  ; 
and  no  doubt  the  intellect  of  a  physician,  who  applies  the 
term  watery  to  the  blood,  sees  some  analogy  between  the 
properties  of  water  and  the  unverbal  thing  to  which  he 
refers  when  he  says  a  patient's  blood  is  watery. 

One  of  the  most  beneficial  powers  of  the  intellect  is  the 
countless  multitude  of  unverbal  things  that  it  organically 
assimilates,  thus  enabling  us  to  designate  all  of  them  by  a 
single  word.  The  more  a  man's  intellect  possesses  this 
analogizing  power,  the  more  acute  we  deem  his  power  of 
generalization ;  and  perhaps  man's  capacity  in  this  particu- 
lar, is  one  of  the  chief  particulars  in  which  he  is  intellectu- 
ally superior  to  other  beings.  The  organic  defect  of  idiots 
may  consist  in  the  deficiency  in  some  idiots,  and  in  the 
absence  in  some't>thers,  of  the  powers  to  conceive  identities 
among  unverbal  things,  and. to  aggregate  unverbal  things 


140  THE  MEANING  OF  WORDS. 

into  units ;  these  two  powers  of  the  intellect  being  the  main 
foundations  of  language,  and  the  absence  or  defectiveness 
thereof  would  account  for  the  inability  among  idiots  to 
acquire,  employ,  and  understand  language.  My  opportu- 
nities have  never  placed  me  in  a  position  to  note  idiots ; 
but  if  the  above  suggestions  shall  prove  to  be  accurate,  they 
may  be  useful  in  the  attempt  to  instruct  idiots ;  the  organic 
powers  alluded  to  being  improveable  by  effort  where  the 
powers  are  not  wholly  absent. 

"We  discover  by  the  foregoing  remarks,  that  the  diversity 
which  exists  in  the  un verbal  .meaning  of  even  the  most 
simple  word,  is  as  great  as  the  diversity  of  unverbal  things 
among  which  the  intellect  can  discover  a  given  analogy ; 
hence  we  can  see  the  necessity  of  seeking  the  unverbal 
meaning  of  every  word  in  the  unverbal  thing  to  which  it 
is  applied  in  every  given  application.  Every  word  is 
somewhat  like  a  mirror.  The  mirror  reflects  the  image  of 
every  object  that  is  placed  before  it,  and  every  word  re- 
flects the  unverbal  things  to  which  the  word  refers.  My 
hand  is  red,  blood  is  red,  hair  is  often  red,  the  moon  is 
sometimes  red,  fire  is  red,  and  Indians  are  red.  The  intel- 
lect sees  in  these  several  unverbal  sights,  an  identity  or 
congruity  that  makes  the  word  red  appropriate  to  all  of 
them ;  but  if  you  would  know  unsophistically  the  unverbal 
meaning  of  the  word  red,  in  its  application  to  my  hand,  to 
an  Indian,  to  the  moon,  etc.,  you  must,  in  each  applica- 
tion, seek  the  meaning  in  the  unverbal  things  referred 

to.    If  you  look  in  a  dictionary  for  the  meaning  of  red, 

• 


UNFALLACIOUS  INTERPRETATION  OF  LANGUAGE.      141 

the  dictionary  can  give  you  only  the  verbal  meaning  of  the 
word. 

Still,  after  my  intellect  shall  decide  that  a  given  colour 
is  red,  your  intellect  may  decide  it  is  crimson,  for  every 
intellect  conceives  its  own  identities  or  similitudes;  but 
whatever  propriety  or  impropriety  may  exist  in  the  name 
with  which  I  designate  the  colour,  the  unverbal  colour  is 
the  only  proper  exponent  of  the  unverbal  meaning  of  the 
word ;  and  with  this  understanding,  the  unverbal  meaning 
is  the  same,  though  fifty  different  persons  call  it  severally 
by  fifty  different  names.  If,  therefore,  the  persons  altercate 
in  reference  to  the  name,  they  should  understand,  that  so 
long  as  they  refer  to  the  same  sight,  their  altercation  re- 
lates to  language,  not  to  unverbal  things.  Whether  a 
given  colour  shall  be  called  red  or  crimson,  depends  on 
usage,  and  I  shall  be  verbally  wrong  if  I  designate  as  red 
what  good  usage  designates  as  crimson ;  but  people  gene- 
rally discriminate  so  little  between  words  and  unverbal 
things,  that  disputants  rarely  understand  definitely  whe- 
ther they  are  differing  verbally  or  unverbally.  I  have 
heard  of  men  who  cannot  tell  "  one  colour  from  another," 
but  I  have  never  been  able  to  understand  whether  the  al- 
leged defect  is  an  inability  to  discriminate  differences  un- 
verbally, or  only  an  inability  to  discriminate  verbally  as 
other  men  discriminate,  who  are  skilled  in  the  proper  use 
of  words ;  though  the  two  defects  are  essentially  different, 
one  relating  to  words,  and  the  other  to  unverbal  things. 

§  2.  To  remedy  as  far  as  practicable  the  foregoing  vague- 


142  THE  MEANING  OF  WORDS. 

ness  in  the  unverbal  meaning  of  verbal  identities,  men 
conventionally  define  what  unverbal  things  shall  constitute 
the  meaning  of  the  words  insanity,  sin,  fever,  contagion, 
knowledge,  matter,  truth,  etc. ;  but  though  such  definitions 
are  useful,  they  are  all  obstructed  by  the  illimitable  diver- 
sity of  unverbal  things ;  and  if  we  would  know  accurately 
the  unverbal  meaning  in  any  given  case,  of  even  the  word 
murder,  we  must  interpret  the  word  by  the  unverbal  actions 
to  which  the  word  refers  in  the  given  case.  If  this  be  true 
of  the  word  murder,  on  whose  definiteness  the  life  of  prison- 
ers is  daily  either  saved  or  lost,  how  much  greater  must  be 
the  necessity  of  thus  interpreting  the  unverbal  meaning  of 
ordinary  verbal  identities,  on  whose  definiteness  of  unver- 
bal meaning  no  important  consequences  are  dependent. 

Men  have,  however,  succeeded  usefully  in  the  substitu- 
tion of  artificial  identifications  of  given  animals,  vegetables, 
minerals,  etc.,  in  place  of  the  assimilations  thereof  which 
the  intellect  makes  spontaneously ;  and  to  which  ordinary 
language  refers,  by  the  words  fish,  birds,  beasts,  trees, 
shrubs,  grass,  etc.  Still  to  these  scientific  identifications, 
we  must  apply  what  we  have  said  above  of  other  defini- 
tions ;  that  unverbal  things  are  no  party  to  our  nominal 
classifications,  divisions,  and  subdivisions.  Over  our  lan- 
guage we  possess  unlimited  control :  we  may  designate  a 
whale  to  be  a  fish,  or  not  a  fish,  as  we  shall  think  best ; 
but  unverbal  things  remain  uncommitted  thereby,  and 
precisely  as  our  senses  reveal  them,  as  unverbally  diverse 
individually,  as  they  are  individually  numerous. 


UNFALLACIOUS  INTERPRETATION  OF  LANGUAGE.      143 

§  3.  Having  thus  shown  that  verbal  identities  must  be 
interpreted  by  their  unverbal  diversities,  I  will  further  il- 
lustrate the  principle  by  showing  that  we  often  erroneously 
estimate  unverbal  diversities  by  their  verbal  identity  ;  not 
seeing  that  the  identity  is  subjective,  not  objective,  in  our 
intellect,  not  in  the  things  contemplated  by  the  intellect. 
The  matter,  for  instance,  of  which  air  is  composed,  is  so 
expansible,  that  a  closed  bladder,  flaccid  and  apparently 
empty,  will  expand  by  heat  so  as  to  become  full  and  hard. 
The  matter  of  gold  is  also  very  expansible,  and  a  very 
small  piece  can  be  beaten  so  as  to  equal  in  surface  a  rood 
or  more  of  land.  But  these  are  nothing  in  comparison 
with  matter  in  the  form  of  musk,  which  is  so  expansible 
by  exposure  as  to  fill  with  its  particles  many  rooms,  while 
the  musk  will  exhibit  no  sensible  diminution.  Light, 
however,  exhibits  the  expansiveness  of  matter  to  a  still 
greater  advantage.  Its  particles  are  so  attenuated  that 
they  fall  millions  of  miles,  and  with  a  velocity  so  wonder- 
ful as  to  accomplish  the  descent  in  an  instant ;  still  they 
hurt  not  the  eye,  though  they  alight  immediately  on  that 
susceptible  organ.  They  seem  absolutely  imponderable, 
for  philosophers  have  in  vain  endeavoured  with  the-  nicest 
balances  to  discover  in  them  any  sensible  weight,  even 
when  the  number  of  particles  thrown  into  the  scale  have 
been  multiplied  by  the  most  powerful  lenses. 

The  above  experiments  are  all  interesting  unverbally, 
but  what  astonishes  us  in  them  is  a  verbal  fallacy.  If  a 
particle  of  gold  should  fall  millions  of  miles  in  an  instant 


144  THE  MEANING  OF  WORDS. 

of  time  and  strike  our  eye,  the  hurt  would  be  fatal  not  to 
the  eye  only,  but  to  the  whole  body ;  still  a  particle  of 
light  will  not  be  even  felt  by  the  eye ;  and  we  are  taught 
to  believe  it  is  not  merely  verbally  identical  with  the  par- 
ticle of  gold,  but  identical  unverbally,  except  in  its  greater 
physical  attenuation. 

But  let  us  review  for  a  moment  the  insidiousness  with 
which  the  artificers  of  these  verbal  mysteries  aid  the  delu- 
sion by  the  manner  of  announcing  them.     When  we  are 
to  be  astonished  by  the  diffusiveness  of  odour,  it  must  be 
announced  as  an  example  of  the  expansiveness  of  matter. 
To  exhibit  it  as  an  example  of  the  diffusiveness  of  odour, 
would  be  only  the  exhibition  of  a  commonplace  fact,  no 
more  curious,  and  no  less  than  any  other  common  occur- 
rence ;  but  the  assimilation  of  the  diffusion  to  the  expansion 
of  gold,  stone,  or  other  tangible  body,  is  the  marvel  and 
the  fallacy.     The  intellect  sees  the  identity  of  the  two,  and 
easily  falls  into  the  delusion  that  is  spread  for  it,  of  not 
discriminating  between  the  verbal  identity,  (which  is  only 
an  intellectual  conception,)  and  a  physical  identity ;  and 
thus  prepared,  receives  with  a  gusto  the  crowning  wonder, 
that  the  musk  remains  undiminished  in  size,  notwithstand- 
ing the  number  of  rooms  it  has  filled  to  overflowing.    The 
verbal  identification  of  the  diffusiveness  of  the  odour  and 
the  expansiveness  of  gold,  produces  thus  a  seeming  miracle 
in  comparison  with  which  the  physical  increase  of  the  Gali- 
lean loaves  and  fishes  is  as  nothing ;  for  no  number  of  baskets 
can  contain  the  increase  of  even  a  single  grain  of  musk. 


UNFALLACIOUS  INTERPRETATION  OF  LANGUAGE.    145 

So  again  with  light.  "We  require  some  preliminary  pre- 
paration before  the  feeling  of  astonishment  can  be  elicited 
in  us,  in  relation  to  what  is  almost  momentarily  familiar 
to  our  perceptions.  We  are  usually  prepared  for  the  forth- 
coming fallacy  by  being  told  that  light  is  composed  of  ma- 
terial particles,  which  materiality  we  deem  as  unverbally 
identical  in  light  and  stone,  as  it  is  verbally  identical.  We 
are  then  in  a  condition  to  feel  astonished  that  particles  of 
light  should  not  hurt  the  eye  whose  peculiar  delicacy  is 
usually  artfully  adverted  to ;  together  with  the  distance 
which  the  particles  fall,  and  the  velocity  of  their  descent ; 
and  then  comes  the  crowning  wonder  in  relation  to  the 
expansiveness  of  matter,  that  the  nicest  balances  can  dis- 
cover no  weight  in  sunbeams,  though  concentrated  on  the 

* 

balances  by  the  most  powerful  lenses.  The  unverbal  facts, 
though  abundantly  interesting,  are  accounted  as  nothing, 
(that  light  is  innoxious  to  the  eye,  and  that  sunbeams  will 
produce  no  trepidation  in  the  nicest  scales,)  but  the  interest 
in  the  narrative  is  the  fallacy,  that  the  materiality  of  light 
and  stones  is  as  identical  unverbally,  as  it  is  verbally. 

We  astonish  ourselves  in  the  same  fallacious  way  when 
we  talk  of  communications  by  an  electric  telegraph.  The 
electric  fluid  will  travel,  we  say,  from  Buffalo  to  New  York 
with  about  the  celerity  of  thought.  The  language  is  un- 
derstood with  entire  accuracy  in  ordinary  intercommunica- 
tions between  man  and  man,  for  both  speaker  and  hearer 
interpret  it  by  the  unverbal  manifestations  to  which  the 
language  refers ;  but  wholly  different  is  the  result  when 


146  THE   MEANING  OF  WORDS. 

we  turn  upon  language  and  speculatively  interpret  the  un- 
verbal  manifestations  of  the  electric  travel  by  their  verbal 
identity  with  the  travel  of  a  stage-coach  or  the  flow  of 
water.  We  overlook  the  fact  that  the  identity  of  the  two 
travels  is  subjective,  not  objective,  in  our  intellect,  and  not 
in  sensible  realities. 

We  cast  into  a  tub  of  water  a  small  piece  of  indigo,  and 
the  water  becomes  tinged  with  blue ;  we  cast  into  another 
tub  of  water  a  lump  of  sugar,  and  the  water  becomes 
sweet ;  we  open  our  shutters,  and  light  becomes  perceptible 
throughout  our  room  ;  we  ignite  a  few  sticks  of  wood,  and 
the  mercury  will  rise  in  a  distant  thermometer ; — these  re- 
sults possess  a  certain  congruity  to  our  intellect ;  hence  in 
reference  thereto,  we  say,  the  indigo  and  sugar  are  diffused 
through  the  water ;  the  light  and  heat  are  diffused  through 
the  room.  If,  however,  we  wish  to  discover  the  objective 
unverbal  meaning  of  the  word  diffused,  in  these  several 
uses,  we  must  resort  to  our  senses,  not  to  our  dictionaries, 
which  can  give  us  only  the  relation  which  a  given  word 
bears  to  other  words.  The  unverbal  objective  meaning  is 
so  diverse  in  the  above  different  applications  of  the  word 
diffused,  that  a  blind  man  will  possess  no  knowledge  of 
the  diffusion  that  refers  to  the  light  and  indigo ;  while  a 
man  who  never  possessed  tasting,  will  possess  no  knowl- 
edge of  the  diffusion  which  refers  to  the  sugar. 

§  4.  Verbal  identities  I  shall  now  dismiss  with  one 
important  inferential  remark,  that  as  the  correct  unverbal 
signification  of  a  word  is  the  unverbal  thing  to  which  the 


UNFALLACIOUS  INTERPRETATION  OF  LANGUAGE.     147 

word  refers,  every  man  can  interpret  words,  un verbally, 
by  only  the  unverbal  things  that  are  known  to  him  ;  con- 
sequently, my  unverbal  meaning  of  a  word  is  unknown  to 
a  man  who  has  never  witnessed  the  unverbal  thing  to 
which  I  refer.  The  analogy  which  the  intellect  organically 
sees  between  unverbal  things  of  the  same  name,  remedies 
this  latent  defect  to  a  good  practical  degree  ;  but  the  end- 
less disagreements  and  controversies  which  arise  among 
men,  in  even  ordinary  conversation,  evince  that  the  irre- 
mediable difficulty  in  the  unverbal  meaning  of  words  is 
still  embarrassing  to  no  small  extent. 

Nor  is  the  above  the  only  difficulty.  The  most  simple 
word  that  can  be  used,  say  white,  names,  even  when  re- 
stricted to  sights,  innumerable  diverse  unverbal  sights, 
from  the  white  of  snow  to  the  white  of  an  egg,  the  white 
of  a  floor,  or  the  white  of  a  man's  hand.  The  identity  be- 
tween them  is  only  intellectual  and  verbal ;  hence  when 
you  designate  something  to  me  as  white,  the  chances  are 
innumerably  great  against  my  receiving  from  your  com- 
munication the  objective  sensible  information  to  which 
you  refer.  These  defects  of  language  are  all  inevitable, 
but  to  know  them  is  providentially  within  our  power. 
The  defects  are,  as  we  shall  see  below,  attended  with  com- 
pensatory benefits,  as  are,  probably,  all  organic  defects; 
but  the  evils  that  proceed  from  our  needless  ignorance, 
are,  in  this  .case,  as  in  most  others,  unmitigated  by  any 
advantage. 


148  THE   MEANING  OF  WORDS. 

Of  the  unverbal  interpretation  of  verbal  homogeneities. 

§  1.  We  are  informed  in  Holy  Writ,  that  after  the 
Creation,  God  brought  all  things  to  Adam,  that  Adam 
might  name  them.  To  enable  Adam  to  accomplish  this 
task,  his  intellect  had  been  so  organized,  that  compara- 
tively few  things  had  to  be  brought  to  him — his  intellect 
deeming  identical  innumerable  things,  notwithstanding 
their  sensible  diversities ;  hence,  many  things  un verbally 
diverse,  became  identical  in  name.  Of  these  verbal  iden- 
tities I  have  just  spoken,  and  shown  the  speculative 
errors  into  which  they  betray  us  in  relation  to  unverbal 
things.  We  cannot,  however,  admire  too  much  the  ex- 
ceeding simplicity  and  efficiency  of  the  organic  intellec- 
tual contrivance,  by  which  the  innumerable  host  of  un- 
verbal things  were  thus  comprehensible  by  a  number  of 
words  not  too  large  for  our  memory ;  and  men  were  ena- 
bled to  talk  understandingly  to  their  fellow  men,  though 
the  interlocutors  may  never  have  seen  the  same  horses, 
the  same  lions,  the  same  trees,  etc.  We  honour  men  too 
much  when  we  deem  language  a  human  contrivance, 
which  it  is  no  more  than  walking,  dancing,  hopping  and 
jumping,  laughing  and  crying. 

But  man  was  designed  to  commune  with  himself,  and 
with  his  fellow  men,  about  not  merely  such  unverbal 
things  as  are  sensibly  perceptible,  but  about  such  also  as 
his  intellect  can  conceive;  and  which  .latter  could,  of 
course,  not  be  brought  to  Adam  that  Adam  might  name 

V 


UNFALLACIOUS  INTERPRETATION  OF  LANGUAGE.     149 

them ;  as,  for  instance,  conceptions  about  his  personal 
origin,  the  origin  of  all  other  perceivable  things,  their  pro- 
spective duration  and  final  catastrophe,  their  insensible 
uses  in  the  universe,  modes  of  operation,  connections,  de- 
pendencies, relations,  etc.  His  intellect  was  accordingly 
organized  to  meet  this  difficulty  also,  and  by  a  contrivance 
as  simple  as  the  former ;  that  is,  the  intellect  was  organ- 
ized to  conceive  its  notions  in  words  that  possess  a  sensi- 
ble signification,  and  to  recognize  in  the  conceived  words 
the  intellectual  notion  to  which  the  words  refer.  Intellec- 
tual conceptions  acquired  thus  a  verbal  homogeneity  with 
sensible  perceptions,  notwithstanding  their  unverbal  hetero- 
geneity. This  twofold  meaning,  sensible  and  intellec- 
tual, which  the  same  word  may  express,  is  well  exemplified 
in  our  ideographic  numerical  figures — the  digit  2  express- 
ing a  French  word  to  Frenchmen,  a  German  word  to 
Germans,  and  an  English  word  to  Englishmen ;  or, 
perhaps,  the  twofold  meaning  of  the  same  word  may  be 
still  better  exemplified  by  Chinese  printed  words,  which 
we  are  told  are  ideographic,  and  alike  intelligible  to 
several  nations  whose  vocal  languages  are  entirely  dis- 
similar. 

The  verbal  homogeneity  of  intellectual  conceptions  and 
sensible  perceptions  produces  no  embarrassment  in  our 
social  intercourse,  for  when  A  tells  B  that  cause  and 
effect  are  linked  together,  B's  intellect  organically  recog- 
nizes the  intellectual  conception  to  which  the  word  link 
refers,  and  is  entirely  satisfied.  But  far  different  is  the 


150  THE  MEANING  OF  WORDS. 

result  when  we  turn  upon  language  speculatively  and  in- 
sist that  causes  and  effects  are  not  linked  together,  for  our 
senses  can  see  no  link.  We  forget  that  the  verbal  homo- 
geneity between  intellectual  conceptions  and  sensible  per- 
ceptions is  merely  an  organic  contrivance,  by  which  alone 
we  can  communicate  to  each  other  our  intellectual  notions, 
and  that,  consequently,  when  we  would  know,  objectively, 
what  a  word  means,  and  whether  it  means  an  intellectual 
conception,  or  a  sensible  perception,  we  must  interpret  the 
word  by  the  un verbal  thing  to  which  it  refers.  •  This,  then, 
is  the  tenet  which  I  desire  to  establish  in  view  of  the  ho- 
mogeneity of  unverbal  things.  As  verbal  identities,  here- 
tofore alluded  to,  must  be  interpreted  by  their  unver- 
bal diversities,  and  as  nominal  units  must  be  interpreted 
by  their  unverbal  duality  or  multifariousness,  so  must 
the  verbal  homogeneity  of  unverbal  things  be  interpreted 
by  their  unverbal  heterogeneity.  Language  is  compelled 
to  deem  unverbal  things  homogeneous,  as  it  is  compelled 
to  deem  certain  unverbal  things  identical,  and  certain  un- 
verbal things  units  ;  but  when  we  would  know  what  the 
verbal  homogeneity  means  unverbally,  in  any  given  case, 
the  unverbal  thing  alluded  to  is  the  only  interpreter  of 
its  own  unverbal  generic  character. 

Such  being  the  general  principles  which  must  govern  us  in 
disintegrating  the  verbal  homogeneity  of  things  generically 
heterogeneous,  I  will  illustrate  the  principle  by  some  few 
additional  examples,  though  probably  further  illustration 
is  superfluous.  Light  and  colours  pass  through  solid  crys- 


UNFALLACIOUS  INTERPRETATION  OF  LANGUAGE.     151 

tal,  sound  passes  through  a  solid  block  of  stone,  electricity 
passes  through  a  bar  of  iron,  a  thought  passes  through 
the  mind,  a  pain  passes  through  our  head.  These  several 
"passages  through,"  differ  from  the  passage  of  a  thread 
through  the  eye  of  a  needle,  the  latter  being  a  sensible 
perception,  while  all  the  former  are  intellectual  concep- 
tions ;  but  if  we  fail  to  understand  this  generic  difference, 
and  deem  all  the  passages  as  homogeneous  unverbally,  as 
they  are  verbally,  we  may  become  as  needlessly  surprised 
that  light  can  pass  through  solid  crystal,  and  sound 
through  solid  stone  etc.,  as  a  man  would  be  if  he 
were  assured  that  a  linen  thread  can  pass  through  solid 
stone,  or,  as  he  may  be,  that  he  cannot  see  the  link  which 
unites  cause  and  effect.  To  avoid,  therefore,  all  such  de- 
lusions we  must  interpret  the  verbal  homogeneity  of  all 
"passages  through,"  by  their  several  unverbal  manifes- 
tations and  generic  differences ;  but  we  seem  fond  of  deem- 
ing the  fallacious  homogeneity  a  mystery  of  nature,  and 
rather  willingly,  I  suspect,  refuse  to  recognise  the  generic 
difference  between  what  is  intellectually  conceived,  and 
what  is  sensibly  perceived.  Professor  Brown  says,  "  That 
light,  itself  a  body,  should  pass  through  solid  crystal  is  re- 
garded by  us  as  a  physical  wonder."  Now,  if  Professor 
Brown  had  not  been  pleased  with  the  verbal  equivoke, 
he  would  not  have  increased  its  pungency  by  adding  the 
word  solid  to  the  crystal ;  the  added  solidity  only  leading 
us  to  infer,  that  light,  "itself  a  body"  ought  to  be  unable  to 
pass  through  the  crystal — the  solid  crystal.  Like  the  fore- 


152  THE  MEANING  OF  WORDS. 

going  are  the  expressions,  an  odour  strikes  my  olfactory 
nerves,  light  strikes  my  retina,  a  sound  strikes  my  tympa- 
num, a  hat  strikes  my  fancy,  a  project  strikes  my  mind. 
In  ordinary  conversation,  the  intellect  of  the  hearer  recog- 
nises the  intellectual  conceptions  to  which  the  several 
strikes  refer,  and  language  fulfils  therein  its  proper  inten- 
tion ;  but  when  we  speculatively  interpret  the  expressions 
by  deeming  them  generically  like  the  expressions,  a  stone 
strikes  my  hand,  the  wind  strikes  my  face,  etc.,  we  surprise 
ourselves  by  the  fallacious  verbal  homogeneity  that  is  im- 
puted to  the  different  strikes  ; — and  especially  that  light 
can  strike  our  retina  blow  upon  blow,  and  we  not  feel  it. 

"  Some  of  the  ablest  philosophers  in  Europe  are  now 
satisfied,"  says  Professor  Stewart,  "  not  only  that  no  evi- 
dence exists  of  motion's  being  produced  by  the  contact  of 
two  bodies,  but  that  proof  may  be  given  of  the  impossi- 
bility of  such  a  process."  In  relation  to  this  discovery,  I 
want  to  make  a  few  remarks : — When  I  see  a  billiard  ball 
move  forward  on  being  struck  by  another  billiard  ball,  I 
see  nothing  but  a  sensible  sequence  of  two  sensible  events, 
the  stroke  and  the  motion  ;  or,  say  the  contact  and  the  re- 
sulting motion.  In  addition,  however,  to  the  sensible 
contact,  and  the  resulting  sensible  motion  of  the  struck 
ball,  my  intellect  conceives  a  power  or  causal  efficiency 
in  the  stroke  or  contact,  to  account  for  the  motion  that 
ensues.  But,  says  Professor  Stewart,  the  ablest  philoso- 
phers of  Europe  are  now  satisfied  that  contact  is  not  the 
cause  which  moves  the  struck  ball.  Before  we  can  under- 


UNFALLACIOUS  INTERPRETATION  OF  LANGUAGE.     153 

stand,  correctly,  this  remark  of  Professor  Stewart,  we 
must  ascertain  whether  it  refers  to  the  efficiency  of  the 
stroke,  which  causes  the  motion  of  the  struck  ball.  I 
suppose  such  to  be  his  meaning,  and  that  the  philosophers 
mean  only  that  the  efficiency  referred  to,  exists  not  in  the 
sensible  contact  or  stroke.  I  will,  any  way,  assume  such 
to  be  the  meaning,  as  the  assumption  will  enable  me 
to  say  what  I  desire  to  communicate  in  relation  thereto. 
The  philosophers  are,  therefore,  I  say,  only  labouring 
under  the  common  delusion  of  not  knowing  that  the  effi- 
ciency which  they  are  alluding  to,  is  merely  a  conception 
of  the  intellect,  and,  of  course,  the  intellectually  conceived 
efficiency  exists  not  in  the  contact  of  one  ball  with  the 
other,  nor  in  the  stroke  of  one  ball  against  the  other. 
When  philosophers  are  unacquainted  with  the  above  sim- 
ple truth,  they  are  constantly  prone  to  interpose  some  im- 
aginary causal  efficient  between  the  contact  and  the  re- 
sulting motion ;  and  we  will  assume  that  they  shall  inter- 
pose in  the  above  case,  as  Professor  Stewart  alleges,  a 
"power  of  repulsion,"  as  something  which  surrounds 
every  particle  of  matter.  All  that  is  gained  thereby,  is  a 
name  for  the  intellectually  conceived  causal  efficiency; 
and  if  they  suppose  that  the  "  power  of  repulsion"  is  a 
physical  existence,  we  may  say  of  it,  as  we  say  of  the  con- 
tact and  stroke,  that  when  a  billiard  ball  moves  forward 
on  the  approach  towards  it  of  a  certain  "  power  of  repul- 
sion," we  see  nothing  but  a  sequence  of  two  sensible 

events, — we  see  the  "  power  of  repulsion,"  and  the  result- 
7* 


THE   MEANING  OF  WORDS. 

ing  motion  of  the  billiard  ball,  but  we  see  not  the  causal 
efficiency  which  is  attributed  to  "  the  power  of  repulsion," 
and  which  compels  the  motion  that  sensibly  ensues. 

From  not  knowing,  however,  that  all  causal  efficiency 
is  only  a  conception  of  the  intellect,  subjective,  and  not 
objective,  philosophers  are  constantly  striving,  as  in  the 
above  case,  to  materialize  the  efficiency  of  causation,  with- 
out ever  being  able  to  arrive  at  an  end  of  the  process, — 
every  imagined  physical  efficient,  call  it  a  power  of  re- 
pulsion or  what  else  you  will,  becoming  immediately,  as 
we  have  shown  above,  only  a  new  sensible  antecedent  in 
some  sequence;  and  we  can  immediately  say  of  every 
such  new  antecedent,  as  we  say  of  the  first,  that  we  see 
only  a  sequence  of  sensible  events,  not  the  causal  effi- 
ciency which  makes  one  produce  the  other.  For  in- 
stance, Locke,  in  speaking  of  ice,  says  that  a  man  would 
discover  a  great,  but  hitherto  unknown  secret,  who  should 
find  the  cement  that  holds  together,  so  firmly,  the  water 
of  which  ice  is  composed.  But,  adds  Locke,  this  dis- 
covery would  aid  but  little,  unless  he  could  discover  also, 
the  cement  which  holds  together  the  particles  of  the  ce- 
ment. To  this,  I  add,  that  the  last-named  discovery 
would  still  leave  undiscovered  the  cement  that  holds  to- 
gether the  particles  of  the  latter  cement,  and  so  on  ad 
infinitum ; — every  new  cement  requiring  a  cement  as 
much  as  the  first,  so  long  as  we  fail  to  see  that  we  are 
vainly  endeavouring  to  materialize  a  causal  cement  that 
is  not  material,  but  only  a  conception  of  the  intellect. 


UNFALLACIOUS  INTERPRETATION  OF  LANGUAGE.     155 

This  error  is,  I  think,  the  source  of  nearly  all  our  theoreti- 
cal causal  imaginings.  We  mistake  an  intellectually 
conceived  causal  efficiency  for  something  that  is  physical, 
and  vainly  endeavour  to  imagine  some  physical  agency 
that  will  supply  the  exigency  of  our  error.  The  causal 
efficiency  is  subjective,  and  we  seek  it  objectively ; — it  is 
in  the  organism  of  our  intellect,  and  we  seek  it  in  what 
is  sensibly  perceptible,  or  in  some  imaginary  thing  analo- 
gous thereto ;  and  hence  we  can  keep  predicating  causes 
ad  infinitum,  and  are  no  better  satisfied  than  when  we 
began. 

§  2.  The  true  interpretation  of  the  words  of  all  lan- 
guages is  the  unverbal  things  to  which  the  words  refer. 
That  mode  of  interpretation  gives  to  the  intellect  what  is 
intellectual,  and  to  the  senses  what  is  sensible  ;  while  our 
present  indiscrimination  of  generic  differences  leads  us  to 
conclusions  so  necromantic,  that  without  any  other  proof, 
we  ought  to  know  that  we  are  in  error.  The  motion  of  the 
earth,  for  instance,  around  its  own  centre  at  a  speed  of  a 
thousand  miles  an  hour,  and  around  the  sun  at  a  speed  of 
about  a  thousand  miles  a  minute,  are  all  intellectual  con- 
ceptions against  which  I  have  nothing  to  say ;  but  when 
we  deem  the  revolutions  and  speed,  etc.,  physical,  we  are 
deluded  by  the  homogeneity  which  exists  verbally  between 
things  that  unverbally  are  generically  different. 

That  men  exist  on  the  earth  whose  feet  are  diametrically 
opposite  to  ours  and  whom  we  term  antipodes,  I  have  no 
wish  to  deny  as  a  general  proposition;  but  certainly  a 


156      .  THE  MEANING  OF  WORDS. 

generic  difference  exists  between  the  sensible  appearance 
of  men  in  the  imagined  position,  should  two  men  stand 
thus  before  us,  and  the  intellectual  conception  of  the  local 
relation  which  men  bear  to  each  other  when  they  stand  on 
opposite  sides  of  the  earth.  My  intellect  will  insist  on 
identifying  the  two  cases,  the  said  sensible  and  the  said  in- 
tellectual ;  but  my  intellect  enables  me  to  conceive  also,  a 
difference  between  the  sensibly  perceived  antipodal  posi- 
tion and  the  intellectually  conceived  antipodal  relation. 
Now,  all  I  demand  in  the  premises  is,  that  the  two  cases 
shall  not  be  interpreted  by  their  verbal  identity,  but,  on 
the  contrary,  the  verbal  identity  shall  be  interpreted  by 
the  unverbal  diversity,  be  it  more  or  less.  I  think  this  is 
not  our  usual  mode  of  interpretation  in  the  above  cases, 
and  that  the  intellectually  conceived  local  relation  which 
men  bear  to  each  other  when  they  stand  on  opposite  sides  of 
the  earth,  is  esteemed  in  proportion  as  it  is  interpreted  to  be 
unverbally  identical  with  a  picture  representing  two  men 
in  an  antipodal  position.  I  comment  more  particularly  on 
the  verbal  identity  of  the  above  two  cases,  because  a 
learned  friend,  to  whom  I  stated  the  position,  saw  nothing 
in  it  but  hypercriticism. 

People  speak  also  of  seeing  distant  objects  by  means 
of  pictures  painted  on  their  retina,  and  seem  to  be  uncon- 
scious that  they  are  talking  of  only  an  intellectual  concep- 
tion. This,  too,  my  learned  friend,  above  alluded  to, 
deemed  hypercritical.  I  avail  myself  of  his  objection,  that 
I  may  make  my  meaning  more  intelligible.  I  desire  not 


UNFALLACIOUS  INTERPRETATION  OF  LANGUAGE.     157 

to  controvert,  as  he  supposes  I  do,  any  sensible  perception 
which  is  referred  to  by  the  alleged  picture  on  the  retina ; 
but  when  a  man  curiously  puzzles  himself  by  supposing 
that  a  sensibly  perceived  landscape  is  sensibly  identical  in 
some  way  with  a  miniature  picture  which  his  intellect 
conceives  to  exist  on  his  retina,  his  puzzle  consists  in 
deeming  the  identity  sensible  when  unverbally  it  is  only 
an  intellectually  conceived  identity.  If  you  ask  me  to  say 
further  what  the  difference  is,  I  say  that  the  equivoke 
possesses  an  unverbal  piquancy  which  manifests  the  differ- 
ence better  than  it  can  be  manifested  by  words. 

In  relation,  however,  to  the  picture  itself,  I  by  no  means 
admit  that  its  intellectually  conceived  existence  on  the 
retina  of  a  living  man  is  identical  unverbally  with  its  sen- 
-  sibly  perceived  existence  in  a  dissected  eye.  The  intellect 
conceives  the  existence  of  the  picture  on  the  eye  of  a  living 
man,  and  the  reasons  for  the  conception  I  cannot  question 
as  to  their  intellectual  cogency  ;  but  still  the  intellect  can 
recognise  also  a  demarcation  between  its  conceptions  and 
sensible  perceptions ;  and  to  understand  the  unverbal  de- 
marcation will  certainly  not  vitiate  our  knowledge.  So 
far,  also,  as  the  intellectually  conceived  picture  is  part  of 
a  modus  operandi  by  which  external  objects  are  conceived 
to  be  seen  sensibly,  I  intend  not  to  comment  thereon ;  but 
if  we  deem  the  modus  operandi  more  than  an  intellectual 
conception,  especially  if  we  fail  to  discriminate  it  from 
sensibly  perceived  operations,  we  are  confounding  things 
generically  different,  though  they  may  be  verbally  homo- 


158  THE  MEANING  OF  WORDS. 

geneous.  All,  however,  that  I  demand  in  the  premises,  is 
that  the  interpretation  of  the  words  alluded  to  shall  be 
governed  by  what  is  unverbal  in  relation  thereto ;  and  es- 
pecially that  we  shall  not  interpret  what  is  unverbal  by 
the  words  that  we  employ  thereon.  . 

Some  years  ago  an  ingenious  account  was  published  in 
our  country  of  discoveries  made  in  the  moon  by  an  en- 
larged and  improved  new  telescope.  The  narrative  verified 
sensibly  all  that  the  intellect  conceives  of  the  moon  in  sub- 
jective explanation  of  the  moon's  sensible  appearances. 
The  mountains,  chasms,  and  human  inhabitants  of  the 
moon  were  no  longer  merely  intellectual  conceptions,  for 
the  telescope  revealed  them  sensibly  with  numerous  colla- 
teral sensible  appendages.  Most  persons  thought  that  such 
a  sensible  realization  of  existing  intellectual  conceptions, 
made  the  narrative  probable ;  but  the  accordance  in  a  case 
like  this,  and  of  a  kind  like  this,  satisfied  me  that  the  nar- 
rative was  as  intellectual  merely  as  the  theory  which  was 
thus  sought  to  be  materialized.  My  skepticism  shocked 
many  persons  who  never  discriminate  generic  differences 
in  verbal  homogeneities,  but  time  soon  manifested  that  the 
narrative  was  a  hoax.  But  I  have  been  asked  why  I 
spontaneously  disbelieved  the  narrative,  since  I  admit  that 
it  only  realized  sensibly  what  is  universally  conceived  in- 
tellectually. The  answer  is  simply,  that  an  intellectual 
anticipation  of  a  sensible  discovery  is  reliable  as  to  its  sen- 
sible realization,  just  in  proportion  as  the  anticipated  sen- 
sible discovery  is  analogous  to  some  known  sensible  occur- 


UNFALLACIOUS  INTERPRETATION  OF  LANGUAGE.      159 

rence.  If  I  see  a  bird  sitting  in  a  nest,  the  intellectual 
conjecture  that  eggs  are  beneath  the  bird  is  so  reliable  that 
a  disappointment  in  the  verification  of  the  anticipation 
would  surprise  me.  Should  I,  however,  see  a  quadruped 
lie  in  his  lair,  and  see  an  egg  under  him,  my  intellect 
might  conceive  that  he  produced  eggs,  but  a  sensible  reali- 
zation of  such  a  conception  I  should  deem  much  less 
likely  than  its  disappointment ;  and  I  estimated  our  con- 
ceptions in  relation  to  the  mountains,  volcanoes,  chasms, 
etc.,  of  the  moon  just  as  little  likely  of  a  sensible  realiza- 
tion as  the  conceived  production  of  eggs  by  a  quadruped. 
The  only  incredulity  which  I  feel  in  relation  to  the  recent 
pendulous  experiments  at  Paris,  proceeds,  as  in  the  above 
moon  hoax,  from  their  accordance  too  physically  with  the 
intellectually  conceived  diurnal  revolution  of  the  earth ; 
though  the  experiment,  if  verified  in  full,  will  only  add 
an  additional  sensible  fact  to  those  which  are  already 
comprehended  under  the  subjective  theory  of  a  diurnal  re- 
volution of  the  earth. 

§  3.  In  concluding  what  I  have  to  say  of  our  interpreta- 
tion of  words  that  relate  to  things  generically  different,  I 
want  to  adduce  a  few  examples  from  philosophical  experi- 
ments, wherein  we  are  continually  playing,  by  means  of 
words,  a  game  of  bo-peep  with  unverbal  things:  at  one 
moment  our  words  referring  to  sensible  perceptions,  and  at 
another  moment  to  intellectual  conceptions,  etc.  When,  for 
instance,  you  exhibit  a  prisrn,  you  may  assert  that  the  light 
which  enters  on  one  side  of  the  prism  is  composed  of  the 


160  THE  MEANING  OF  WORDS. 

gorgeous  colours  that  are  emitted  on  the  other  side.  The 
language  refers  to  a  theory  by  which  the  intellect  accounts 
for  the  prismatic  spectrum ;  but  we  desire  the  spectator, 
and  ourselves  included,  to  interpret  the  language  by  deem- 
ing the  light  sensibly  alike  on  both  sides  of  the  prism, 
despite  our  eyes  which  affirm  the  contrary.  The  only 
physical  interpretation  which  is  not  sophistical  of  such  an 
experiment,  is  the  precise  unverbal  perceptions  of  the 
senses.  When,  however,  we  desire  a  theoretical  interpre- 
tation, we  must  accept  it  in  such  words  as  the  intellect 
will  suggest;  for  the  intellect  organically  theorises  in 
words,  and  the  existing  theory  in  relation  to  the  spectrum 
may  be  the  best  that  can  be  conceived.  The  unverbal 
meaning  of  theories  and  other  verbal  conceptions  of  the 
intellect  I  shall  discuss  in  another  lecture.  That  such  con- 
ceptions possess  a  meaning  that  is  unverbal,  we  may  know 
from  the  fact  that  deaf  mutes  when  uneducated  and  void 
of  all  language,  still  evince  all  kinds  of  intellectual  concep- 
tions. The  intellect  of  such  a  mute  may  conceive,  as  well 
as  ours,  that  ordinary  solar  white  light  bears  the  same  rela- 
tion to  the  prismatic  coloured  rays,  as  a  monochromatic  cord 
bears  to  the  variously  coloured  strands  of  which  the  cord 
may  be  fabricated.  He  may  also  be  as  much  deluded 
speculatively  as  we,  by  not  understanding  that  such  a  con- 
ceived relation  between  the  cord  and  the  light  differs 
genetically  from  a  sensibly  perceived  identity. 

But  after  the  foregoing  prismatic  experiment,  the  expe- 
rimenter may  tell  you,  that  as  you  have  seen  a  ray  of  light 


UNFALLACIOUS  INTERPRETATION  OF  LANGUAGE.      161 

untwisted  by  the  prism,  and  split  into  its  constituent 
threads,  he  will  collect  the  filaments  and  ret  wist  them  into 
their  original  form.  With  this  preface  which  is  true  in- 
tellectually, but  fallacious  when  interpreted  sensibly,  he 
will  cause  the  coloured  rays  to  pass  through  a  lens  which 
will  converge  them  to  a  focus  of  light  in  its  usual  colour. 
The  experiment  is  interesting,  but  what  the  observer  sees 
constitutes  all  the  unverbal  sensible  signification  that  the 
experimenter's  language  possesses. 

The  intellect  seems  organically  compelled  to  conceive 
some  theoretical  rationale  to  account  for  all  that  our  senses 
perceive ;  but  we  need  not  confound  such  intellectual  con- 
ceptions with  physical  things,  nor  should  we  confound 
them,  except  for  a  bias  which  also  seems  organic  in  us  to- 
wards the  excitation  of  the  feeling  of  wonder  in  ourselves 
and  others.  This  bias  crowds  with  spectators  all  exhibi- 
tions of  sleight  of  hand,  and  probably  we  should  look  with 
but  little  interest  on  a  prismatic  spectrum  were  we  not 
stimulated  by  the  verbal  and  hence  delusive  homogeneity 
of  the  intellectual  twisting  and  untwisting  of  light,  with 
the  physical  twisting  and  untwisting  of  the  strands  of  a 
rope  ;  and  hence  imagining  that  light  is  somehow  sensibly 
coloured  while  it  looks  white,  and  somehow  sensibly  white 
while  it  looks  coloured. 

"When  a  chemist  ignites  a  stream  of  hydrogen  gas  and 
oxygen,  and  permits  the  flame  to  pass  through  a  glass 
tube,  the  inside  of  the  tube  becomes  suffused  with  water. 
The  chemist  will  accordingly  say,  that  water  is  nothing  but 


162-  THE   MEANING   OF  WORDS. 

a  union  of  the  two  gases ;  and  intellectually  the  chemist  is 
right.  He  is  right  physically  also,  to  the  extent  that  his 
language  is  to  be  interpreted  by  what  is  sensibly  percepti- 
ble in  the  experiment ;  but  without  being  captious,  I  be- 
lieve that  such  an  interpretation  of  the  language  employed 
is  not  intended  by  any  body.  I  feel  an  irresistible  repug- 
nance myself  to  such  a  limitation  of  the  meaning.  I  want 
to  deem  the  water  gases,  and  the  gases  water,  in  a  sense 
different  from  the  experiment.  I  want  somehow  to  dispel 
the  sensible  diversity  of  the  water  and  gases,  and  to  sub- 
stitute therefor  as  sensible,  the  identity  between  them  that 
the  intellect  conceives.  To  interpret  what  is  sensible  in 
the  experiment  by  simply  its  sensible  manifestations,  takes 
from  the  experiment  all  its  piquancy  and  necromancy. 

Chemistry  also  analyses  bodies,  and  out  of  glass  pro- 
duces sand,  alkali,  etc.  "  Now,"  says  Mr.  Brown,  (Philo- 
sophy of  the  Mind,  Lecture  IX.,)  "these  processes  of 
chemistry  enable  us  only  to  discover  what  are  always  be- 
fore our  eyes ;  but  our  sight  is  not  keen  enough  to  see 
them."  That  the  sand  is  present  in  glass,  and  would  be 
visible  were  our  eyes  sufficiently  acute,  means  not  the  same 
as  when  I  say  this  table  is  present.  The  word  present,  as 
used  by  Mr.  Brown,  refers  to  the  intellect  which  theoreti- 
cally accounts  for  the  analytical  production  of  the  sand  by 
conceiving  that  the  sand  is  present  in  the  glass.  If  we  see 
not  the  generic  unverbal  difference  between  a  sensible 
presence,  and  an  intellectually  conceived  presence,  the  equi- 
voke will  necessarily  surprise  us. 


UNFALLACIOUS  INTERPRETATION  OF  LANGUAGE.     163 

"When  a  spark,"  says  the  same  philosopher,  "  falls  on 
gunpowder,  and  kindles  it'  into  explosion,  every  person 
ascribes  to  the  spark  the  power  of  kindling  the  inflamma- 
ble mass.  But,"  continues  he,  "  let  any  person  ask  himself 
what  he  means  by  the  power  which  he  imputes  to  the 
spark  ?  and  without  contenting  himself  with  a  few  phrases 
which  signify  nothing,  let  him."  What?  shall  he  content 
himself  with  no  phrase,  but  deem  the  word  power  signifi- 
cant of  precisely  the  unverbal  things  to  which  the  word 
power  is  applied?  No;  he  must  content  himself  with 
some  phrases  which  Mr.  Brown  prescribes.  Such  has  al- 
ways been  the  advice  of  philosophers,  and  such  will  be 
their  advice  till  they  know  that  the  unverbal  signification 
of  every  word  is  neither  more  nor  less  than  the  unverbal 
things  (sensible  or  intellectual  as  the  case  may  be)  to 
which  the  word  refers.  Every  philosopher  gives  us  a  new 
phrase,  and  like  a  quack  with  a  new  nostrum,  desires  us 
to  be  content  with  no  other. 

In  the  present  case,  Mr.  Brown  advises  the  person  to 
answer,  that  by  the  power  imputed  to  the  spark,  he  means 
only,  "that  in  all  similar  circumstances,  an  explosion  of 
gunpowder  will  be  the  immediate  and  uniform  consequence 
of  the  application  of  a  spark."  You  may  suppose  that  the 
occurrence  is  vastly  simplified  by  the  new  phraseology,  but 
the  supposition  is  founded  on  the  error  of  employing  the 
phrase  to  interpret  an  unverbal  occurrence,  instead  of  em- 
ploying the  unverbal  occurrence  to  interpret  the  phrase. 
So  long  as  the  two  phrases  refer  to  the  same  unverbal  oc- 


164  THE   MEANING  OF  WORDS. 

currence,  their  unverbal  meaning  must  be  the  same ;  but 
if  an  explanatory  phrase  refers  to  some  unverbal  thing 
that  is  different  from  the  unverbal  occurrence  referred  to 
by  the  phrase  which  is  sought  to  be  explained,  the  parties 
are  controverting  without  understanding  that  they  are 
probably  referring  to  unverbal  things  that  are  generically 
different — one  of  the  parties  referring  to  an  intellectual 
conception,  and  the  other  to  a  sensible  perception.  Most 
of  the  controversies  of  philosophers  are  founded  on  such  a 
misunderstanding  of  the  unverbal  import  of  their  words. 

§  4.  "We  talk  of  mountains  in  the  moon,  of  the  tidal  in- 
fluence of  the  moon,  the  size  and  distance  of  the  moon,  etc., 
with  no  apparent  consciousness  that  we  are  talking  of  only 
intellectual  conceptions,  not  of  sensible  things ;  and  that  the 
physical  meaning  of  each  expression  is  limited  to  only 
what  our  senses  can  perceive,  and  that  the  remainder  of  the 
meaning  is  intellectual.  But  I  have  said  enough  of  the 
unverbal  interpretation  of  such  verbal  homogeneities,  and 
I  will  proceed  to  explain  the  proper  unverbal  interpreta- 
tion of  some  verbal  homogeneities  whose  unverbal  hetero- 
geneity consists  of  internal  feelings  and  intellectual  con- 
ceptions, instead  of  consisting,  like  the  foregoing,  of  sensible 
perceptions  and  intellectual  conceptions.  A  man,  for  in- 
stance, may  disbelieve  in  ghosts,  and  yet  be  unable  to  pass 
alone  at  night  across  a  burial-ground  without  fear  of  ghosts. 
Can  he  thus  both  believe  and  not  believe  at  the  same  time? 
Experience  evinces  that  unverbally  he  can,  and  the  con- 
tradiction is  only  verbal.  One  belief  may  unverbally  be 


UNFALLACIOUS  INTERPRETATION  OF  LANGUAGE.     165 

intellectual,  and  the  other  unverbally  an  internal  feeling. 
Nothing  is  more  common  than  the  co-existence  of  such 
generically  diverse  beliefs.  A  man's  intellect  may,  like 
Pyrrho's,  believe  confidently  in  the  logical  non-existence 
of  an  external  sensible  universe,  and  still  on  the  approach 
towards  him  of  a  coach  and  horses,  he  may  be  compelled 
by  \i\sfeelings  to  seek  safety  in  a  change  of  position.  Many 
men  disbelieve  intellectually  all  the  tenets  of  Christianity, 
and  still  tremble  like  Felix,  while  hearing  of  "  righteous- 
ness, temperance,  and  judgment."  Such,  no  doubt,  was 
the  position  of  many  Greeks  and  Romans  in  relation  to  the 
theology  of  their  era;  though  by  interpreting  the  word 
belief  as  something  wholly  intellectual,  we  often  say  that 
men  like  Cicero  could  not  possibly  believe  in  the  heathen 
mythology. 

§  5.  If  we  possessed  no  unverbal  belief  but  what  is  in- 
tellectual, our  condition  would  be  wholly  unreliable,  for 
the  intellect  must  assent  to  its  own  logical  deductions ;  and 
nothing  is  so  absurd,  when  interpreted  physically,  as  some 
of  the  intellect's  conclusions.  Even  while  I  am  penning 
this  lecture,  one  of  the  judges  of  our  Supreme  Court 
publishes  gratuitously  and  ostentatiously,  his  belief  in 
table-turnings  by  spiritual  agency,  and  in  table-rappings 
as  personal  communications  by  the  dead  of  past  ages.  He 
says  he  believes  the  above  because  his  intellect  can  dis- 
cover no  other  solution  of  what  his  senses  have  witnessed. 
Now  this  judge,  though  still  exercising  well  his  judicial 
functions  on  life,  liberty,  and  property,  is  accounted  insane 


166  THE   MEANING  OF  WORDS. 

by  most  men ;  but  in  what  consists  his  insanity  ?  In  being 
governed  by  his  intellectual  belief,  and  not  by  the  feeling 
of  unbelief  which,  in  such  matters,  would  govern  him,  as 
is  supposed,  were  he  in  a  condition  of  sanity. 

Some  time  ago,  a  sect  called  Millerites  in  our  country, 
began  to  preach  that  the  millenium  predicted  in  the  Bible, 
was  at  hand  ;  and  as  a  precursor  thereof,  that  the  earth  was 
soon  to  be  burned  up,  and  "  the  heavens  were  to  melt  with 
fervent  heat."  The  texts  of  Scripture  on  which  the  pre- 
dictions were  founded,  Christians  had  always  assented  to ; 
but  the  moment  this  sect  began  to  make  their  intellectual 
belief  therein  so  effective  over  their  conduct  as  to  abandon 
their  ordinary  occupations  in  preparations  for  the  milleni- 
um, they  were  deemed  insane  for  not  being  governed  by 
the  feeling  of  unbelief  which  all  sane  men  are  deemed  to 
experience  in  reference  to  the  immediate  advent  of  the 
millenium ;  how  much  soever  the  intellect  may  be  able,  as 
in  the  case  of  the  Millerites,  to  logically  demonstrate  that 
the  advent  is  to  be  immediate.  Our  unverbal  belief  seems 
to  have  been  given  us  as  a  providential  corrective  of  our 
indiscrimination  of  the  heterogeneity  which  exists  unver- 
bally  between  intellectual  conceptions  and  sensible  percep- 
tions. The  intellect  may  be  deceived  by  verbal  homoge- 
neities, as  in  the  above  examples,  but  our  internal  feelings 
will  not  yield  to  the  delusion,  and  will  control  our  conduct 
despite  of  our  intellect.  The  moment,  however,  we  under- 
stand the  unverbal  difference  between  things  verbally  ho- 
mogeneous, we  are  no  longer  dependent  for  our  protection 


UNFALLACIOUS  INTERPRETATION  OF  LANGUAGE.     167 

on  the  insubordination  of  our  feelings,  for  we  know  that 
what  the  intellect  conceives  is  not  physical,  and  that  the 
intellect  can  reveal  to  us,  in  cases  like  the  foregoing, 
nothing  but  its  own  subjective  notions. 

Having  thus  endeavoured  to  show,  but  perhaps  too 
briefly,  that  all  verbal  homogeneities  must  be  interpreted 
by  their  unverbal  heterogeneities,  I  will  dismiss  verbal 
homogeneities,  and  proceed  to  discuss  even  still  more 
briefly,  the  last  topic  of  the  present  lecture. 

Of  the  unverbal  interpretation  of  nominal  units. 

The  nominal  oneness  of  a  man  is  only  a  conception  of 
the  intellect ;  the  nominal  oneness  of  a  ship,  an  army,  the 
universe,  magnetism,  attraction,  matter,  life,  insanity,  fever, 
gravity,  body,  etc.,  are  severally  only  a  conception  of  the 
intellect.  If  an  army  could  not  be  spoken  of  as  a  unit, 
and  we  could  speak  of  it  only  by  repeating  its  muster-roll ; 
and  if  no  soldier  on  the  muster-roll  could  be  spoken  of  as 
a  unit,  and  we  could  speak  of  him  only  by  repeating  the 
skin,  flesh,  bones,  etc.,  of  which  he  is  composed ;  language 
would  be  impossible,  or  almost  useless  if  possible.  But 
the  necessity  for  aggregating  sensible  multiplicity  into 
nominal  units  for  the  purposes  of  language,  forces  us  to 
segregate  into  its  sensible  components  any  given  nominal 
unit,  when  we  would  interpret  unsophistically  what  the 
nominal  unit  means  unverbally.  If,  on  the  contrary,  you 
seek  sensibly  in  any  such  nominal  unit  for  an  unverbal 
oneness  that  differs  from  the  unverbal  multiplicity  that  you 


168  THE  MEANING  OF  WORDS. 

may  sensibly  perceive  therein,  you  may  gain  the  pleasure 
of  much  mystery,  but  you  will  lose  the  benefit  of  under- 
standing aright  the  nature  of  language,  and  your  unverbal 
knowledge ;  the  oneness  which  you  are  seeking  sensibly, 
being  only  a  conception  of  the  intellect. 

What  we  have  thus  said  of  the  unverbal  interpretation 
of  physical  units,  we  may  repeat  of  the  unverbal  interpre- 
tation of  intellectual  units,  as  wisdom,  wit,  imagination, 
judgment,  intellect,  truth,  knowledge,  mind,  etc.,  to  the 
end  of  the  vocabulary  of  intellectual  units.  The  oneness 
of  each  is  only  intellectually  conceived  and  verbal,  while 
unverbally  each  unit  is  as  multifarious  as  its  unverbal 
manifestations;  consequently  we  must  segregate  the  un- 
verbal components  of  each  verbal  unit  when  we  would 
know  what  its  verbal  oneness  means  unverbally.  We 
must  practise  the  like  mode  of  interpretation  with  every 
emotional  unit,  as  anger,  revenge,  jealousy,  love,  suspicion, 
vanity,  envy,  malice,  pride,  etc.,  the  nominal  oneness  of 
each  being  only  a  conception  of  the  intellect,  while  unver- 
bally it  is  multifarious.  Finally,  I  doubt  much  if  every 
speculative  mystery  may  not  be  solved  by  the  foregoing 
lecture.  Ourselves  and  everything  within  our  conscious- 
ness is,  in  one  sense,  mysterious ;  but  the  peculiar  myste- 
ries which  perplex  our  speculations,  arise  from  our  misin- 
terpreting nominal  units,  nominal  identities,  and  verbal 
homogeneities.  Such  speculative  mysteries  all  vanish  when 
we  interpret  verbal  homogeneities  by  their  generic  unver- 
bal elements,  sensible,  intellectual,  and  emotional;  and 


UNFALLACIOUS  INTERPRETATION  OF  LANGUAGE.     169 

when  we  interpret  verbal  identities  by  their  unverbal  di- 
versities, and  nominal  units  by  their  unverbal  multiplicity. 
But  I  fear,  notwithstanding  I  tautologize  these  eminent 
truths  in  various  ways,  I  shall  fail  to  make  them  intel- 
ligible. 


LECTURE  VI. 

OF  THE   UNFALLACIOUS  INTERPRETATION"  OF  AFFIRMA- 
TIVE  GENERAL   PROPOSITIONS. 

CONTENTS. 

1.  The  generality  of  a  proposition  is  subjective  and  refers  to  the  intellect ; 

but  the  objective  signification  of  a  proposition  is  governed  by  the  ob- 
jects to  which  it  refers. 

2.  Every  general  proposition  possesses  as  many  different  objective  signi- 

fications as  it  refers  to  different  objects. 

§  1.  The  propositions  of  which  only  I  wish  to  speak 
either  affirm  something  or  deny  something ;  and  I  shall 
speak  first  of  affirmative  propositions.  Twice  two  are  four. 
Four  what?  Four  anythings  to  which  your  intellect  may 
see  the  proposition  is  applicable.  Every  proposition  pos- 
sesses thus  two  heterogeneous  meanings,  one  general  and 
looking  to  the  intellect,  like  "twice  two  are  four;"  the 
other  particular  and  looking  to  the  object  to  which  the 
proposition  refers,  like  twice  two  apples  are  four  apples. 
The  generality  of  a  proposition  is  subjective,  not  objective; 
hence,  general  propositions  are  intellectually  what  rel^- 
made  coats  are  physically  that  we  find  in  slop  shops.  Ow- 
ing to  the  physical  similarity  of  men,  a  coat  which  fits  one 


UNFALLACIOUS  INTERPRETATION  OF  LANGUAGE.     171 

man  will  fit  multitudes  of  men ;  and  owing  to  the  similar- 
ity which  the  intellect  sees  among  objective  events  and 
things,  the  proposition  which  is  intellectually  applicable  to 
any  objective  event  or  thing,  like  the  foregoing  twice  two 
are  four,  will  apply  to  numerous  objective  events  and 
things.  When,  therefore,  Pythagoras  affirmed  that  the 
earth  revolves  around  the  sun,  we  are  not  compelled  to  be- 
lieve that  he  knew,  objectively,  what  Copernicus  subse- 
quently taught  thereof,  or  what  the  proposition  signifies 
objectively  now  by  means  of  the  developments  of  Newton. 
Pythagoras  may  have  meant  something  intellectually  anal- 
ogous thereto,  but  which  is  no  part  of  the  existing  Newto- 
nian system  of  the  universe.  All  Pythagoras  discovered 
was  the  general  proposition,  "  that  the  earth  revolves  around 
the  sun."  His  proposition  is  an  intellectual  surtout,  which 
is  found  to  fit  many  objective  bodies  that  were  probably 
wholly  unknown  to  Pythagoras. 

By  means,  however,  of  the  above  objective  indefinite- 
ness  of  subjective  general  propositions,  no  modern  discov- 
ery is  announced  but  some  person  will  show  it  was  known 
to  the  ancients ;  for  he  will  adduce  some  ancient  general 
proposition  that  will  intellectually  fit  the  modern  discovery. 
Should  my  Lectures  ever  gain  public  attention,  many  per- 
sons will  recollect  some  general  proposition  of  Plato,  Socra- 
tes, or  somebody  else,  that  will  intellectually  include  all 
that  I  shall  manifest ;  and  in  this  subjective  way  alone  is 
the  adage  true  that  "  nothing  is  new  under  the  sun."  Steam 

is  powerful,  dangerous,  and  useful.     This  proposition  may 
6* 


172  THE   MEANING  OF  WORDS. 

have  been  asserted  of  steam  centuries  ago,  and  the  propo- 
sition would  have  referred  to  objective  facts  then  known, 
that  would  have  made  the  proposition  objectively  signifi- 
cant ;  but  we  should  mistake  were  we  to  suppose  that  the 
author  of  the  proposition  necessarily  knew  the  modern  ap- 
pliances of  steam:  he  may  have  known  none  of  them. 
When  Lord  Bacon  recommended  physical  investigations, 
we  may  see  from  his  Novum  Organum,  that  the  recom- 
mendation was  a  subjective  intellectual  garment  whose  ob- 
jective occupants  were  almost  worthless ;  but  we  speak  of 
Bacon  as  though  his  recommendations  possessed  the  same 
objective  signification  to  him  as  they  possess  to  us. 

Since  the  time  of  Newton,  his  general  proposition  of 
universal  gravitation  includes  many  objective  facts  that 
were  unknown  to  him.  So  the  late  experiments  with  a 
pendulum,  in  the  Pantheon  at  Paris,  may  give  additional 
objective  meaning  to  the  proposition  which  affirms  subjec- 
tively the  diurnal  rotation  of  the  earth ;  but  no  proposition 
can,  at  any  given  time,  signify  objectively  more  than  the 
known  objective  facts  to  which  it  refers  at  the  time :  all  its 
capacity  for  further  objective  meaning  is  in  our  intellect. 
I  suppose  we  are  speculatively  ignorant  of  this  limitation 
in  the  objective  signification  of  general  propositions,  though 
we  know  the  limitation  practically ;  and  hence  the  interest 
we  evince  in  physical  experiments  like  the  above  at  Paris. 
Our  ignorance  consists  in  not  duly  estimating  the  hetero- 
geneous character  of  general  propositions — not  clearly  dis- 
criminating that  their  generality  is  only  an  intellectual 


UNFALLACIOUS  INTERPRETATION  OF  LANGUAGE.     173 

conception ;  and  hence,  when  we  would  know  what  the 
"diurnal  rotation  of  the  earth"  signifies  objectively,  we 
must  not  speculatively  inquire  what  objective  facts  the 
proposition  will  intellectually  fit,  and  assume  that  they  ex- 
ist objectively  ;  but  we  must  examine  sensibly  to  discover, 
as  in  the  above  pendulous  experiments  at  Paris,  what  ob- 
jective things  really  exist  that  will  conform  to  the  propo- 
sition. 

I  deem  the  above  rule  of  interpretation  as  important  as 
any  which  can  be  given  in  relation  to  language,  and  it  ap- 
plies as  intelligibly  to  every  general  proposition  as  to  the 
"diurnal  rotation  of  the  earth."  In  the  "Polynesian  Ee- 
searches,"  published  some  years  since  in  London,  the  au- 
thor, in  speaking  of  some  islands  in  the  Pacific  Ocean,  says, 
"  The  tide  is  here  very  singular.  If  influenced  at  all  by 
the  moon,  it  is  in  a  very  small  degree  only.  The  height 
to  which  the  water  rises  varies  but  a  few  inches  during  the 
whole  year.  Whatever  be  the  age  or  situation  of  the 
moon,  the  water  is  lowest  at  six  in  the  morning,  and  the 
same  hour  in  the  evening,  and  highest  at  noon  and  mid- 
night." The  writer  seems  embarrassed  by  the  usual  indis- 
crimination between  the  intellectually  conceived  general 
proposition  in  relation  to  the  influence  of  the  moon  over 
tides,  and  objective  physical  facts.  If  the  seas  to  which 
the  writer  alludes  exhibit  no  sensible  response  to  the  in- 
tellectually conceived  power  of  the  moon,  the  defect  is  no 
wonder  of  objective  nature,  but  an  instance  of  inapplica- 
bility in  an  intellectual  conception  of  man.  The  proposi- 


174  THE   MEANING   OF   WORDS. 

tion  which  imputes  tides  to  the  attraction  of  the  sun  and 
moon  means,  objectively,  not  every  objective  occurrence 
and  thing  that  we  can  speculatively  see  the  proposition 
will  fit,  but  it  means,  objectively,  such  objective  things 
only  as  we  can  find  sensibly  to  agree  with  the  proposition. 
To  know  therefore,  intellectually,  that  the  sun  and  moon 
influence  the  tides — that  the  earth  revolves  daily  on  its 
axis,  and  annually  around  the  sun — that  the  earth  is  round, 
etc.,  is  to  know  certain  general  propositions  which  our  in- 
tellect feels  to  be  severally  true  subjectively ;  but  if  we 
would  know  what  any  one  of  the  propositions  means  ob- 
jectively, we  must  not  employ  oi«ir  intellects  to  conceive 
what  objective  things  the  proposition  will  fit,  but  we  must 
employ  our  senses  to  discover,  sensibly,  what  objective 
things  exist  that  can  be  covered  by  the  proposition.  I  am 
aware  that  such  an  interpretation  of  general  propositions 
will  dispel  much  intellectual  and  verbal  enchantment ;  but 
it  will  make  our  knowledge  wholesome,  masculine,  and  con- 
formable to  the  realities  of  existence.  I  know,  however, 
we  delight  rather  to  deem  every  proposition  sensibly  sig- 
nificant of  every  sensible  fact  that  the  proposition  will  in- 
tellectually fit,  irrespective  of  whether  such  facts  are  sensi- 
bly perceptible  or  not.  That  the  limitation  is  consequeii- 
tial  which  I  thus  speculatively  assert,  we  may  know ;  for 
when  a  person  disregards  the  limitation,  and  deems  him- 
self revolving  with  the  earth  as  physically  as  he  may  see 
a  fly  revolve  with  a  revolving  artificial  globe,  he  feels  an 
amazement  that  is  not  excited  by  any  of  the  sensible  per- 


UNFALLACIOUS  INTERPRETATION  OF  LANGUAGE.     175 

ceptions  which  constitute  the  sensible  meaning  of  the  astro- 
nomical general  propositions  that  impute  revolutions  to  the 
earth. 

§  2.  Every  new  proposition  that  the  English  language 
can  make  is  only  a  new  collocation  of  old  words ;  just  as 
a  compositor  sets  in  type  different  sentences  by  only  chang- 
ing the  collocation  of  the  same  types.  A  complete  permu- 
tation, like  that  imagined  by  Eaymond  Lully,  of  all  the 
words  in  the  English  language,  would  exhibit  every  prop- 
osition that  can  be  made  in  English ;  but  many  of  the  new 
propositions  would  be  objectively  insignificant  till  time 
should  furnish  some  objects  which  the  intellectual  propo- 
sitions would  fit.  We  read  in  ancient  history  of  "  Greek 
fire ;"  but  as  we  know  not  any  objective  things  which  the 
phrase  intellectually  fits,  the  phrase  is  objectively  insigni- 
ficant. "When  a  schoolboy  learns,  intellectually,  that  every 
verb  must  agree  with  its  nominative  case  in  number  and 
person,  he  may  know  none  of  the  objective  applications  of 
the  rule ;  and  after  a  child  has  learned,  intellectually,  that 
twice  one  is  two,  he  has  still  to  learn  the  objective  signifi- 
cations of  the  formula ;  as,  for  instance,  that  one  apple  and 
another  are,  objectively,  equal  to  two  apples.  I  mean  not 
to  say  that  a  boy's  intellect  will  never  learn  spontaneously 
that  one  apple  and  another  are  objectively  equal  to  two 
apples ;  the  intellects  of  men  are  so  alike  organically,  that 
what  one  man's  intellect  conceives  on  any  given  occasion, 
another  man's  will  be  likely  to  conceive  when  similarly  in- 
duced (just  as  what  one  man's  arms  will  perform  on  some 


176  THE   MEANING  OF  WORDS. 

emergency,  other  men's  will  be  likely  to  perform  under  a 
like  emergency) ;  but  if  to  know,  intellectually,  that  twice 
one  is  two,  includes  not  necessarily  the  objective  knowl- 
edge that  one  apple  and  another  are  two ;  no  other  gene- 
ral proposition  that  we  may  know  intellectually  will  neces- 
sarily involve  a  knowledge  of  any  of  its  objective  meanings. 

The  general  proposition  attributed  to  Columbus,  that  he 
could  make  an  egg  stand  on  end  is  useful  in  at  least  show- 
ing the  distinction  between  a  general  proposition  and  its 
objective  meanings,  and  thereby  disabusing  us  of  the  falla- 
cious indiscrimination  that  is  common  in  us  between  an 
intellectual  knowledge  of  a  general  proposition  and  its  sen- 
sible significations.  In  short,  every  general  proposition 
possesses  as  many  different  objective  meanings  as  it  refers 
to  different  objects,  and  we  must  interpret  every  general 
proposition  as  we  interpret,  in  an  indictment,  a  general  ac- 
cusation of  mutiny,  treason,  or  felony.  The  general  accu- 
sation is  subjective,  and  refers  to  the  intellect ;  but  when 
we  would  know  what  the  general  accusation  means  objec- 
tively, we  must  examine  the  specifications  for  particular 
actions,  and  they  alone  can  yield  us  unsophistically  the 
answer. 

No  person  can  read  Spurzheim's  Treatise  on  Phrenology 
without  discovering,  intellectually,  the  connection  which 
his  intellect  saw  between  our  emotional  and  intellectual 
activity,  etc.,  and  certain  protuberances  of  our  brain  and 
cranium ;  but  the  general  propositions  that  his  intellect  con- 
ceived thereon  can  mean,  objectively,  no  more  than  the 


UNFALLACIOUS  INTERPRETATION  OF  LANGUAGE.     177 

limited  number  of  objective  facts  that  can  be  realized  un- 
verbally.  Subject  to  the  same  objective  limitation  is  the 
major  proposition  which  makes  the  whole  brain  the  organ 
of  intelligence — a  sort  of  imperium  in  imperio,  or  great  nat- 
ural galvanic  battery;  from  which  nerves,  like  galvanic 
wires,  issue  and  ramify  over  all  parts  of  the  body,  carrying 
to  the  brain  communications  from  the  external  world  by 
contact  in  the  perceptions  of  touch — by  pictures  formed  on 
the  retina  of  the  eye  in  the  perception  of  sights — by  ap- 
pulses  on  the  tympanum  of  the  ear  in  the  perception  of 
sounds — by  effluvia  to  the  olfactory  nerves  in  the  percep- 
tion of  smells — and  by  papilla  on  the  tongue  in  the  per- 
ception of  tastes.  No  general  proposition  is  more  subject- 
ively satisfactory  to  the  intellect  than  the  foregoing  in  re- 
lation to  the  brain;  still  its  objective,  unverbal  meaning 
must,  like  the  objective,  unverbal  meaning  of  every  other 
general  proposition,  be  limited  by  the  discoverable  unver- 
bal objects  to  which  it  refers. 

§  3.  To  limit  the  objective  or  unverbal  signification  of 
every  proposition  to  the  unverbal  objects  to  which  it  refers, 
may  seem  to  conflict  with  what  in  law  is  called  circum- 
stantial evidence.  That  Thomas  struck  the  blow  which 
killed  John  may  be  substantiated  without  proving  the 
blow,  but  by  showing  that  a  cry  of  murder  proceeded 
from  a  house  out  of  which  Thomas,  covered  with  blood, 
was  seen  to  issue;  and  that  John,  recently  killed,  was 
found  alone  in  the  house,  with  the  sword  of  Thomas  in  his 
heart,  etc.  These  objective  facts  include  not  any  act  of 


178  THE  MEANING   OF  WOKDS. 

Thomas  which  will  be  included  by  the  proposition  that  he 
murdered  John ;  still  apparently  they  are  all  the  objective 
facts  on  which  a  jury  may  find  a  verdict  of  wilful  murder 
against  him.  Why,  therefore,  cannot  certain  sensible  ap- 
pearances, etc.,  in  relation  to  the  earth's  diurnal  revolution 
around  its  axis,  prove  not  themselves  only,  but,  in  addi- 
tion, other  sensible  facts  not  discoverable  sensibly  in  the 
earth,  but  discoverable  in  the  revolution  of  say  an  artificial 
sphere,  etc.?  The  difference  in  the  two  cases  may  be 
stated  as  follows: — The  objective  facts  which  are  mani- 
fested on  the  trial  of  Thomas,  prove  more  than  themselves 
by  means  of  our  objective  experience  with  men  like 
Thomas,  their  motives,  actions,  etc. ;  but  the  objective  facts 
discoverable  in  the  earth,  etc.,  prove  more  than  themselves, 
not  by  means  of  our  objective  experience  with  any  thing 
like  the  earth,  but  with  artificial  spheres,  etc.,  which  we 
intellectually  assume  the  earth  to  be  like ;  so  that  really 
our  theoretical  conclusion  of  the  earth's  physical  identical- 
ness  in  revolution,  with  the  revolution  of  an  artificial 
sphere,  partakes  of  the  nature  of  a  petitio  principii.  I  must 
not,  however,  be  understood  as  denying  the  revolution  of 
the  earth,  as  an  intellectual  proposition.  I  am  only  main- 
taining that  the  unverbal  sensible  meaning  of  the  revolu- 
tion is  limited  by  the  sensible  facts  which  we  can  discover 
in  relation  thereto ;  and  that  all  we  superadd  is  subjective, 
not  objective ;  intellectual,  not  physical.  But  I  shall  have 
occasion  to  speak  further  on  such  general  propositions  in 
our  next  lecture. 


UNFALLACIOUS  INTERPRETATION  OF  LANGUAGE.     179 

§  4.  Scientific  general  propositions  such  as  we  have  been 
considering,  possess  determinate  objective  sensible  mean- 
ings ;  but  books  and  conversation  are  full  of  general  jfro- 
positions  which  partake  more  of  the  intellectual  character 
of  riddles  than  of  specific  objective  communications.  If  a 
man  has  been  thrown  from  the  back  of  a  vicious  horse  and 
wounded,  he  may  relate  the  accident  objectively  in  words 
like  the  above,  or  he  may  refer  to  it  subjectively,  in  one  or 
several  enigmatical  general  propositions:  as,  "when  we 
seek  pleasure,  we  may  find  pain ;  what  we  employ  as  a 
substitute  for  medicine,  may  occasion  a  necessity  for  medi- 
cine ;  brute  animals  are  so  destitute  of  gratitude,  that  the 
more  you  pamper  them  with  food,  the  more  they  will  repay 
you  with  injury."  He  can  construct  as  many  such  enig- 
matical general  propositions  as  his  intellect  shall  deem 
analogous  to  his  accident ;  and  they  may  all  mean  objec- 
tively, no  more  than  the  one  accident.  When  you  hear 
from  him  one  of  these  propositions,  the  chance  that  you 
will  interpret  it  objectively,  by  the  accident,  if  it  be  un- 
known to  you,  is  about  equal  to  your  chance  of  guessing 
what  objective  things  I  refer  to  when  I  say  that  I  had  a 
nice  dish  for  my  dinner  to-day.  Still  your  intellect  will 
probably  endeavour  to  find  some  objective  physical  mean- 
ing to  his  general  proposition  ;  and  you  will  seek  it  among 
such  of  the  objective  things  known  to  you  as  the  general 
proposition  will  seem  to  fit.  Should  you  succeed  in  find- 
ing any  such  objective  thing,  you  will  assent  to  the  truth 
of  his  general  proposition,  "  that  brute  animals  are  so  des- 


180  THE   MEANING   OF   WORDS. 

titute  of  gratitude,  that  the  more  you  pamper  them  with 
food,  the  more  they  will  repay  you  with  ingratitude;" 
though  perhaps  all  you  mean  is,  that  the  more  you  feed 
your  cat,  the  more  neglectful  she  becomes  of  clearing  your 
house  from  mice. 

You  may,  however,  recollect  no  objective  thing  which 
seems  to  accord  with  the  above  proposition,  and  by  an  an- 
tagonism to  which  the  intellect  is  organically  prone,  you 
may  be  induced  to  recollect  some  objective  things  which 
contradict  the  proposition ;  as,  for  instance,  the  more  you 
have  housed  and  fed  poultry  during  the  winter,  the  more 
eggs  they  have  furnished  for  your  table ;  or  the  more  you 
have  provided  appropriate  food  for  your  apiary,  the  more 
its  bees  have  repaid  you  with  honey.  You  will,  therefore, 
deny  his  general  proposition,  and  adduce  these  instances 
as  proofs  of  its  falsity.  So  a  man  who  picked  up  a  dollar 
which  he  saw  fall  from  a  traveller,  went  to  a  tavern,  and 
in  conversation  with  the  landlord,  made  this  general  pro- 
position :  "  Men  are  more  honest  in  great  matters  than  in 
small."  He  meant  that  he  acted  dishonestly  in  not  restor- 
ing the  dollar,  whilst  in  his  more  extensive  intercourse 
with  mankind  he  was  honest.  The  innkeeper,  (who  had  a 
week  previously  found  in  one  of  his  chambers  a  pocket- 
book  with  bank-notes,  which  he  intended  to  keep,  though 
he  frequently  corrected  errors  when  his  guests  gave  inad- 
vertently some  trifle  too  much,)  replied,  that  he  thought 
"  men  were  more  honest  in  small  matters  than  in  great." 

"  We  are,"  says  Professor  Stewart,  "  enabled  by  our  in- 


UNFALLACIOUS  INTERPRETATION  OF  LANGUAGE.     181 

stinctive  anticipations  of  physical  events,  to  accommodate 
our  conduct  to  what  we  perceive  is  to  happen."  This  gen- 
eral proposition  will  be  objectively  insignificant  to  every 
person  whose  intellect  cannot  attach  to  it  some  objective 
incident  which  the  intellect  shall  deem  it  to  fit.  The  object 
of  which  it  caused  me  to  think,  was  the  falling  of  a  tree. 
Instinctive  anticipation  would  enable  me  to  perceive  that 
I  should  be  crushed  if  I  did  not  change  my  position. 
Probably  Professor  Stewart  thought  of  something  different, 
and  the  fall  of  a  tree  may  never  have  occurred  to  his  ob- 
servation. The  inexperience  of  children  tends  to  make  gen- 
eral propositions  objectively  unintelligible  to  them;  hence 
books  intended  for  children,  should  avoid  general  proposi- 
tions which  are  only  intellectual  vestments,  and  for  which 
children  may  possess  no  sensible  bodies. 

§  5.  Other  writers  avoid  the  above  enigmatical,  objective 
unintelligibility.  If  they  intellectually  involve  any  objec- 
tive fact  in  a  general  proposition,  they  subjoin  the  fact  by 
way  of  sample,  though  it  often  constitutes  all  the  objective 
meaning  of  their  general  proposition;  thus,  "the  more," 
says  St.  Pierre,  "  temples  are  multiplied  in  a  state,  the  more 
is  religion  enfeebled."  What  did  St.  Pierre  mean  ?  You 
will  find  in  his  succeeding  paragraph: — "Look,"  says  he, 
"at  Italy  covered  with  churches,  yet  Constantinople  is 
crowded  with  Italian  renegadoes ;  while  the  Jews,  who  had 
but  one  temple,  are  so  strongly  attached  to  their  religion,  that 
the  loss  of  their  temple  excites  to  this  day  their  regret."  Mr. 
Hawkesbee  asserts  that  the  aurora  borealis  is  the  effect  of 


182  THE   MEANING  OF  WORDS. 

electricity  on  a  vacuum.  "What  does  he  mean  by  his  general 
proposition  ?  He  states  subsequently  as  follows  : — "  The 
excitation  of  electricity  in  an  exhausted  Florence  flask 
produced  a  light  which  resembled  the  aurora."  Another 
person  who  shall  find  that  all  the  phenomena  of  the  aurora 
borealis  cannot  be  thus  imitated,  will  insist  that  Mr. 
Hawkesbee  is  wrong ;  but  both  are  right  intellectually,  for 
they  severally  mean  objectively,  no  more  than  the  objects 
to  which  each  refers.  To  speak  thus  of  single  physical 
facts  as  general  propositions,  enables  us  to  seem  physically 
rich  on  a  very  small  actual  capital ;  but  without  any  deter- 
minate motive,  the  tendency  of  the  intellect  in  every  man, 
is  strong  to  such  subjective  generalization  ;  and  like  every 
organic  tendency,  it  no  doubt  subserves  useful  purposes 
when  judiciously  employed. 

To  compel  all  men  to  employ  the  same  collocation  of 
words,  is  impracticable.  The  attempt  has  filled  the  world 
with  controversy,  and  not  brought  us  to  the  desired  unifor- 
mity. I  am  so  confident  that  nearly  every  general  propo- 
sition is  true,  in  the  manner  intended  by  the  speaker,  that 
I  never  contradict : — Cullen  asserts,  "  that  when  an  exter- 
nal cause  produces  in  us  a  morbid  action,  Nature  exerts  an 
opposite  process  to  counteract  the  evil."  Some  medical 
writers  assert  a  conflicting  general  proposition.  They  say, 
"  that  every  morbid  change  which  occurs  in  our  system  is 
essentially  injurious,  and  must  be  opposed  by  medicine." 
Two  physicians  who  should  severally  enforce  a  different 
one  of  the  above  general  propositions,  supposing  both  pro- 


UNFALLACIOTJS  INTEKPRETATION  OF  LANGUAGE.     183 

positions  to  refer  to  the  same  objective  diseased  condition, 
would  employ  opposite  remedies.  Bat  to  act  thus  pro- 
ceeds from  an  erroneous  belief  that  the  general  propositions 
are  objectively  significant  of  more  than  certain  definite 
particulars.  A  person  who  knows  the  objective  particulars 
to  which  the  framer  of  each  general  proposition  alludes, 
will  probably  find  that  both  propositions  are  correct  in  the 
restricted  cases. 

Physicians  have  much  employed  such  verbal  controversy 
on  the  origin  of  yellow  fever,  some  asserting  as  a  general 
proposition  that  it  is  indigeneous,  and  others  exotic.  Were 
each  parti zan  to  detail  the  un verbal  objective  particulars 
to  which  his  general  proposition  refers,  no  disagreement 
would  probably  exist;  but  while  he  deems  his  general 
proposition  significant  objectively  of  more  than  certain  un- 
verbal  particulars,  endless  verbal  controversy  ensues. 
Each  thinks  justly  that  the  other  errs,  for  the  same  mis- 
take of  the  nature  of  general  propositions  misleads  both. 
A  father  said  once,  "My  son,  in  water  exists  a  principle 
which  is  destructive  of  life ;  and  in  brandy,  a  principle 
preservative  of  life."  The  father  meant  objectively,  that 
total  immersion  in  water  would  produce  death,  and  that  a 
small  quantity  of  brandy  was  occasionally  salutary.  The 
proposition  was  correct  while  confined  to  the  objects  to 
which  the  father  alluded ;  but  the  son,  supposing  its  appli- 
cation as  universal  un  verbally,  as  verbally,  refrained  from 
the  use  of  water,  and  substituted  brandy.  We  all  err, 
though  not  always  in  a  like  degree,  when  we  consider  any 


184  THE   MEANING   OF  WORDS. 

general  proposition  significant  objectively  of  more  than 
certain  objective  particulars ;  and  if  those  who  promulge 
general  propositions  will  not  announce  the  objective  par- 
ticulars to  which  they  refer,  the  proposition  is  to  us  only  a 
sort  of  intellectual  garment  with  which  we  may  invest  any 
un verbal  object  that  our  intellect  shall  happen  to  know, 
and  deem  the  proposition  to  fit ;  but  the  proposition  will 
not  necessarily  teach  us  the  objective  meaning  referred  to 
by  the  promulgers  of  the  proposition.  Speculative  writers 
are  particularly  fruitful  of  general  propositions,  and  usually 
without  subjoining  any  objective  example  by  way  of  key 
to  the  respective  riddles  which  they  thus  construct.  Books, 
however,  of  every  kind,  abound  with  unexplained  general 
propositions, — to  frame  general  propositions  being  much 
less  laborious  than  to  furnish  them  with  substantial  objec 
tive  bodies.  Politicians  find  such  propositions  a  conve- 
nient mode  of  expressing  opinions  that  will  suit  every- 
body; for  instance,  "a  judicious  tariff"  is  precisely  what 
every  man  desires,  though  one  man  may  mean  thereby  an 
import  duty  of  a  hundred  per  cent,  ad  valorem,  and  another 
man  may  mean  a  total  exemption  from  any  duty.  "To 
demand  from  foreign  nations  nothing  but  what  ought  to  be 
demanded,  and  to  submit  to  nothing  but  what  ought  to  be 
submitted  to,"  is  a  proposition  which  will  meet  with  uni- 
versal assent,  though  conduct  entirely  opposite  in  character 
may  be  covered  thereby.  "  To  give  to  every  private  indi- 
vidual the  utmost  personal  liberty  that  is  useful  to  the 
individual  himself  as  well  as  to  the  nation,"  will  meet  the 


UNFALLACIOUS  INTERPRETATION  OF  LANGUAGE.      185 

approbation  of  the  most  liberal  democrat  and  the  most 
tyrannical  autocrat.  All  such  propositions  are  like  the 
bathing  dresses  supplied  to  visitors  on  the  beach  at  New- 
port; they  fit  everybody  equally  well,  but  the  bodies 
clothed  thereby  exhibit,  when  uncovered,  every  sort  of 
variety  that  bodies  are  capable  of  assuming.  Silence  has 
been  long  denoted  a  characteristic  of  wisdom ;  and  when 
we  consider  the  character  of  general  propositions,  we  see  a 
propriety  in  refraining  from  speech  if  we  have  nothing  to 
communicate  but  general  propositions;  though  the  diffi- 
culty in  acquiring  sensible  facts  deserving  of  specific  an- 
nouncement, must  impose  much  .silence  on  any  man  who 
should  employ  them  as  his  only  topics  of  conversation. 
The  scarcity  in  which  new  sensible  facts  exist,  is  usually 
illustrated  very  painfully  when  scientific  men  meet  to- 
gether formally,  in  public  associations,  to  interchange  in- 
formation. What  a  relief  on  such  an  emergency  is  some 
narrative  like  the  late  soundings  of  the  ocean  by  Lieuten- 
ant Maury,  which  speaks  of  something  besides  ever  chang- 
ing, ever  conflicting  intellectually  conceived  opinions. 
The  specific  sensible  facts  that  are  usually  announced  at 
such  meetings  compare  in  number  with  the  general  propo- 
sitions in  about  the  relation  of  a  grain  of  wheat  to  a  peck 
of  chaff. 

§  6.  Before  I  close  the  present  Lecture,  I  want  to  make 
a  few  remarks  on  propositions  which  possess  little  or  no 
objective  signification,  and  whose  signification  is  mostly  or 
wholly  subjective.  Such  propositions  are  easily  construe- 


186  THE   MEANING  OF  WORDS. 

ted,  and  books  of  every  description  abound  with  them. 
The  intellect  discovers  in  the  words  a  syntactical  congru- 
ity  to  each  other ;  hence  the  propositions  possess  a  hazy 
intellectual  intelligence,  which  satisfies  the  author  and 
often  pleases  the  feelings  of  the  reader.  "Fellow  citizens!" 
might  a  Fourth  of  July  orator  say,  in  accordance  with  the 
above  species  of  propositions — "  the  destiny  of  our  beloved 
country  is  in  our  keeping,  let  us  be  faithful  to  our  sacred 
trust,  and  support  no  man  for  any  public  station  who  will 
not  advocate  principles  that  will  bear  the  scrutiny  of  vir- 
tue ;  for,  without  virtue,  all  seeming  prosperity  is  baseless, 
and  all  seeming  good  but  evil  in  disguise.  Oh !  that  this 
important  truth  could  be  wafted  by  the  four  winds  of  hea- 
ven, and  impressed,  as  with  the  point  of  a  diamond,  on  the 
hearts  of  the  rising  generation;  then,  indeed,  would  our 
teeming  population,  from  the  wide  Atlantic  to  the  broad 
Pacific,  become  a  great  and  glorious  nation,  for  we  should 
be  a  virtuous  people.  Finally,  fellow  citizens,  let  us  not 
be  deceived  by  false  demagogues  who  speak  what  they 
mean  not,  but  let  us  believe  honest  patriots  who  mean 
what  they  speak,  though  they  tell  us  unpalatable  truths." 
Propositions  like  the  above  assimilate  to  poetry  or  mu- 
sic. They  speak  to  the  feelings  rather  than  to  the  intellect, 
and  hence  probably  their  power  to  please.  The  feelings 
can  be  affected  irrespective  wholly  of  the  objective  mean- 
ing of  words,  as  we  find  in  very  young  children,  to  whom 
the  songs  which  induce  tranquillity  or  pleasure  can  com- 
municate no  objective  information.  Nor  ought  we  to  deem 


UNFALLACIOUS  INTERPRETATION  OF  LANGUAGE.     187 

propositions,  such  as  the  foregoing  oration,  destitute  of  util- 
ity when  addressed  to  men.  I  once  went  with  a  gentleman 
to  an  oratorio,  where,  after  a  few  intellectually  unintelligi- 
ble words  had  been  sung,  and  repeated  often  in  melodious 
tones  and  with  melodious  accompaniments,  he  observed  to 
me,  that  he  had  derived  from  what  he  had  heard,  more  re- 
ligious feelings  than  he  had  ever  obtained  from  intellectual 
sermons.  So,  probably,  a  Fourth  of  July  oration,  which 
communicates  no  objective  information,  may  yet  promote 
the  patriotic  feelings  of  the  hearers,  or  cultivate  in  them 
other  beneficial  feelings,  and  thus  influence  their  conduct 
more  beneficially  than  any  number  of  precepts  with  any 
amount  of  objective  signification.  Indeed,  no  inconsider- 
able part  of  all  prayers  and  sermons  derive  their  cogency 
from  their  effect  on  our  internal  feelings ;  hence,  when  lis- 
tened to  for  objective  information,  the  listeners  constitute 
usually  the  most  dissatisfied  portion  of  the  audience.  The 
organic  principle,  by  which  words  are  thus  efficacious  over 
our  internal  feelings,  has  not  received  the  speculative  con- 
sideration that  the  principle  merits.  I  have  presented  my 
views  thereon  in  Lecture  V.  of  a  small  book,  entitled  "Re- 
ligion in  its  Relation  to  the  present  Life,"  published  for  me, 
in  1841,  by  Harper  &  Brothers,  of  New  York,  and  to  which 
I  refer  because  any  direct  consideration  of  the  subject  would 
not  be  within  the  proper  purview  of  the  present  work. 

§  7.  Having  thus  shown,  I  hope  sufficiently,  that  the  objec- 
tive signification  of  every  general  proposition  is  only  the  ob- 
jective particulars  to  which  the  proposition  refers,  and  that 


188  THE   MEANING  OF  WOKDS. 

no  verbal  universality  of  the  purview  of  any  proposition 
can  make  it  significant  unverbally  beyond  the  above  lim- 
its, I  might  dismiss  the  subject,  except  that  a  verbal  puzzle 
is  connected  with  the  assigned  limits.  A  man,  for  instance, 
who  lives  within  the  tropics,  may  never  have  heard  that 
light  and  darkness  are  not  diurnally  successive  in  every 
part  of  the  earth ;  and  no  general  proposition  will  be  more 
incontestible  to  his  intellect  than  the  diurnal  alternation, 
everywhere,  of  light  and  darkness.  We  know,  however, 
that  the  man  is  mistaken ;  and  why  may  we  not  be  mis- 
taken in  our  belief  that  every  unsupported  stone  will  ev- 
erywhere fall  towards  the  earth,  and  that  every  man  will 
die  ?  The  question  I  will  reserve  for  our  next  Lecture,  as 
it  involves  an  important  principle  in  the  interpretation  of 
general  propositions,  and  otherwise  deserves  a  separate  con- 
sideration. 


LECTURE  VII. 

OF  THE  UNFALLACIOUS  MEANING  OF  NEGATIVE  GENERAL 
PROPOSITIONS. 

CONTENTS. 

A  negation  that  refers  to  no  physical  object,  is  physically  insignificant. 

An  affirmation  that  is  universal  in  its  terms,  and  unlimited  by  any  sensi- 
ble negative,  is  still  significant  sensibly  of  only  the  sensible  objects  to 
•which  it  refers. 

§  1.  As  no  proposition  can  signify,  objectively,  more 
than  the  objects  to  which  it  refers,  every  proposition  in  the 
form  of  a  negation  is  necessarily  unmeaning,  objectively, 
when  it  refers  to  no  objective  thing.  The  limitation  is  not 
conventional,  but  pertains  to  language  constitutionally: 
when,  therefore,  a  man  within  the  tropics  asserts  that  light 
and  darkness  alternate  diurnally  everywhere,  he  is  correct 
to  the  extent  only  of  the  physical  particulars  to  which  he 
refers ;  but  a  negation  of  his  proposition  is  also  significant 
physically,  because  the  negation  refers  to  physical  facts 
that  occur  beyond  the  tropics.  If,  however,  I  assert  that 
unsupported  stones  may,  in  some  unexplored  part  of  the 
earth,  not  fall  towards  the  earth,  I  shall  refer  to  no  physi- 


190  THE   MEANING  OF  WORDS. 

cal  fact,  and  hence  my  salvo  will  "be  physically  insignifi- 
cant. 

The  limitation  above  stated,  in  the  un verbal  meaning  of 
negative  propositions,  possesses  great  practical  importance, 
and  has,  I  suppose,  not  received  the  speculative  recogni- 
tion which  it  merits.  I  solicit  for  it,  therefore,  much  atten- 
tion, and  will  give  some  further  examples  of  my  meaning: 
— An  Esquimaux  Indian  will  be  as  positive  that  water  ev- 
erywhere freezes  during  the  winter,  as  I  am  that  a  piece  of 
gold  will  everywhere  exhibit  the  sight  round,  and  the  feel 
round,  when  the  piece  is  so  formed  that  a  line  drawn  from 
the  centre  of  it  to  the  surface,  anywhere,  will  measure  just 
one  inch.  Now  I  know  that  the  Esquimaux  is  mistaken. 
Countries  exist  in  which  water  never  freezes,  and  why  may 
not  countries  exist  in  which  physical  objects  are  so  differ- 
ent from  those  with  which  I  am  acquainted,  that  a  piece 
of  gold  may  possess  the  proportions  that  I  have  stated,  and 
still  not  be  round  ?  The  two  propositions  are  verbally  alike, 
but  unverbally  different.  That  countries  exist  in  which 
water  never  freezes  is  significant  unverbally,  for  the  affir- 
mation refers  to  the  sensible  experience  of  credible  wit- 
nesses ;  but  the  doubt  in  relation  to  the  gold  is  merely  ver- 
bal, or,  at  most,  intellectual.  It  refers  to  no  sensible  ex- 
perience, and  hence  is  as  sensibly  insignificant  as  any  story 
of  fairies  that  amuses  infancy,  and  for  precisely  the  same 
reason,  and  for  no  other  reason. 

That  the  dead  exhibit  neither  sensation  nor  conscious- 
ness is  nearly  all  we  mean  objectively  when  we  assert  that 


TJNFALLACIOUS  INTERPRETATION  OF  LANGUAGE.    191 

the  dead  are  void  of  feeling  and  consciousness.  We  can- 
not know,  experimentally,  that  the  dead  suffer  no  pain  on 
a  funeral  pyre,  or  under  the  knife  of  an  anatomical  demon- 
strator, or  under  the  process  of  decomposition.  You  may 
deem  this  intellectual  reflection  full  of  horror,  and  depre- 
cate for  the  dead  some  attention  to  the  intellectually  al- 
leged possibility  of  their  latent  sensibilities.  But  you  will 
deprecate  in  vain.  The  anatomical  demonstrator  will  pro- 
ceed in  his  dissecting  operations  as  unconcernedly  as  be- 
fore. He  may  not  be  able  to  state  why  he  practically 
disregards  your  remarks ;  but  the  reason  lies  in  his  practical 
acquaintance  with  the  nature  of  language.  Your  remarks 
refer  to  nothing  sensible,  hence  he  knows  them  to  be  sensibly 
insignificant.  No  views  of  language  manifest  so  well  the 
secret  of  its  significancy  as  the  contemplation  of  salvos  like 
the  foregoing.  The  contingencies  are  objectively  insigni- 
ficant from  no  lack  of  subjective  significancy,  but  simply 
because  they  possess  no  objective  meaning.  They  are  intel- 
lectual garments  which  ostensibly  are  capable  of  fitting 
somebody,  but  no  physical  body  is  adapted  to  them.  They 
are  worse  than  the  slipper  of  Cinderella,  for  one  foot  was 
found  that  it  could  fit ;  but  a  reservation  which  refers  to  no 
unverbal  object,  is  objectively  meaningless. 

§  2.  "We  may  apply  remarks  like  the  foregoing  to  nu- 
merous scientific  propositions.  For  instance,  the  intellect 
of  every  man  conceives  irresistibly,  from  existing  premises, 
that  the  earth  is  round,  and  that  it  is  subject  to  diurnal  and 
annual  motions ;  but  should  a  man  assert  that  the  round- 


192  THE   MEANING   OF  WORDS. 

ness  and  motions  thus  conceived  of  the  earth  are  not  asso- 
ciated with  any  physical  roundness  and  motions,  his  nega- 
tion will  be  physically  significant  to  only  the  extent  of  the 
sensible  perceptions  to  which  it  refers  ;  and  when  any  such 
negation  refers  to  nothing  that  is  sensibly  perceptible,  the 
negation  will  be  sensibly  insignificant.  These  doctrines 
may  be  thought  to  conflict  with  what  I  have  said  hereto- 
fore on  such  propositions,  and  I  contrast  the  two  doctrines 
the  better  to  explain  them.  My  former  comments  on  such 
doctrines,  in  their  affirmative  announcement,  were  directed 
not  against  the  propriety  of  the  announcement,  but  against 
imputing  to  the  propositions  a  physical  meaning  beyond 
the  sensible  particulars  on  which  the  doctrines  are  founded. 
I  suppose  I  am  not  mistaken  in  believing  that  men  are  ac- 
customed to  deem  the  affirmative  diurnal  and  annual  mo- 
tions conceived  of  the  earth,  etc.,  not  limited  insensible  sig- 
nification to  the  sensible  particulars  to  which  the  intellectu- 
ally conceived  motions  relate ;  we  include  therewith  and 
confound  as  sensible  much  that  is  only  intellectually  con- 
ceived. And  here  again  you  may  ask  me  what  is  the  dif- 
ference between  what  is  only  intellectually  conceived  and 
what  can  be  sensibly  perceived ;  and  I  again  answer,  that 
it  is  what  it  is ;  the  difference  is  unverbal,  not  verbal,  and 
words  can  only  refer  us  to  it.  Unverbal  things  cannot  be 
transmuted  into  words,  or  vice  versa ;  and  if  no  unverbal 
difference  exists  between  what  is  only  intellectually  con- 
ceived and  what  is  sensibly  perceived,  my  whole  specula- 
tive superstructure  is  inane — a  distinction  without  a  differ- 


UN  FALLACIOUS  INTERPRETATION  OF  LANGUAGE.     193 

ence;  though  our  bias  towards  confounding  the  two,  or 
rather  the  piquancy  which  attends  the  materializing  of 
what  we  conceive  intellectually,  is  conclusive  to,  at  least, 
my  feelings,  that  an  unverbal  and  consequential  difference 
exists  between  what  we  intellectually  conceive  and  what 
we  sensibly  perceive. 

Similar  to  the  foregoing  are  the  intellectually  conceived 
assertions,  that  the  moon  and  the  sun  cause  the  tides ;  that 
every  fixed  star  is  a  sun,  and  the  centre  of  a  planetary  sys- 
tem; that  beyond  all  telescopic  vision  other  stars  exist, 
which  also  are  the  centres  of  more  remote  systems ;  that 
the  earth  appears  like  a  star  to  the  inhabitants  of  the  plan- 
ets, etc.  Now,  if  a  person  chooses  to  say  that  no  physical 
realities  exist  that  conform  to  these  intellectual  conceptions, 
his  negation  will  possess  no  physical  significance  beyond 
the  sensible  perceptions  to  which  his  negation  may  refer, 
and  the  negation  will  be  wholly  insignificant  sensibly  if  it 
refer  to  nothing  sensible.  The  absence  of  a  physical  nega- 
tive will  make  any  affirmative  proposition  true  universally ; 
yet  the  universal  affirmation  will  still  mean,  physically, 
the  physical  particulars  only  to  which  the  affirmation  re- 
fers. A  nursery  couplet  says,  "  The  children  of  Holland 
take  pleasure  in  making,  what  the  children  of  England  take 
pleasure  in  breaking."  I  want  to  avoid  a  like  conduct  if 
possible,  though  it  is  quite  prevalent  in  speculative  contro- 
versy. I  take  no  pleasure  in  subverting  any  received  spec- 
ulative tenets,  and  only  endeavour  to  manifest  their  proper 

unverbal  signification. 
9 


194:  THE   MEANING   OF  WORDS. 

And  now  a  friend  suggests  to  me  the  following  queries : 
— "  Have  you  any  objective  reasons  for  disbelieving  that 
the  earth  would  appear  like  a  star,  if  you  could  view  it 
from  any  of  the  planets  which  belong  to  our  solar  system?. 
— have  you  any  objective  reasons  for  disbelieving  it  would 
exhibit  the  sight  round  and  the  feel  round,  if  you  could 
possibly  see  it  and  feel  it  in  entirety,  as  you  can  see  and 
feel  an  artificial  globe? — have  you  any  objective  reasons 
for  disbelieving  that  the  earth's  motions  would  be  as  sen- 
sibly perceptible  as  an  artificial  globe's,,  were  you  located 
in  relation  to  the  earth  as  you  are  located  in  relation  to  an 
artificial  globe  ?"  To  these  queries  I  answer,  that  as  they 
refer  to  nothing  sensible  that  is  within  my  knowledge,  they 
are  to  me  sensibly  insignificant;  but  my  intellect  sees 
the  cogency  of  the  questions,  and  cannot  avoid  assenting 
thereto ;  and  the  intellectual  assent  no  way  conflicts  with 
any  position  I  have  intended  to  establish.  If  any  person 
shall  discover  a  verbal  conflict,  the  discovery  will  arise 
from  my  inability  to  express  verbally  what  I  intended  un- 
verbally. 

I  have  treated  far  too  summarily  the  important  truths 
which  the  present  Lecture  embraces  within  its  proper  pur- 
view, but  I  will  close  it  with  an  illustration  of  the  embar- 
rassment we  may  experience  when  we  know  not  that  a 
negation  is  subject  to  the  same  limitation  in  its  unverbal 
interpretation  as  an  affirmation ;  namely,  that  neither  can 
mean  objectively  more  than  the  objects  to  which  it  refers ; 
and  that  either  is  insignificant  sensibly  when  it  refers  to  no 


UNFALLACIOUS  INTERPRETATION  OF  LANGUAGE.     195 

sensible  object.  I  once  heard  a  celebrated  clergyman  as- 
tonish and  puzzle  his  hearers  by  the  announcement  that 
experience  alone  would  not  authorize  the  belief  that  we 
must  all  die ;  experience  being  able,  he  said,  to  speak  of 
the  past  only — not  of  the  future.  He  insisted  that  we  can 
be  affirmatively  certain  of  death  from  only  its  being  a  pre- 
diction of  revelation.  Now  the  puzzle  of  the  above  van- 
ishes when  we  discriminate  between  its  intellectual  signifi- 
cancy  and  its  sensible  significancy. "  That  we  must  all  die 
refers,  certainly  for  its  sensible  signification,  to  only  our 
sensible  experience ;  but  any  doubt  in  relation  thereto,  and 
any  negative  in  relation  thereto,  refer  to  no  sensible  expe- 
rience, and,  consequently,  both  doubt  and  negative  are  sen- 
sibly insignificant. 


LECTURE  VIII. 

OF  THE  UNFALLACIOUS  INTERPRETATION  OF  WORDS  THAT 
ARE  INTELLECTUALLY   CONCEIVED. 

CONTENTS. 

1.  Words  conceived  by  the  intellect  mean,  unverbally,  the  organism  of 

the  intellect;  not  the  objects  which  the  words  mean  when  they  ap- 
ply to  the  perceptions  of  the  senses. 

2.  Intellectually  conceived  words  are  subjective  responses  of  the  intellect 

to  objective  premises. 

8.  As  a  man  increases  his  objective  knowledge,  he  increases  the  material 
out  of  which  his  intellect  conceives  its  subjective  responses. 

4.  The  intellect  cannot  originate  objective  knowledge  except  what  relates 

to  its  own  organism. 

5.  The  responses  of  the  intellect  are  independent  of  our  volition. 

§  1.  We  are  now  arrived  where  we  may  usefully  reflect 
upon  so  much  of  what  we  have  accomplished  as  is  neces- 
sary to  make  the  past  subsidiary  to  the  future.  The  un- 
verbal  meaning  of  words  is  our  theme ;  what  the  un verbal 
meanings  are  is  the  object  of  our  researches.  To  make 
words  tell  what  unverbal  meanings  are  has  always  led 
speculation  to  where  it  wanders  "  in  endless  mazes  lost ;" 
and  the  result,  as  well  as  the  attempt,  may  be  likened  to 
the  efforts  of  a  child  to  outrun  its  shadow,  or  of  a  kitten, 
by  revolving,  to  catch  its  own  tail.  Words  are  as  unable 


UNFALLACIOUS  INTERPRETATION  OF  LANGUAGE.     197 

to  tell  us  what  unverbal  things  are  as  the  sounds  of  a  bell 
are  unable  to  tell  us  what  unsonorous  things  are ;  or,  as 
visible  appearances,  pictures,  etc.,  are  unable  to  tell  us 
what  invisible  things  are ;  or,  as  odours  are  unable  to  tell 
us  what  inodorous  things  are.  What  unverbal  things  are 
we  can  be  told  by  only  the  mute  unverbal  revelations  of 
our  senses,  internal  feelings,  and  intellect.  Into  these  alone 
we  must  translate  words  when  we  desire  to  know  the  ulti- 
mate unverbal  signification  of  the  words ;  and  this  mode 
of  interpreting  words  constitutes  one  of  the  main  precepts 
that  I  have  attempted  to  inculcate. 

§  2.  Unverbal  things  which  I  have  thus  postulated  as 
the  ultimate  signification  of  words,  differ  among  themselves 
generically  ;  the  revelations  of  each  of  our  five  senses  dif- 
fering from  the  revelations  of  the  other  four ;  and  the  reve- 
lations of  the  intellect  and  of  the  internal  feelings  differing 
from  each  other,  and  from  sensible  perceptions.  Our  spe- 
culative disregard  of  the  generic  differences  which  thus 
exist  in  our  sensible,  moral,  and  intellectual  knowledge, 
(our  estimating  unverbal  things  by  their  verbal  homo- 
geneity rather  than  by  their  unverbal  heterogeneity,) 
must,  at  some  future  period  of  the  world's  existence,  aston- 
ish our  successors,  as  much  as  we  are  astonished  that  our 
predecessors  could  ever  believe  that  the  intellectually  con- 
ceived flight  through  the  air  of  witches  on  broomsticks  was 
homogeneous  with  a  visible  flight  through  the  air  of  birds. 
When  a  juggler  opens  a  box,  and  shows  us  it  is  empty, 
and  again  opens  it  and  we  find  it  full  of  sand,  and  again 


198  THE   MEANING   OF  WORDS. 

opens  it  and  we  see  it  full  of  live  birds ;  we  are  surprised, 
for  we  have  not  seen  that  the  box  possesses  three  different 
compartments.  We  employ  words  with  the  same  delusive 
misunderstanding.  The  word  revolution,  for  instance,  re- 
fers unverbally  in  one  use  of  it,  to  the  sensible  (visible  and 
tactile)  revolution  of  a  cart-wheel  or  a  boy's  top ;  and  in 
another  use  of  it  to  the  intellectually  conceived  relation 
which  men  personally  bear  to  the  earth  in  its  intellectually 
conceived  revolutions  around  its  axis  and  around  the  sun ; 
but  when  we  suppose  that  in  both  uses  (the  revolutions 
intellectually  imputed  to  us  personally  and  to  the  earth, 
and  the  revolution  sensibly  imputed  to  the  cart-wheel  and 
the  top,)  the  word  revolution  possesses  a  meaning  that  is 
homogeneous,  we  are  as  much  surprised  at  the  verbal 
equivoke,  which  deems  us  and  the  earth  thus  to  revolve, 
as  we  are  at  the  juggle  of  the  conjurer ;  and  the  source  of 
the  surprise  is  alike  fallacious  in  both  cases.  To  estimate 
unverbal  things  by  their  generic  differences,  despite  their 
verbal  homogeneity,  as  in  the  above  examples,  has  been 
another  of  the  purposes  which  I  have  endeavoured  to  ac- 
complish; and  after  a  short  familiarity  with  the  generic 
discrimination  in  the  unverbal  signification  of  words,  every 
man  will  be  delighted  with  the  clearness  which  it  will 
confer  on  his  knowledge,  and  the  immunity  it  will  yield 
him  from  mysteries. 

Colloquial  language  has  been  unpremeditatedly  fash- 
ioned by  our  practical  knowledge  of  the  above  generic 
differences  that  we  speculatively  disregard.  We  talk,  for 


UNFALLACIOUS  INTERPRETATION  OF  LANGUAGE.     199 

instance,  of  our  ability  or  inability,  as  the  case  may  be,  to 
feel  the  truth  of  a  given  remark — to  feel  ashamed,  excited, 
elated,  proud,  humble,  envious,  jealous,  etc. ;  thus  denoting 
that  the  words  designate  severally  an  internal  feeling.  We 
talk  of  an  ability  or  inability,  as  the  case  may  be,  to  con- 
ceive how  the  soul  is  united  to  the  body ;  how  the  dead  are 
to  appear  bodily  in  another  world ;  how  effects  are  united 
to  causes,  etc.;  thus  denoting  that  the  words  designate 
severally  intellectual  conceptions,  not  sensible  perceptions. 
We  talk  of  hearing  thunder,  seeing  lightning,  perceiving  or 
smelling  odours,  feeling  cold,  etc. ;  thus  denoting  that  the 
words  designate  sensible  perceptions,  and  of  different 
senses.  The  litany  of  the  Episcopal  church  prays  for  de- 
liverance from  temptations  of  "the  world,  the  flesh,  and 
the  devil ;"  which  expressions  recognise,  as  I  suppose,  the 
three  generically  different  departments  of  our  unverbal 
knowledge — the  "world"  designating  sensible  temptations ; 
the  "flesh"  designating  temptations  of  the  internal  feel- 
ings; and  the  "devil"  designating  temptations  from  intel- 
lectual suggestions.  The  Bible,  in  many  places,  triplicates 
thus  its  allusions  to  our  triple  organism ;  and  often,  though 
not  always,  employs  the  word  flesh  as  in  the  above  exam- 
ple:— "the  spirit  is  willing,  but  the  flesh  is  weak";  the 
spirit  denotes  the  intellect;  the  flesh,  the  feelings.  A 
volume  might  be  written  of  such  biblical  generic  discrimi- 
nations, and  profitably  written,  I  think,  to  familiarise  us 
with  the  unverbal  triplicity  of  man's  nominal  oneness. 
§  3.  The  foregoing  are  all  that  I  will  recapitulate  of 


200  THE   MEANING  OF  WOEDS. 

what  I  have  yet  accomplished,  if  I  may  hope  a  full  fruition 
of  what  I  have  attempted.  But  now  arises  the  most  preg- 
nant and  subtile  difficulty  that  is  connected  with  my  specu- 
lations, or  with  speculations  generally.  I  alluded  to  it  in 
my  introductory  lecture,  and  said  I  should  speak  more  on 
the  subject  thereafter ;  and  I  am  now  to  fulfil  that  promise. 
The  five  senses  yield  unverbal  utterances,  sights,  sounds, 
tastes,  feels,  smells,  which  every  person  can  understand 
unverbally.  The  utterance  of  each  sense  is  known  also 
to  be  peculiar;  and  we  can  readily  translate  into  such 
unverbal  sensible  utterances,  any  word  that  relates  to 
sensible  revelations.  The  internal  feelings  also  possess 
unverbal  emotional  utterances,  and  into  the  unverbal 
emotions  we  can  readily  translate  anger,  and  every 
other  word  that  relates  to  any  internal  feeling ;  but  the  in- 
tellect conceives  in  words,  and  thus  the  intellect  seems  to 
possess  no  unverbal  utterances.  A  very  important  question 
therefore  arises,  whether  our  intellectually  conceived  words 
possess  any  unverbal  meaning — any  meaning  ulterior  to 
the  conceived  words.  I,  at  one  period,  supposed  they  pos- 
sess no  ulterior  meaning,  and  that  all  abstract  speculations 
are  mere  words.  Twice  one  house  is  two  houses,  and 
twice  one  fairy  is  two  fairies.  The  first  proposition  is  sig- 
nificant of  more  than  words,  because  it  refers  to  something 
unverbal ;  but  the  second  is  mere  words,  I  said,  because  it 
refers  to  nothing  that  is  unverbal.  I  should  probably  have 
continued  in  this  short-sighted  belief,  had  I  not  found  that 
a  vast  amount  of  human  learning,  including  all  natural 


UNFALLACIOUS  INTERPRETATION  OF  LANGUAGE.     201 

theology,  is  involved  in  the  issue ;  and  perhaps  all  revealed 
theology.  When,  for  instance,  I  look  at  the  sun,  my  in- 
tellect will  irresistibly  conceive  that  its  existence  had  a 
commencement,  that  its  origin  needed  a  maker,  that  it  is  a 
design  of  some  designer,  a  contrivance  of  some  contriver, 
an  effect  of  some  cause ;  hence,  as  affirmed  by  natural 
theology,  any  intellect  will  be  forced  onward  and  upwards 
to  the  conception  in  words  of  a  first  cause,  a  first  contriver, 
designer  and  maker,  who  is  himself  uncaused,  uncontrived, 
undesigned,  uncreated.  Indeed,  all  the  fundamental  tenets 
of  theology,  with  an  after-life  retribution  of  bliss  or  woe, 
have  been  conceived  (variously  modified)  by  all  men  in  all 
ages ;  so  that  to  doubt  whether  such  conceptions  belong  to 
the  human  intellect  is  as  irrational,  as  to  doubt  whether 
walking,  seeing,  tasting,  feeling,  hope,  fear,  and  hunger, 
belong  to  our  sensible  and  moral  nature. 

§  4.  To  find  that  such  verbal  conceptions  are  indigenous 
to  the  human  intellect,  not  foreign  grafts  thereon  by  priest- 
craft, as  some  suppose,  is  one  step  gained  in  the  direction 
of  right  knowledge,  and  probably  the  most  important 
step ;  but  are  such  intellectual  conceptions  verbal  only,  or 
possess  the  conceived  words  a  meaning  that  is  unverbal  ? 
We  can  look  behind  words  that  relate  to  sensible  percep- 
tions and  internal  feelings,  and  find  objects  that  are  unver- 
bal ;  but  can  we  look  behind  intellectually  conceived  words 
and  find  anything  unverbal  ?  Revelation,  I  think,  answers 
the  question ;  and  though  I  mean  not  to  found  my  doc- 
trine thereon,  but  contrariwise  the  interpretation  is  founded 
9* 


202  THE   MEANING   OF   WOEDS. 

on  my  doctrine ;  yet  I  deem  the  coincidence  valuable  and 
remarkable : — St.  Luke  "  was  demanded  of  the  Pharisees 
when  the  kingdom  of  God  should  come ;"  and  he  answered 
them  and  said,  "  the  kingdom  of  God  is  within  you;"  which 
signifies,  as  I  suppose,  that  "the  kingdom  of  God"  are  in- 
tellectually conceived  words  whose  unverbal  meaning  is 
subjective,  not  objective  ;  in  our  intellect,  and  not  anything 
physical,  though  we  seem  to  suppose  the  meaning  to  be 
physical,  when  we  point  our  finger  upwards  when  we 
speak  of  the  kingdom  of  God  ;  and  point  our  finger  down- 
wards, when  we  speak  of  the  kingdom  of  Satan ;  whose 
meaning  also  is  within  us. 

But  what  is  in  us  besides  the  conceived  words  ?  that  is 
the  question  which  I  am  to  consider.  The  organism  is 
within  us,  from  which  the  conceived  words  proceed.  A 
man's  imprecations  of  curses  on  his  eyes,  body  and  soul, 
are  words ;  but  they  are  also  signs  of  an  unverbal  internal 
feeling  in  the  organism  of  the  imprecator : — So  "  the 
kingdom  of  God"  are  words,  but  the  words  are  also  signs 
of  an  unverbal  impulse  or  tendency  in  the  organism  of  our 
intellect ;  as,  therefore,  the  internal  organic  feeling  which 
prompts  an  imprecation  is  the  unverbal  meaning  of  the 
imprecation ;  so  the  organism  of  the  intellect  that  conceives 
any  given  words  is  the  unverbal  meaning  of  the  verbal 
conception. 

Many  commentators  interpret  the  text  of  St.  Luke  as 
referring  to  the  internal  feelings  which  predominate  in  de- 
vout Christians,  and  "the  kingdom  of  God"  may  doubtless 


UNFALLACIOUS  INTERPRETATION  OF  LANGUAGE.     203 

be  in  a  man  un verbally  in  loth  ways  ;  but  in  both  ways  the 
unverbal  meaning  is  alike  subjective,  not  objective;  in  one 
case  the  unverbal  meaning  is  in  the  organism  of  the  feel- 
ings, and  in  the  other  in  the  organism  of  the  intellect ;  and 
in  both  cases  the  organisms  are  part  of  every  man's  nature, 
hence  the  conceived  words  possess  an  unverbal  meaning  as 
truly  as  the  words  horse  or  orange.  Eemember  that  our 
disquisitions  relate  to  only  the  unverbal  meaning  of  words, 
or  rather  of  sounds,  (which  all  words  are,)  in  themselves 
as  unmeaning  as  the  bellow  of  a  bull  or  the  crow  of  a 
cock ;  and  as  little  intelligible,  except  in  the  country  whose 
people  have  converted  the  given  sounds  into  words,  by  at- 
taching to  the  sounds  something  that  is  unverbal ;  a  some- 
thing that  must  have  reference  to  the  organism  of  the 
speakers,  for  we  can  no  more  invent  a  word  whose  unver- 
bal meaning  can  surpass  the  purview  of  our  organisms, 
than  we  can  invent  a  new  sense. 

§  5.  In  further  corroboration  that  the  above  interpreta- 
tion of  the  unverbal  meaning  of  intellectually  conceived 
words  is  not  repugnant  to  the  Scriptures,  revelation  con- 
tinually warns  us  against  affixing  an  objective  meaning  to 
such  of  its  tenets  as  the  intellect  can  conceive  in  words 
only.  A  remarkable  warning  of  this  kind,  in  relation  to 
Deity,  is  contained  in  the  second  commandment  of  the 
Decalogue.  The  intellect  alone  can  conceive  Deity  unphy- 
sically,  but  the  intellect  can  manifest  the  conception  only 
by  words  ;  and  such  words  will  be  vox  et  preterea  nihil, 
unless  we  find  for  them  an  unverbal  meaning  in  the  intel- 


204  THE   MEANING   OF  WORDS. 

lectual  organism  from  which  the  conceived  words  proceed. 
Indeed,  revelation  characterizes  as  mysteries,  all  of  its 
tenets  that  like  omniscience,  omnipotence,  trinity  in  unity, 
etc.,  are,  objectively,  only  intellectually  conceived  words ; 
and  towards  them,  nothing  is  required  of  us  but  faith, 
which  is  an  internal  feeling  that  we  know,  experimentally, 
the  intellectual  conceptions  are  capable  of  exciting. 

I  will  add  in  further  illustration  of  the  above  interpre- 
tation of  intellectually  conceived  words,  and  not  to  make 
innovations  in  theology,  that  St.  John  says,  "  In  the  begin- 
ning was  the  Word,  and  the  Word  was  with  God,  and  the 
Word  was  God."  Now  I  suppose  the  text  to  affirm  that 
our  meaning  of  God,  apart  from  the  word  God,  was  only 
subjective;  till,  as  St.  John  says,  subsequently,  "The 
Word  was  made  flesh  and  dwelt  among  us,"  and  thereby 
gave  the  word  God  an  objective  meaning. 

Let  us  present  another  illustration  of  the  un verbal  mean- 
ing of  intellectually  conceived  words :  the  intellect  insists 
on  conceiving  that  what  we  see,  feel,  taste,  hear,  and  smell, 
are  not  physical  copies  of  any  external  things,  but  only 
subjective  effects  produced  on  our  senses  by  some  external 
objective  "substance"  which  we  are  incapable  of  knowing 
sensibly  except  by  the  sensible  effects  on  us  it  thus  pro- 
duces. This  doctrine  philosophers  deem  entirely  satisfac- 
tory. But  the  conceived  "substance,"  which  is  thus  know- 
able  only  verbally  by  the  intellect,  bears  the  same  subject- 
ive relation  to  the  intellect  that  conceives  it  as  sensible 
qualities  bear  to  the  senses;  the  intellectually  conceived 


UNFALLACIOUS  INTERPRETATION  OF  LANGUAGE.     206 

verbal  "  substance"  being  an  effect  only  of  our  intellectual 
organism,  as  sensible  qualities  are  effects  only  of  our  sen- 
sible organs.  What  then  is  ultimate  to  the  verbal  "sub- 
stance" which  the  intellect  thus  conceives  ?  The  organism 
of  our  intellect,  of  which  the  verbal  conception  is  an  effect; 
and  we  can  know  no  more  in  relation  thereto.  Our  ver- 
bal conceptions  of  Deity,  and  of  every  kindred  truth,  are 
like  the  above  verbally  conceived  "substance;"  they  be- 
long to  the  nature  of  our  intellect,  and  are,  unverbally,  part 
of  every  man's  ego.  The  intellect  organically  craves  to 
know  more  in  relation  to  its  conceptions,  and  may  conceive 
thereon  more  words  •  but  all  such  words  will  only  be  fur- 
ther effects  of  the  organism  of  the  intellect,  and  that  organ- 
ism will  constitute  the  ultimate  meaning  of  the  conceived 
words,  proceed  with  such  conceptions  as  far  as  our  dic- 
tionaries and  other  vocabularies  will  supply  words. 

§  6.  When  we  deem  intellectually  conceived  words  a 
manifestation  of  the  organism  of  our  intellect,  as  just  stated, 
we  obtain  the  most  satisfactory  understanding  of  them  that 
we  are  capable  of  obtaining.  Instead,  however,  of  being 
satisfied  with  this  subjective  meaning,  we  often  seek  an 
objective  meaning ;  and  from  an  inability  of  finding  any 
objective  meaning,  many  intellectually  conceived  words 
are  deemed  insignificant.  Men,  thus  influenced,  scoff  at 
the  words  spirit,  immateriality,  immortality,  resurrection, 
heaven,  hell,  etc. ;  but,  properly  understood,  the  words  de- 
note an  organism  of  the  intellect,  or  the  intellect  could 
not  habitually,  in  all  ages  of  the  world  and  in  all  places 


206  THE  MEANING  OF  WORDS. 

form  such  conceptions.  I  have  drawn  most  of  my  illus- 
trations of  this  tenet  of  my  Doctrines  from  subjects  con- 
nected with  theology,  not  because  intellectually  conceived 
words  on  theology  differ  essentially  from  other  verbal  con- 
ceptions of  the  intellect,  but  because  literature  is  full  of 
splendid  wrecks,  in  proof  that  no  teachings  can  be  useful 
or  durable  unless  they  are  reconcileable  with  revelation. 
All  intellectually  conceived  words,  whether  relating  to 
sacred  subjects  or  profane,  must  alike  find  their  ultimate 
un  verbal  meaning  in  the  organism  of  the  intellect;  just  as 
all  sounds  produced  by  a  piano  must  rest  ultimately  on  the 
organism  of  the  piano;  and  as  all  sensible  perceptions 
must  rest  ultimately  on  the. organism  of  our  senses ;  and  as 
all  we  eat  must  depend  for  its  effects  on  the  organism  of 
our  stomach. 

The  tenets  of  geology,  that  anticipate  sensible  researches 
in  relation  to  the  stratification  of  the  earth,  etc.,  my  intel- 
lect recognizes  as  consonant  to  its  organism ;  hence,  my 
intellect  assents  to  them;  and  my  intellect  conceives  just 
as  necessarily  that  the  earth  is  the  product  of  some  maker; 
that  its  existence  had  a  commencement,  and  will  have  a 
termination ;  but  if  I  fail  to  see  that  these  intellectual  con- 
ceptions are  all  subjective  knowledge,  not  objective,  I  have 
yet  to  learn  the  correct  unverbal  interpretation  of  intellec- 
tually conceived  words.  Vitality,  gravitation,  wisdom, 
electricity,  etc.,  are  also  words  that  the  intellect  is  organ- 
ized to  conceive ;  but  not  otherwise  than  it  is  organized  to 
conceive  the  words  soul,  Deity,  conscience,  heaven,  hell, 


UNFALLACIOUS  INTERPRETATION  OF  LANGUAGE.    207 

immortality,  resurrection,  etc. ;  hence  we  discover  how 
vain  are  all  hopes  or  fears  in  relation  to  the  permanence 
of  religion.  It  possesses  an  un verbal  subjective  reality, 
which  is  as  organic,  and  hence  as  little  dependent  for  its 
permanence  on  fashion  and  caprice,  as  hunger,  hope,  fear, 
or  the  perception  of  colours  and  figures. 

When  we  deem  religion  a  human  contrivance — a  de- 
vice of  priestcraft — two  essentially  different  things  are 
confounded ;  namely,  forms  of  worship  and  verbal  creeds 
are  confounded  with  the  intellectual  and  moral  organisms 
from  which  creeds  and  forms  originate.  Creeds  and  forms 
are  only  an  objective  verbal  manifestation  of  a  subjective  un- 
verbal  impulse  or  state  of  the  intellect  and  feelings.  Creeds 
and  forms  of  worship  have  changed  repeatedly,  and  are 
changing  continually ;  but  the  intellectual  organism  from 
which  creeds  and  forms  of  worship  proceed,  must  insure 
the  perpetuity  of  creeds  in  some  form ;  and  our  internal 
feelings  are  so  organized,  that  the  feelings  which  give  unc- 
tion to  present  creeds  and  forms,  and  which  formerly  made 
sacred  the  nominal  units  Jupiter  and  Pluto,  must  continue 
to  give  unction  to  any  future  creeds  and  forms  that  the 
intellect  may  conceive  in  substitution  of  the  present ;  if  we 
may,  for  illustration,  conceive  a  radical  change  practicable, 
after  our  nearly  two  thousand  years'  experience  to  the  con- 
trary, and  after  attempts  thereto  by  men  of  the  most  cele- 
brated intellects.  The  ultimate  results,  therefore,  which 
infidelity  in  existing  creeds  and  forms  can  ever  perma- 
nently accomplish,  is  the  substitution  of  some  new  creeds 


208  THE  MEANING   OF  WORDS. 

and  forms  for  those  which  exist  at  the  time  of  the  substi- 
tution. 

As  different  men  groan  and  imprecate  differently,  under 
the  influence  of  the  same  internal  feeling,  so  different  men 
may  conceive  different  verbal  creeds,  etc,  under  the  in- 
fluence of  the  same  intellectual  impulse ;  but  the  intellec- 
tual organic  impulses  of  all  men  are  probably  alike  un- 
verbally, j  ust  as  the  internal  feelings  of  all  men  are  probably 
alike  unverbally.  When,  however,  we  would  look  for  a 
meaning  behind  the  words  which  the  intellect  conceives  on 
any  such  occasion,  we  can  find  nothing  unverbal  but  the 
organism  of  the  intellect ;  just  as  we  can  find  nothing  be- 
hind sensible  perceptions  but  the  organism  of  the  senses. 
All  beyond  the  purview  of  our  three  (sensible,  intellectual, 
and  moral)  organisms  is  a  terra  incognita,  which  revelation 
doubtless  alludes  to,  but  which  we  can  understand  objec- 
tively no  better  than  the  blind  can  understand  colours,  or 
the  deaf  sounds ;  and  even  such  a  verbally  conceived  terra 
incognita  is  also,  unverbally,  only  a  result  of  our  intellec- 
tual organism ;  and  so  is  the  further  verbal  conception,  that 
the  organization  which  relates  to  religious  conceptions  would 
not  have  been  given  to  us  were  it  not  to  be  hereafter  objec- 
tively realized. 

§  7.  But  while  I  am  striving  to  discriminate,  generically, 
intellectually  conceived  words  from  sensibly  perceived  ob- 
jects, etc.,  I  desire  not  to  be  understood  as  deeming  intel- 
lectually conceived  words  inferior  to  sensible  objects  in 
dignity,  purport,  and  character.  We  possess  three  ge- 


UNFALLACIOUS  INTERPRETATION  OF  LANGUAGE.    209 

nerically  different  organisms — the  intellect,  the  senses,  and 
the  internal  feelings.  Every  man's  verbal  ego  is  thus  es- 
sentially triune  unverbally ;  and  while  every  thing  we  can 
know  must  be  subjective  to  one  of  these  three  sets  of  or- 
gans, no  extra  limitary  criterion  exists  beyond  the  said 
organs  by  which  we  can  decide  which  set  of  organs  is  most 
authoritative,  or  most  entitled  to  our  respect.  Each  is  ul- 
timate within  its  own  sphere,  and  around  each  "a  great 
gulf  is  fixed,"  which  will  not  permit  any  one  of  the  three 
sets  of  organs  to  invade  unverbally  the  province  of  either 
of  the  other  sets.  We,  however,  continually  employ  the 
intellect  to  yield  us  physical  information  where  our  senses 
cease  their  purview.  We  desire  to  know  what  exists  in 
the  centre  of  the  earth — when  came  it  there — how,  and 
whence ;  and  to  look  forward  into  the  undeveloped  future, 
and  backward  down  the  unrecorded  and  even  antediluvian 
past.  But  though  the  intellect  will  in  such  cases  seem  to 
yield  us  physical  responses,  yet  the  responsive  words,  in 
all  such  speculations,  possess  no  unverbal  meaning  but 
what  is  subjective  to  the  intellect  that  conceives  them. 
The  words  will  reflexly  exhibit,  to  every  man  that  con- 
ceives them,  the  organism  of  his  intellect — its  aspirations, 
its  impulses,  its  conceptions;  and  they  constitute  to  him 
the  only  unsophistical  unverbal  meaning  of  his  intellectu- 
ally conceived  words  in  the  cases  above  described.  I  cen- 
sure no  such  use  of  our  intellect,  for  the  use  is  as  inevitable 
and  organic  as  any  other,  and  the  results  are  irresistibly 
operative  on  our  internal  feelings ;  hence,  intellectually 


210  THE   MEANING   OF   WORDS. 

conceived  words,  in  even  the  above  cases,  and  in  all  cases, 
influence  our  conduct,  and  constitute  as  substantive  a  part 
of  our  knowledge  as  sensible  information,  though  of  a  dif- 
ferent generic  character.  In  short,  when  a  man  has  ana- 
lyzed his  intellectually  conceived  words  into  what  is  un- 
verbal  in  relation  thereto,  he  is  at  the  end  of  his  unverbal 
knowledge  in  the  premises ;  and  if  we  say  of  such  intellec- 
tions as  possess  no  sensible  reference,  that  they  are  what 
they  are,  we  shall  speak  of  them  more  unsophistically  than 
by  characterizing  them  verbally  in  any  other  way;  the 
ultimate  elements  of  our  knowledge  being  not  words  but 
unverbal  things.  The  intellect  strives  to  end  every  dis- 
cussion with  words — it  organically  struggles  for  the  last 
word ;  but  the  end  of  every  disquisition  must  be  unverbal, 
if  we  would  obtain  an  end  that  is  unsophistical. 

§  8.  I  much  suspect  that  deeming  all- intellectually  con- 
ceived words  objective  in  their  signification,  makes  us 
underestimate  the  intelligence  of  deaf  mutes.  "We  mistake 
in  the  mutes  an  absence  of  intellectually  conceived  words, 
for  an  absence  of  the  intellectual  unverbal  impulses,  etc., 
from  which  verbal  conceptions  proceed.  The  intellect  of 
a  deaf  mute  will,  of  course,  not  know  that  "  the  whole  is 
greater  than  a  part,"  but  he  will  possess  the  unverbal  in- 
tellectual impulse  from  which  the  verbal  axiom  originates ; 
and  he  will  resist  as  pertinaciously  any  subtraction  from 
his  possessions,  as  we  whose  intellect  can  conceive  the 
maxim  in  words.  His  intellect  will  not  conceive  that 
"things  equal  to  the  same,  are  equal  to  each  other;"  yet 


UNFALLACIOUS  INTERPRETATION  OF  LANGUAGE.     211 

he  will  possess  the  unverbal  intellection  which  alone  gives 
the  axiom  its  intellectual  signification ;  and  he  will  evince 
that  his  unverbal  intellection  or  impulse,  is  as  influential 
over  his  physical  conduct,  as  the  axiom  is  over  yours  who 
can  conceive  the  axiomatic  words.  His  intellect  will  not 
conceive  that  "  everything  requires  a  maker;"  that  "every- 
thing is  the  effect  of  some  cause,"  and  that  "  every  exist- 
ence had  a  beginning,  and  must  have  a  termination ;"  yet 
we  can  know  from  his  general  physical  conduct,  that  he 
possesses  the  intellectual  impulses  which  constitute  the 
unverbal  meaning  of  even  such  intellectually  conceived 
words.  Creeds  he  will,  of  course,  not  know;  but  the  intel- 
lectual impulse  or  tendency  which  is  unverbal  in  creeds, 
and  which  constitutes  their  unverbal  cogency,  unction  and 
signification,  he  may  know  as  well  as  we.  Dickens' 
"  Household  "Words"  contains  an  article  on  idiots,  as  he 
saw  them  "  at  the  Essex  Hall  Asylum  for  idiots,  near  Col- 
chester," and  the  article  countenances  a  belief  that  even 
idiots,  who  usually,  in  addition  to  their  other  intellectual 
defects,  know  no  language,  may  possess  measurably  the 
unverbal  impulses  which  constitute  the  subjective  mean- 
ing of  intellectually  conceived  words  that  possess  no  sen- 
sible meaning.  He  says  the  idiots  "  are  very  fond  of 
attending  prayers  in  a  body.  "What  dim  religious  impres- 
sions they  connect  with  public  worship  it  is  impossible  to 
say ;  but  the  struggling  soul  would  seem  to  have  some  in- 
stinctive aspirations  towards  its  Maker." 

§  9.  I  will  now  assume  that  all  intellectually  conceived 


212  THE   MEANING  OF  WORDS. 

words  possess  a  meaning  which  is  unverbal.  In  view  of 
the  vast  significance  of  the  tenet,  I  feel  that  I  have  not 
manifested  it  as  fully  as  it  deserves ;  but  if  I  have  succeeded 
in  making  my  meaning  intelligible,  I  have  accomplished 
all  that  I  have  contemplated  in  relation  to  the  unverbal 
meaning  of  intellectually  conceived  words.  Indeed,  I  only 
say  enough  on  any  topic  to  merit  the  character  of  sugges- 
tions ;  the  full  development  of  the  topics — knowledge  being 
progressive — I  confidently  expect,  in  the  course  of  time, 
from  men  who  may  succeed  me.  My  efforts  must  be  con- 
sidered as  mere  inklings  of  a  new  analysis  of  language, 
attempted  in  the  briefest  manner  compatible  with  an  ex- 
position of  my  design.  I  have  opened  a  mine  which  con- 
tains much  precious  metal,  but  what  I  exhibit  are  only  rude 
specimens  of  the  ore. 

I  will  close  this  Lecture  with  a  few  collateral  suggestions 
on  the  formation  and  nature  of  theories.  The  words  which 
the  intellect  of  any  man  conceives  as  a  theory  on  any  occa- 
sion are  responses  of  his  intellect  to  given  premises ;  and 
the  words  that  constitute  every  such  theoretical  response 
are  as  independent  of  the  man's  volition,  as  the  pulsations 
of  his  heart,  or  the  processes  of  his  digestive  organs.  "Were 
the  responses  not  thus  involuntary,  the  intellect  would  be 
like  an  oracle  that  could  speak  only  what  the  interrogator 
should  direct ;  and  hence  be  useless.  But  while  the  theo- 
retical responses  of  the  intellect  are  involuntary,  every  ver- 
bal response  of  a  man's  intellect  is  derived  from  his  objec- 
tive knowledge ;  the  intellect,  in  conceiving  words,  being 


UNFALLACIOUS  INTERPRETATION  OF  LANGUAGE.      213 

like  a  man  who  is  playing  whist,  and  who  can  play  such 
cards  only  as  happen  to  have  been  dealt  to  him.  We  ac- 
cordingly find  that  the  intellect,  in  conceiving  theories, 
conceives  French  words  on  one  side  of  the  British  Chan- 
nel, and  English  words  on  the  other  side ;  and  in  a  rude 
age  conceives  rude  theories,  and  in  a  refined  age  conceives 
subtile  theories.  A  man's  objective  employments  also  re- 
gulate to  a  great  degree  the  words  that  his  intellect  will 
conceive  in  its  theoretical  responses  to  given  premises : — a 
chemist's  intellect  responding  With  words  which  relate  to 
chemistry ;  a  mechanic's,  with  words  that  relate  to  mecha- 
nics ;  and  a  mathematician's,  with  words  that  relate  to  ma- 
thematics, etc.  Still,  while  the  intellects  of  different  men 
vary  thus  in  the  words  which  they  conceive  as  theories  on 
any  given  occasion,  the  intellectual  organism  that  gives  an 
unverbal  meaning  to  the  conceived  words,  may  be  much 
alike  in  all  men,  whatever  difference  exists  being  in  quali- 
ty rather  than  in  kind ;  just  as  the  physical  actions  of  dif- 
ferent men  vary  in  modes  of  performance  rather  than  in 
variety  of  actions ;  a.nd  just  as  an  Esquimaux  Indian  and  a 
London  alderman  differ  in  the  food  which  they  eat,  while 
the  organic  impulse  which  craves  food,  and  for  which  the 
food  is  eaten,  is  alike  in  both  the  persons.  Hence,  though 
the  gravitation  which  the  intellect  conceives  now  as  up- 
holding the  earth,  is  different,  verbally,  from  the  Atlantean 
shoulders  that  the  intellect  conceived  formerly  as  uphold- 
ing it ;  yet,  except  in  differences  that  are  sensibly  percep- 
tible, the  two  verbal  theories  signify  unverbally  only  the 


214:  THE   MEANING   OF   WORDS. 

organism  of  the  intellect.  We  may  repeat  the  same  remark 
of  all  theories.  "  The  horror  of  a  vacuum,"  and  "  the  pres- 
sure of  the  atmosphere,"  differ  not  from  each  other  in  the 
relation  of  truth  and  fiction ;  the  modern  theory  may  be 
more  useful  than  the  old,  and  its  sensible  meaning  may 
refer  to  a  greater  number  of  sensibly  perceptible  particu- 
lars ;  but  so  much  of  both  theories  as  is  not  sensibly  per- 
ceptible, but  only  intellectually  conceived,  is  subjective, 
and  signifies,  un verbally,  nothing  but  the  organism  of  the 
intellect — both  the  theories  referring  probably  to  the  same 
organic  unverbal  impulse. 

§  10.  As  a  consequence  of  the  circumscription  which 
thus  seems  to  pertain  to  men's  intellectual  conceptions,  the 
intellect  is  continually  superseding  old  theories  with  new, 
as  it  acquires  new  objective  knowledge.  When  earthquakes 
were  felt  in  a  rude  age,  the  intellect  of  the  observers  re^- 
sponded  thereto  by  conceiving,  verbally,  that  imprisoned 
Titans  were  struggling  to  liberate  themselves ;  but  the  dis- 
covery of  gunpowder  enabled  the  intellect  to  conceive  that 
earthquakes  were  caused  by  spontaneously  generated  and 
spontaneously  ignited  gunpowder.  On  the  discovery  of 
steam  power,  the  intellect  was  enabled  to  again  amend  its 
verbal  theory  by  substituting  steam  as  the  conceived  cause 
of  earthquakes,  and  new  verbal  causes  will  continue  to  be 
conceived  therefor  to  the  end  of  time,  as  the  intellect  shall 
become  acquainted  with  new  objective  agencies ;  the  agen- 
cy whose  results  the  intellect  shall  deem  most  analogous 


UNFALLACIOUS  INTERPRETATION  OF  LANGUAGE.     215 

to  earthquakes,  will  always  be  the  cause  therefor  which  the 
intellect  will  verbally  assign. 

But  I  desire  particularly  to  remark  in  relation  to  theo- 
ries— and  I  solicit  for  the  remark  much  attention — that 
every  theory  is  a  fiction  to  the  extent  that  we  employ  it  to 
materialize  a  modus  operandi  that  is  only  intellectually 
conceived,  and  such  a  materialization  is  the  object  of  every 
theory.  The  object  is  in  its  nature  a  fallacy,  and  unattain- 
able ;  the  intellect  being  organically  incapable  of  revealing 
to  us  new  physical  existences :  for  instance,  when  I  see  a 
needle  rush  towards  a  magnet,  my  intellect  is  not  satisfied 
with  merely  the  sensible  facts;  it  will  organically  insist  on 
conceiving  some  physical  modus  operandi  which  shall  as- 
similate what  I  see  in  the  needle  and  magnet  to  what  I 
experience  in  myself  when  I  draw  towards  me  a  chair  or 
some  other  object.  To  satisfy  this  organic  impulse,  the  in- 
tellect will  conceive  some  physical  emanation  from  the 
magnet  to  the  needle,  or  some  other  theoretical  physical 
machinery ;  but  the  attempt  becomes  a  delusion  the  mo- 
ment we  deem  physical  the  intellectually  conceived  verbal 
theory.  If  a  philosopher  were  to  tell  me  that  by  means 
of  a  powerful  microscope,  he  had  become  able  to  see  the 
emanation  from  the  magnet  to  the  needle,  I  should  know 
the  statement  was  like  the  moon  hoax,  heretofore  alluded 
to,  and  that  he  was  labouring  under  some  delusion.  The 
emanation  is  only  a  conception  of  the  intellect,  and  cannot 
be  transmuted  into  a  sensible  reality,  the  two  things  being 
generically  different,  heterogeneous,  and  inconvertible.  On 


216  THE   MEANING   OF  WORDS. 

this  principle,  I  entertain  no  doubt  that  some  fallacy  exists 
in  relation  to  the  late  pendulous  experiments  at  Paris,  and 
which  seem  tq  materialize  unverball y  the  intellectually  con- 
ceived diurnal  motion  of  the  earth — a  conception  as  little 
likely  to  be  realized  physically  as  the  once  intellectually 
conceived  residence  of  the  soul  in  the  pineal  gland  is  likely 
to  be  realized  physically ;  or  as  the  intellectual  conception 
of  spectres,  ghosts,  fairies,  and  kindred  beings,  is  likely  to 
be  realized  physically.  I  shall  not  be  surprised  if,  even- 
tually, we  discover  also  that  some  fallacy  exists  in  the  ex- 
periment of  Dr.  Maskelyn,  in  Perthshire,  that  a  mountain 
will  so  attract  a  plummet  as  to  prevent  the  plummet  from 
falling  perpendicularly,  and  a  kindred  experiment  made 
by  Mr.  Cavendish  in  1788.  The  experiments  materialize 
too  literally  to  be  reasonable  the  physical  attraction  towards 
each  other  which  is  intellectually  conceived  to  exist  uni- 
versally in  physical  bodies.  If  I  am  correctly  informed,  a 
fallacy  has  been  discovered  in  the  experiments  that  seemed 
to  realize  unverbally  the  intellectual  conceptions  of  New- 
ton, that  diamonds  and  carbon  are  physically  homogeneous. 
The  only  intellectual  conceptions  of  which  we  ought  to  ex- 
pect a  physical  realization,  are  such  as  are  analogous  to 
existing  sensible  perceptions :  as,  for  instance,  when  we 
conceive  of  a  newly  discovered  lake  that  it  contains  fish, 
our  conception  will  be  more  likely  to  be  realized  physi- 
cally than  to  be  disappointed.  In  such  conceptions,  the 
intellect  is  performing  its  proper  common-sense  functions. 
So,  also,  when  astronomers  conceived  that  the  great  nebu- 


UNFALLACIOUS  INTERPRETATION  OF  LANGUAGE.     217 

la  in  Orion  was  produced  by  indistinct  stars,  the  intellect 
was  only  assimilating  the  nebula  to  what  had  previously 
been  realized  in  the  galaxy  ;  hence,  in  that  case  also,  the 
intellect  was  only  performing  its  proper  common-sense 
functions ;  and  when  the  improved  telescope  of  Lord  Rosse 
subsequently  materialized  the  conception,  the  materializa- 
tion no  way  conflicts  with  the  foregoing  skepticism  in  rela- 
tion to  the  pendulous  experiments  at  Paris,  etc. 
10 


LECTURE  IX. 

THE  .SAME  SUBJECT  CONTINUED. 


CONTENTS. 


1.  The  subjective  nature  of  intellectual  verbal  conceptions,  as  contradis- 

tinguished from  objective  things,  is  urged  upon  our  notice  by  the 
necromantic  dilemmas  to  which  the  intellect  organically  arrives  in 
predicating  verbal  conceptions  to  their  ultimate  results. 

2.  Conceptions  of  the  intellect  are  organic,  but  not  innate ;  their  evolve- 

ment  depending  on  accidental  objective  occurrences. 

§  1.  Locke  says,  "that  every  person  who  possesses  an 
idea  of  a  foot,  finds  he  can  repeat  the  idea,  and,  joining  it 
to  the  former,  make  the  idea  of  two  feet."  "He  may," 
says  Locke,  "  continue  the  process  without  ever  arriving  at 
an  end  of  his  increase,  whether  the  idea  so  enlarged  be  a 
foot,  a  mile,  the  diameter  of  the  earth,  or  the  orbis  mag- 
nus."  In  my  last  Lecture  I  showed,  that  words  which  the 
intellect  thus  conceives  on  any  occasion  mean,  physically, 
the  sensibly  perceptible  objects  only  to  which  the  words 
refer,  and  that  the  residue  of  meaning  possessed  by  such  in- 
tellectually conceived  words  is  subjective,  and  exists  in  the 
organism  of  the  intellect.  I  suppose  this  limitation  in  the 
sensible  signification  of  words  is  not  recognized  in  our  spec- 


UNFALLACIOUS  INTERPRETATION  OF  LANGUAGE.     219 

ulations,  and  that  we  fallaciously  deem  the  meaning  of  such 
words  wholly  physical.  The  error  is  very  consequential, 
and  surrounds  our  verbal  knowledge  with  much  mystery; 
just  as  the  word  ghost  becomes  mysterious  when  we  deem 
it  more  than  a  verbal  conception  of  the  intellect,  and  espe- 
cially when  we  mistake  it  for  an  objective  existence.  Our 
intellect,  whose  organization  permits  Locke's  process  of  ad- 
dition inimitably,  and  irrespectively  of  whether  the  adden- 
da possess  any  physical  archetype  or  not,  may  be  likened 
to  the  wind,  which  is  organized  to  blow  whether  any  ships 
be  wafted  by  it  or  not,  and  to  fill  the  exposed  sails  of  a 
ship  whether  the  ship  be  moored  to  a  dock  or  drifting  on 
the  ocean. 

The  intellectual  organization,  which  permits  the  intellect 
to  thus  add  whether  the  addenda  be  physical  or  not,  is  as 
useful  as  the  physical  organization  which  permits  the  wind 
to  blow,  whether  any  ship  is,  or  not,  propelled  thereby; 
but  the  usefulness  of  neither  organic  process  is  impaired  by 
our  discrimination  of  what  is  subjective  in  the  processes 
from  what  is  objective.  Indeed,  Providence,  as  if  to  force 
on  us  the  discrimination  in  the  organism  of  the  wind,  com- 
pels our  senses  to  note  that  a  moored  ship  remains  station- 
ary, notwithstanding  the  continued  bellying  of  her  sails  by 
the  wind ;  and  as  if  to  force  on  us  the  discrimination  in  the 
organism  of  the  intellect,  between  what  is  subjective  and 
what  is  objective,  compels  the  intellect  to  note  that  the 
continued  process  of  addition  leads  ultimately  to  an  exten- 
sion without  a  terminus,  or  a  terminus  that  no  extension 


220  THE  MEANING   OF  WOEDS. 

can  reach ;  either  result  being  as  evincive  that  the  process 
is  not  objective,  but  relates  only  to  the  organism  of  the  in- 
tellect, as  the  immobility  of  the  ship  is  evincive  that  the 
continued  bellying  of  her  sails  relates  only  to  the  organism 
of  the  wind. 

§  2.  Equally  evincive  with  the  above,  of  the  distinction 
between  sensibly  objective  things  and  intellectually  sub- 
jective conceptions,  is  the  intellectually  conceived  bound- 
lessness of  space.  Soar  in  imagination  ever  so  high,  plunge . 
ever  so  low,  or  extend  laterally  ever  so  far,  the  intellect 
can  arrive  at  no  end  of  its  conception  of  space.  Even  if 
we  imagine  adamantine  barriers  in  any  direction,  we  are 
sure,  says  Locke,  "  that  space  exists  to  the  extent  of  the 
barriers ;  and  where  the  barriers  terminate,  space  must  com- 
mence again."  But  now,  I  say,  if  the  foregoing  results  be 
not  merely  subjective  (evincive  of  the  organism  of  the  in- 
tellect), a  dilemma  arises  as  necromantic  as  what  we  ar- 
rived at  above,  in  extension ;  and  we  must  admit  the  ex- 
istence of  an  objective  space  without  bounds,  or  objective 
bounds  without  space.  To  me  the  dilemma  would  be  con- 
clusive of  the  merely  subjective  character  of  the  process, 
if  I  possessed  no  other  criterion  of  its  purely  intellectual 
character.  But  a  criterion  exists  entirely  sufficient  for  me, 
irrespective  of  the  above :  whatever  my  senses  cannot  per- 
ceive must  be  intellectual,  and  cannot  be  physical.  If  I 
am  incorrect  in  this,  my  whole  treatise  is  a  fallacy ;  for  I 
assume  throughout  that  words  are  unmeaning,  except  as 
they  refer  to  some  thing  that  is  unverbal ;  and  that  unver- 


UNFALLACIOUS  INTERPRETATION  OF  LANGUAGE.     221 

bal  things  are  heterogeneous,  being  intellectual,  sensible, 
and  emotional. 

§  3.  That  the  earth  needs  no  support  is  also  an  intellec- 
tual conception  that  depends  for  its  unverbal  signification 
on  only  the  organism  of  the  intellect ;  for  if  we  adopt  the 
Indian  tradition,  that  the  earth  rests  on  an  elephant,  and 
the  elephant  on  a  tortoise,  the  intellect  will  still  organically 
insist  that  the  tortoise  must  rest  on  something,  and  so  ad 
infinitum.  Nor  can  the  earth  hang  on  any  thing.  The 
intellect  may  verbally  suspend  the  earth  with  a  chain  from 
the  sky,  but  the  intellect  will  insist  on  a  support  to  sustain 
the  sky ;  and  so  again  ad  infinitum.  The  intellect  is  thus 
brought  to  the  necromantic  dilemma  that  usually  attends 
such  verbal  processes;  the  intellect  being  compelled  to 
choose  between  a  conceived  ultimate  support  that  is  unsup- 
ported, or  a  conceived  ultimate  suspension  that  is  unsus- 
pended.  Modern  astronomers  select  the  latter  alternative, 
and  dismissing  both  Atlas  and  the  elephant,  conceive,  in- 
tellectually, that  the  earth  is  suspended  in  space  without  a 
suspension  on  any  thing,  and  mistake  this  logical  subjective 
result  of  their  intellectual  organism  for  a  physical  reality : 
much  like  the  fabled  dog,  who  mistook  for  a  rival  quadru- 
ped what  was  only  a  subjective  creation  of  the  water  into 
which  he  was  looking. 

§  4.  That  every  given  time  must  have  been  preceded  by 
a  past,  and  must  be  followed  by  a  future,  are  among  the 
most  inevitable  conceptions  of  the  intellect ;  but  when  the 
intellect  proceeds  inimitably  with  the  past,  the  process 


222  THE   MEANING   OF   WORDS. 

brings  us  to  the  usual  necromantic  dilemma  of  a  past  with- 
out any  antecedent,  or  an  antecedent  which  had  no  begin- 
ning. Nor  is  our  intellectual  process  with  reference  to  a 
future  any  less  necromantic,  for  we  ultimately  arrive  at  an 
end  without  any  future,  or  a  future  without  any  end. 

§  5.  That  every  thing  required  in  its  construction  some 
material,  is  another  conception  that  the  intellect  is  organi- 
cally incapable  of  avoiding;  but  when  the  intellect  con- 
tinues such  conceptions  abstractedly  and  illimitably,  it  ar- 
rives as  usual  at  a  necromantic  dilemma,  which  presents  us 
with  a  first  material  that  was  made  out  of  nothing,  or  an 
eternity  of  things  without  any  beginning  to  the  series.  The 
latter  conclusion  was  held  by  the  ancients;  the  creative 
power  of  Deity,  said  they,  extends  no  farther  than  the  ar- 
rangement of  pre-existing  materials.  The  moderns  reject 
this  circumscription  of  Divine  power,  and,  taking  the  oppo- 
site alternative,  insist  that  God  created  every  thing  out  of 
nothing.  Spinoza  deemed  both  results  unsatisfactory,  and 
insisted  that  Deity  was  the  material  out  of  which  all  things 
are  created.  This  he  esteemed  a  great  physical  discovery 
of  the  intellect,  and  by  which  the  maxim,  nihil  fit  ex  ni- 
hilo,  was  reconciled  with  the  sole  eternity  of  Deity.  In 
view  of  such  intellectual  speculations  which  differ  only  in 
topics,  not  in  kind,  from  any  others  that  confound  what  per- 
tains to  the  intellect  subjectively  with  what  pertains  to  the 
senses  objectively,  we  may  see  that  the  wisdom  of  the 
world  may  well  be  accounted  "  foolishness  with  God."  The 
intellect,  by  conceiving  words  in  logical  forms,  cannot  dis- 


UNFALLACIOUS  INTERPRETATION  OF  LANGUAGE.     223 

cover  physical  things  which  our  senses  have  not  revealed 
to  us,  any  more  than  we  can,  "  by  taking  thought,  add  a 
cubit  to  our  stature." 

§  6.  The  intellect  is  organically  compelled  to  conceive 
also,  that  nothing  can  exist  without  a  maker ;  but  when  we 
intellectually  predicate  a  maker  inimitably,  we  arrive  at  a 
dilemma  of  the  usual  character,  and  must  choose  between 
a  succession  of  makers  without  a  beginning,  or  a  beginning 
without  a  maker.  The  same  may  be  repeated,  severally, 
of  the  intellectual  conceptions  of  a  cause,  a  contriver,  a  de- 
signer ;  in  each  case  we  must  choose  between  the  concep- 
tion of  an  endless  succession  of  causes,  contrivers,  design- 
ers, without  a  first ;  or  we  must  arrest  the  succession  by  an 
intellectually  conceived  first,  that  is  uncaused,  uncontrived, 
and  undesigned,  etc.  A  celebrated  European  philosopher, 
in  lecturing  on  the  above  topics,  was  in  the  habit  of  pre- 
facing his  introduction  by  saying  to  his  class,  "  Now,  gen- 
tlemen, we  will  make  God !"  The  remark  was  probably 
a  sarcasm,  for  he  belonged  to  the  school  which  deems  words 
insignificant  when  they  refer  to  no  sensible  object ;  not  see- 
ing that  intellectually  conceived  words  derive  an  unverbal 
subjective  meaning  from  the  intellect  whose  aspirations 
and  organism  generally  the  conceived  words  manifest :  just 
as  the  words  scarlet,  sweet,  loud,  fragrant,  etc.,  derive  an 
unverbal  meaning  from  only  the  senses  whose  perceptions 
they  designate ;  and  just  as  the  words  anger,  love,  and  pity, 
derive  an  unverbal  meaning  from  only  the  internal  feelings 
the  words  refer  to. 


224  THE  MEANING  OF  WORDS. 

§  7.  The  indestructibility  of  matter  is  another  conception 
of  the  intellect  similar  to  the  foregoing ;  the  intellect  being 
organically  compelled  to  admit  it,  or  to  admit,  ultimately, 
that  something  is  nothing.  The  infinite  divisibility  of  mat- 
ter is  another  intellectual  necessity  of  the  same  character ; 
the  intellect  being  organically  necessitated  to  admit  it,  or 
to  admit,  ultimately,  that  a  whole  is  not  greater  than  a 
part.  But  while  I  endeavour  to  show  that  intellectually 
conceived  words  result  from,  and  signify  unverbally  an 
intellectual  organism,  I  mean  not  to  assert  that  any  verbal 
conceptions  are  innate,  even  when,  like  most  or  all  the  fore- 
going, they  are  found  in  all  ages  of  the  world  and  among 
all  races  of  men.  I  claim  only  that  given  verbal  concep- 
tions are  a  result  of  the  organism  of  the  intellect  when 
placed  under  given  objective  circumstances ;  and  that  the 
universality  of  any  given  verbal  conception  is  a  result  of 
only  the  universality  of  the  excitive  objective  circum- 
stances ;  just  as  you  will  find  language  wherever  you  find 
human  society — apple-eaters,  wherever  you  find  apples — 
climbers,  wherever  you  find  hills — swimmers  and  fishers, 
wherever  you  find  water — and  walkers  every  where,  the 
earth  being  co-extensive  with  man. 


LECTURE  X. 

OF  THE   UNFALLACIOUS  PROSECUTION  OF  INQUISITION. 


CONTENTS. 

1.  Retrospect  of  the  preceding  Lecture. 

2.  Questions  analysed  into  an  inquirer,  inquiree,  and  object. 

3.  Each  of  the  three  is  unverbally  triform,  and  only  verbally  a  unit 

4.  The  error  exemplified  of  seeking  sensibly  what  is  only  intellectual,  and 

of  seeking  intellectually  what  is  only  sensible. 

5.  Inquisition  is  limited  by  the  purview  of  our  sensible,  intellectual,  and 

moral  organisms. 

6.  All  physical  inquisition  is  unanswerable  that  is  not  within  the  purview 

of  the  senses ;  all  intellectual  inquisition  is  unanswerable  that  is  not 
within  the  purview  of  the  intellect ;  and  all  inquisition  that  relates 
to  the  internal  feelings  is  unanswerable  that  is  not  within  the  pur- 
view of  our  consciousness  therein. 

7.  Knowledge,  except  of  language,  is,  in  its  ultimate  form,  unverbal,  not 

verbal. 

8.  Conclusion. 

Retrospect  of  the  preceding  Lecture. 

§  1.  The  preceding  Lecture  teaches  that  when  the  intel- 
lect premises  that  any  thing  is  a  contrivance,  the  intellect 
is  organically  constrained  to  see  in  the  premises  that  they 
include  the  agency  of  a  contriver ;  when  the  intellect  pre- 
mises that  any  thing  is  an  effect,  the  intellect  is  organically 

constrained  to  conceive  that  the  effect  required  a  precedent 
10* 


226  THE  MEANING  OF  WORDS. 

cause;  when  the  intellect  premises  that  any  thing  is  a 
whole,  the  intellect  is  organically  compelled  to  conceive  it 
is  more  than  a  part ;  when  the  intellect  premises  that  A 
and  B  are  severally  equal  to  C,  the  intellect  is  constrained 
to  conceive  that  A  is  equal  to  B ;  when  the  intellect  pre- 
mises that  a  mark  which  exists  on  a  sandy  shore  is  a  foot- 
print, the  intellect  is  organically  forced  to  conceive  that 
some  foot  imprinted  it ;  and  when  the  intellect  conceives 
that  any  thing  is  an  existence,  the  intellect  is  organically 
compelled  to  conceive  that  the  existence  had  a  beginning, 
and  must  suffer  a  termination,  etc.  Wherein  the  cogency 
consists  of  given  premises  to  compel  the  intellect  to  con- 
ceive therefrom  given  conclusions,  I  shall  not  inquire,  for 
I  am  not  writing  a  treatise  on  the  intellect.  The  rationale 
of  the  process  is,  however,  I  think  obvious ;  and  in  pages 
164  to  206,  of  a  former  publication  (entitled  "  A  Treatise 
on  Language,"  etc.,  published  by  the  Harpers,  of  New 
York,  for  me  in  1836),  I  manifested  my  views  thereon 
elaborately ;  but  the  subject  is  not  properly  within  my  pre* 
sent  design,  which  is  limited  to  the  unverbal  meaning  of 
words.  Conclusions  of  the  intellect,  like  the  foregoing  ex- 
amples, are  words,  and  only  as  such  are  they  within  my 
purview ;  and  I  have  shown,  in  Lecture  VIII.,  that,  except 
what  the  senses  can  perceive,  the  ultimate  unverbal  mean- 
ing of  intellectually  conceived  words  is  the  organism  of  the 
intellect;  just  as  the  ultimate  unverbal  physical  meaning 
of  paralysis,  beyond  what  is  sensible,  is  the  organism  of ' 
our  physical  formation. 


UNFALLACIOUS  INTERPRETATION  OF  LANGUAGE.     227 

By  means  of  our  intellectual  organism,  my  intellect  is 
compelled  to  conceive,  that  what  I  behold  in  certain  rocks 
and  stones  are  the  fossilized  remains  of  an  extinct  species 
of  animals  that  existed  anterior  to  the  Deluge ;  that  certain 
existing  ravines  are  extinct  rivers ;  certain  existing  rocks, 
extinct  volcanoes ;  certain  distantly  separated  existing  em- 
inences, parts  of  a  former  entirety ;  that  the  centre  of  the 
earth  is  fire,  and  the  surface  of  the  earth  a  cool  crust  of 
what  was  originally  a  mass  in  fusion.  Astronomy  presents 
to  my  intellect  premises  which  constrain  it  to  conceive  that 
the  Asteroids  are  fragments  of  a  large  planet  burst  asunder 
by  some  unknown  natural  convulsion ;  though  other  pre- 
mises will  compel  my  intellect  to  conceive  that  the  above 
is  an  unreasonable  hypothesis,  and  to  supersede  it  by  con- 
ceiving that  the  Asteroids  were  made  in  their  present  form 
and  for  just  the  purposes  they  now  subserve.  A  sermon 
will  present  to  my  intellect  premises  from  which  it  will 
conceive  the  mode  in  which  the  dead  are  to  be  re-animated 
at  the  last  day,  and  whether  friends  are  to  recognize  each 
other,  or  remain  unrecognized.  The  conclusions  are  all 
very  reasonable,  I  may  say.  They  accord  with  my  intel- 
lectual organism  as  satisfactorily  as  a  well  prepared  omelet 
accords  with  my  physical  organization.  The  conclusions 
signify,  unverbally,  the  organism  of  my  intellect,  just  as 
ventriloquism,  whistling,  talking,  singing,  and  screaming, 
evince  the  organism  of  my  vocal  powers ;  and  just  as  pain, 
smart,  burn,  etc.,  evince  the  organism  of  my  physical  for- 
mation. Now,  I  admit,  that  I  can  but  postulate  this  doc- 


228  THE   MEANING   OF   WORDS. 

trine.  The  doctrine  is  a  verbal  conception  of  my  intellect 
as  organic  and  subjective  only,  in  its  ultimate  unverbal  sig- 
nification, as  the  other  intellectual  conceptions  that  I  have 
alluded  to,  and  possessing  neither  more  unverbal  signifi- 
cancy  than  they,  nor  less.  I  insist  only,  as  positive  know- 
ledge, that  intellectually  conceived  words  can  mean,  phy- 
sically, nothing  but  what  is  sensibly  perceptible,  and  that 
all  their  other  signification,  except  what  is  emotional,  is 
intellectual,  deriving  its  whole  unverbal  unction  from  the 
organism  of  the  intellect. 

But  wherein  is  the  above  doctrine  new  ?  In  this :  other 
men  fail  to  recognize  that  nearly  every  word  may  relate  to 
three  heterogeneous  unverbal  things.  The  fire,  for  in- 
stance, with  which  I  am  warming  my  boots,  is  sensible — 
the  fire  of  lust,  zeal,  hate,  opinion,  etc.,  is  an  internal  feel- 
ing ;  but  the  fire  which  the  intellect  conceives,  verbally,  in 
the  centre  of  the  earth,  is  an  intellectual  conception.  The 
three  fires  are  not  homogeneous  unverbally,  though  they 
are  verbally,  and  I  postulate  no  more.  The  difference  be- 
tween the  three  fires  is  precisely  what  it  is ;  and  thus  to 
designate  the  difference  is  more  accurate  than  any  verbal 
designation — the  unverbal  difference  being  always  ultimate 
to  the  verbal  (underlying  the  verbal),  select  what  verbal 
designation  you  may. 

§  2.  I  have  now  concluded  all  that  I  contemplated  say- 
ing on  the  unverbal  meaning  of  intellectually  conceived 
words,  and,  indeed,  of  the  unverbal  meaning  of  words  in 
every  other  use  of  them.  I  have  endeavoured  to  only 


UNFALLACIOUS  INTERPRETATION  OF  LANGUAGE.     229 

make  men  cease  from  contemplating  unverbal  things 
through  the  medium  of  language.  I  have  endeavoured 
that  unverbal  things  shall,  on  the  contrary,  occupy  in  cre- 
ation the  rank  and  precedence  to  which  they  are  entitled 
as  elder  brothers  of  words.  The  unverbal  thing  to  which 
the  word  man  applies,  is  certainly  older  and  more  conse- 
quential than  the  word  man :  the  unverbal  thing  should, 
therefore,  be  deemed  the  interpretation  or  exposition  of 
the  meaning  of  the  word  man ;  not,  vice  versa,  the  word  be 
deemed  the  interpretation  of  the  unverbal  thing.  The  like 
may  be  said  of  every  other  unverbal  thing,  and  I  have  ac- 
cordingly endeavoured  that  the  unverbal  multiplicity  of 
any  unverbal  thing  shall  be  no  longer  obscured  by  its  ver- 
bal oneness ;  and  that  the  unverbal  diversities  of  any  two 
things  shall  be  no  longer  estimated  by  their  verbal  same- 
ness or  identity.  These  are,  in  brief,  my  whole  doctrine, 
if  you  add  thereto  that  I  have  throughout  assumed  for  man 
a  treble  organization — sensible,  intellectual,  and  emotional ; 
and  that  every  word  of  all  languages  must  be  bounded  in 
its  unverbal  signification  by  the  purview  of  our  said  three 
organisms,  and  be  deemed  as  heterogeneous  in  its  unverbal 
signification  as  the  said  three  sets  of  organisms  are  hetero- 
geneous in  their  functions.  Words  apply  indiscriminately 
to  the  operations  of  the  three  species  of  organs;  hence, 
words  possess  a  verbal  homogeneity  that  prevents  us  from 
seeing  the  heterogeneity  of  their  unverbal  meaning.  Va- 
rious phases  of  this  verbal  delusion  I  have  adduced,  but 
only  for  the  purpose  of  illustrating  the  result  on  intellec- 


230  THE  MEANING  OF  WORDS. 

tual  verbal  speculations.  With  a  final  view  to  the  same 
purpose,  I  will  terminate  the  present  speculations  with  an 
investigation  of  the  unverbal  signification  of  verbal  inqui- 
sition. I  have  touched  on  no  subject  more  practically  use- 
ful, and  on  none  so  little  understood ;  for  as  the  eye  sees 
every  visible  thing  but  itself,  so  questions  have  interro- 
gated everything  but  interrogation. 

§  3.  Every  question  presupposes  an  inquirer,  an  inqui- 
ree,  and  an  object  sought.  The  inquirer  we  will  assume  to 
be  a  man,  and  the  inquiree  a  man  also.  Language  deems 
every  man  a  unit,  but  we  have  repeatedly  shown  that  the 
nominal  unit  man  is  un verbally  triune — sensible,  intellec- 
tual, and  internal  feelings.  Every  question,  therefore,  ad- 
dressed to  verbal  Peter,  is  addressed  to  three  inconvertibly 
different  unverbal  Peters.  We  can  readily  conceive  some 
mystification,  were  we  questioning  three  Dromios,  without 
suspecting  their  want  of  personal  identity ;  but  the  mysti- 
fication is  greater  with  the  three  Peters  that  constitute  the 
nominal  unit  of  every  inquiree ;  the  three  differing  from 
each  other  even  more  heterogeneously  and  inconvertibly 
than  the  three  Dromios — the  senses  being  organically  un- 
able to  perform  the  office  of  the  intellect,  and  the  intellect 
being  organically  unable  to  perform  the  offices  of  the  senses, 
and  the  feelings  being  unable  to  perform  the  offices  of  the 
senses  or  the  intellect.  If  we  disregard  this  latent  triplicity 
of  the  inquiree,  our  questions  on  any  occasion  may  seek 
sensible  information  from  the  intellect,  or  intellectual  in- 
formation from  the  senses,  etc. 


UNFALLACIOUS  INTERPRETATION  OF  LANGUAGE.     231 

§  4.  The  difficulty  becomes  still  more  complicated,  and 
the  danger  of  mystification  still  more  imminent,  by  the  un- 
verbal  triplicity  that  characterizes  the  objects  also  of  inqui- 
sition— the  object  sought  being  sometimes  sensible  infor- 
mation, sometimes  intellectual  information,  and  sometimes 
emotional  information — three  entirely  distinct  and  incon- 
vertibly  different  objects  un verbally,  but  which  language 
frequently  deems  an  homogeneous  unit. 

Nearly  all  the  perplexing  questions  of  speculation  are 
produced  by  verbal  equivokes  like  the  above.  Our  senses, 
for  instance,  cannot  discover  how  the  soul  is  united  to  the 
body,  how  effects  are  united  to  their  causes,  how  our  ac- 
tions are  united  to  our  will,  etc.  But  nothing  in  these  dis- 
abilities ought  to  surprise  us ;  the  unions  alluded  to,  being 
all  conceptions  of  the  intellect,  are,  by  the  nature  of  our  or- 
ganization, not  discoverable  by  our  senses,  any  more  than 
the  wings  are  which  "riches  take  unto  themselves  when 
they  fly  away,"  or  any  more  than  sounds  are  discoverable 
by  our  sight,  or  colours  by  our  ears.  An  astronomer,  mys- 
tified by  such  indiscriminations,  may  admire,  as  a  great 
physical  enigma,  that  attraction,  which  pervades  the  uni- 
verse, upholds  the  earth,  and  keeps  the  sun,  moon,  and 
planets  in  their  respective  orbits,  can  by  no  ingenuity  of 
man  be  discovered  in  its  physical  personality,  though  its 
effects  are  ever  present.  The  explanation  of  this  enigma 
is  precisely  like  the  last.  The  attraction  alluded  to  is  a 
conception  of  the  intellect,  hence  not  discoverable  by  our 
senses  any  more  than  lead  is  digestible  by  our  stomachs, 


232  THE   MEANING  OF  WORDS. 

thoughts  tangible  by  onr  fingers,  or  dreams  measurable  by 
the  gallon. 

What  we  have  said  of  attraction  we  may  say  of  vitality. 
We  are  conscious  of  it,  but  its  sensible  personality  con- 
stantly eludes  our  senses.  The  soul  also,  the  mind,  the 
intellect,  severally  elude  all  sensible  searches — conscious 
of  them  continually,  our  senses  can  nowhere  discover  them. 
Such  equivokes  pass  usually  for  profound  mysteries ;  but 
all  mystery  vanishes  when  we  know  that  the  respective 
words  name  only  conceptions  of  the  intellect,  and  of  course 
their  meaning  is  not  within  the  purview  of  our  senses.  The 
fallacy  shows  itself  often  in  the  science  of  medicine.  Med- 
ical theories  are  intellectual  conceptions;  but  physicians 
are  continually  striving  to  realize  them  physically ;  just  as 
persons  who  seek  to  discover  perpetual  motion  are  endea- 
vouring to  realize  sensibly  a  notion  which  exists  only  in- 
tellectually. The  theories  of  diseases,  of  contagion,  of  gen- 
eration, of  alimentation,  are  severally  conceptions  of  the 
intellect;  and  to  the  extent  that  the  conception  in  each 
case  is  only  intellectually  conceived  words,  the  mystery  of 
our  inability  to  realize  it  physically  is  a  delusion.  That 
inoculation  will  prevent  small-pox,  that  vaccination  is  equi- 
valent to  inoculation,  are  conceptions  of  the  intellect ;  but 
when  sensible  results  conflict  therewith  in  any  particular, 
we  need  not  be  surprised — the  theory  and  the  sensible  re- 
sults belonging  to  two  generically  and  inconvertibly  differ- 
ent compartments  of  our  knowledge ;  hence  their  conflict 
unverbally  is  no  mysterious  duality  of  any  unverbal  iden- 


UNFALLACIOUS  INTERPRETATION  OF  LANGUAGE.     233 

tity,  the  identity  being  only  a  verbal  equivoke.  A  uni- 
versal panacea,  an  elixir  of  life,  a  universal  dissolvent,  the 
transmutations  of  alchemy,  are  all  conceptions  of  the  intel- 
lect; but  men  who  sought  them  as  physical  existences, 
were  deluded  by  the  verbal  homogeneity  of  sensible  objects 
and  intellectual  conceptions.  That  physical  results  ha- 
bitually conform  measurably  to  theoretical  anticipations 
evinces  only  the  beneficial  design  of  our  intellectual  organ- 
ization, and  no  way  subverts  the  utility  of  our  knowing 
the  unverbal  heterogeneity  of  intellectual  conceptions  and 
sensible  perceptions. 

§  5.  The  intellect  insists,  imperatively  and  irresistibly, 
that  every  occurrence  is  the  effect  of  some  cause ;  hence, 
wljen  a  disease  occurs,  our  intellect  will  insist  that  a  cause 
has  preceded  it ;  but  we  are  not  always  able  to  discover 
any  sensible  cause.  "We  rarely  recognize  that  the  neces- 
sity which  insists  on  a  cause  belongs  only  to  the  organism 
of  our  intellect,  and  that  the  un discoverability  of  any  sen- 
sible cause  is  not  a  conflicting  fact,  but  an  additional  fact : 
both  facts  are  equally  true,  but  they  relate  to  different  or- 
ganisms ;  the  necessity  for  a  cause  being  intellectual,  while 
the  undiscoverability  of  a  cause  is  physical.  This  distinc- 
tion I  deem  highly  important,  and  it  removes  much  specu- 
lative mystery ;  for  when  we  deem  a  cause  as  much  a  phy- 
sical necessity  as  it  is  an  intellectual  necessity,  we  are  cer- 
tainly involved  in  a  delusive  indiscrimination  between  the 
organic  duality  of  our  knowledge. 

But  I  have  been  asked,  whether  the  undiscoverability  of 


234:  THE   MEANING  OF  WORDS. 

a  physical  cause  is  equivalent  to  the  non-existence  of  a 
physical  cause  ?  I  answer,  that  the  two  propositions  pos- 
sess different  intellectual  meanings,  but  not  necessarily  dif- 
ferent physical  meanings.  Every  proposition  means  phy- 
sically the  physical  facts  only  to  which  it  refers ;  hence,  to 
affirm  of  any  given  occurrence,  that  no  physical  cause  exists 
therefor,  or  to  affirm  that  no  physical  cause  therefor  is  dis- 
coverable, will  in  both  cases  possess  but  one  physical  mean- 
ing, if  they  both  refer  to  the  same  physical  fact.  I  am 
anxious  to  manifest  only  that  when  we  deem  a  cause  as 
much  a  physical  necessity  as  it  is  an  intellectual  necessity, 
we  are  identifying  things  that  are  generically  different,  and 
hence  we  are  mystifying  our  knowledge  by  means  of  a 
misunderstanding  of  the  nature  of  language.  "We  are  view- 
ing unverbal  things  through  the  veil  which,  the  oracle  says, 
has  never  been  taken  off. 

The  intellect  will  insist  also,  that  the  generation  of  a 
foetus,  the  germination  of  a  seed,  the  assimilation  of  nour- 
ishment into  the  substances  of  our  body,  etc.,  must  result 
from  some  processes  analogous  to  sensible  creative  opera- 
tions ;  and  when  such  processes  are  not  discoverable  sensi- 
bly, we  deem  the  processes  peculiarly  mysterious ;  but  our 
knowledge  will  be  less  sophistical  by  understanding  the 
generic  intransmutability  of  intellectual  conceptions  into 
sensible  things,  and  hence,  that  the  disagreement  of  the 
two,  as  above,  is  only  a  manifestation  of  our  knowledge  in 
its  unverbal  truth. 

That  on  the  earth  some  point  exists  where  magnetic  at- 


UNFALLACIOUS  INTERPRETATION  OF  LANGUAGE.     235 

traction  is  fixedly  located,  is  a  conception  of  the  intellect ; 
and  such  a  locality  is  said  to  have  been  discovered  physi- 
cally by  some  late  Arctic  navigator,  though  I  much  doubt 
it.  The  discovery  will,  however,  only  show  the  possibility 
of  a  sensible  realization  of  an  intellectual  conception  ;  just 
as  the  search  after  hidden  treasure,  founded  on  a  dream, 
may  also  be  occasionally  realized.  The  cases  are,  however, 
wholly  different,  inasmuch  as  the  intellect  was  organized 
to  prompt  and  aid  our  physical  researches,  and  hence,  in- 
tellectual conceptions  of  a  given  analogy  to  sensible  per- 
ceptions are  often  realized  sensibly;  while  dreams  were  not 
made  to  facilitate  the  discovery  of  buried  treasures,  and  are 
rarely  realized. 

The  intellect  conceives  that  all  sensible  perceptions  are 
but  qualities  of  some  physical  substratum.  "What  this  in- 
tellectually conceived  substratum  is  physically,  philoso- 
phers say  the  senses  cannot  discover — the  senses  being  able 
to  know  only  the  effects  produced  in  them  by  this  undis- 
coverable  substratum.  That  such  a  substance  exists,  and 
that  no  efforts  of  the  senses  can  discover  it,  seems  very  mys- 
terious till  we  find  that  it  is  only  a  conception  of  the  intel- 
lect ;  hence,  like  thought,  it  is  organically  out  of  the  pur- 
view of  the  senses,  and  to  say  we  cannot  discover  it,  is  only 
equivalent  to  saying  that  the  senses  cannot  discover  what 
is  not  sensible.  Language  speaks,  however,  of  substance, 
as  it  would  speak  of  a  horse ;  and  when  we  look  only 
verbally,  the  inability  of  the  senses  to  discover  the  in- 
tellectually conceived  substance  seems  as  mysterious 


236  THE  MEANING  OF  WORDS. 

as  would  be  our  inability  to  discover  a  postulated  horse. 
The  intellect  conceives  that  terrestrial  creation  constitutes 
a  chain,  which  ascends  by  links  of  so  insensible  a  gradation 
from  unorganized  matter  to  man,  the  climax  of  organized 
materiality,  that  we  cannot  discover,  sensibly,  where  inor- 
ganic matter  ends  and  organic  commences,  where  vege- 
table life  ends,  and  animal  commences,  or  where  any 
species  of  animality  terminates  and  another  species  com- 
mences— including  even  the  link  which  separates  man  from 
some  other  animals.  Our  inability  to  discover  the  postu- 
lated links  and  gradations  constitutes  the  mystery.  But 
we  have  discovered  them,  or  we  should  be  unable  to  talk 
about  them !  This  explains  the  mystery :  what  we  have 
discovered  are  intellectual,  but  what  we  cannot  discover 
are  sensible.  We  cannot  discover,  sensibly,  the  chain, 
links,  gradations,  etc.,  that  we  conceive  intellectually.  The 
inability  proceeds  from  no  defect  of  the  senses,  from  no  in- 
scrutableness  of  un verbal  things,  but  simply  from  the  he- 
terogeneity of  our  organisms.  What  is  conceived  intellec- 
tually, and  what  is  perceived  sensibly,  may  be  nominally 
identical  and  verbally  homogeneous ;  but,  unverbally,  they 
belong  to  different  worlds — the  world  of  the  intellect,  and 
the  world  of  the  senses.  Instead  of  contrasting  the  discov- 
erability and  undiscoverability  as  mysterious  antagonists, 
vre  should  note  the  antagonism  as  parts  of  our  experimen- 
tal knowledge,  and  thereby  obey  the  ancient  injunction, 
"  Know  thyself."  And  here  we  may  note  how  insidiously, 
in  cases  like  the  above,  we  play  a  game  of  bo-peep  with 


UNFALLACIOUS  INTERPRETATION  OF  LANGUAGE.     237 

the  word  "  discover,"  using  it  at  one  moment  to  designate 
an  intellectual  operation,  and  the  next  moment  to  designate 
a  sensible  operation,  without  recognizing  that  we  are  talk- 
ing of  two  processes  that  are  unverbally  heterogeneous, 
though  verbally  homogeneous. 

In  a  treatise,  entitled  "  The  Theory  of  Agreeable  Sensa- 
tions," a  recent  writer  says:  "Actors,  when  they  either 
laugh  or  weep,  affect  spectators  with  the  sensations  which 
the  drama  expresses ;  but  who  can  discover  the  mechanism 
by  which  the  fibres  of  the  actor's  brain  transmit  them- 
selves to  that  of  the  spectators !"  The  discovery  spoken 
of  as  mysteriously  impracticable  is,  of  course,  to  be  physi- 
cal ;  while  the  things  to  be  discovered  are  only  conceptions 
of  the  intellect,  namely,  "the  mechanism  by  which  the 
fibres  of  the  actor's  brain  transmit  themselves  to  the  brain 
of  other  persons."  The  delusion  becomes  apparent  the 
moment  we  penetrate  through  the  homogeneity  of  words, 
and  analyze  unverbal  things  into  their  generic  differences. 
In  the  same  fallacious  way  we  may  marvel  that  we  cannot 
find,  sensibly,  how  animal  life  commences — how  some- 
thing becomes  nothing,  or  nothing  becomes  something — 
how  external  objects  or  their  impressions  are  carried  by  the 
nerves  to  the  brain,  etc. ;  and  for  the  simple  reason,  that 
the  things  to  be  found  sensibly,  are  not  sensible  but  intel- 
lectual conceptions. 

§  6.  The  great  instruments  of  verbal  inquisition  are  the 
words  what  and  how ;  as  when  we  say,  what  is  gravity? — 
how  is  the  soul  united  to  the  body?  The  moment  we 


238  THE   MEANING  OF  WORDS. 

clearly  understand  the  "what"  and  "how"  as  inquiring 
after  some  physical  thing,  we  see  why  we  cannot  tell  what 
gravity  is  personally — its  personality  being  not  a  physical 
thing,  but  a  conception  of  the  intellect;  hence,  the  question 
is  equivalent  to  asking  what  physical  thing  is  a  thing  that 
is  not  physical.  We  may  repeat  the  same  remarks  of  how 
the  soul  is  united  to  the  body.  The  question,  as  usually 

• 

propounded,  is  equivalent  to  asking  what  physical  modus 
operandi  is  a  modus  operand!  that  is  not  physical. 

§  7.  I  discover  in  the  work  of  Auguste  Comte,  as  trans- 
lated by  Harriet  Martineau  (the  only  form  in  which  I  have 
seen  any  work  of  his),  that  he  deprecates  all  inquiries  like 
the  above,  they  being,  as  he  thinks,  beyond  the  purview 
of  human  knowledge.  He  says:  "As  to  what  weight  and 
attraction  are,  we  have  nothing  to  do  with  that  question, 
for  it  is  not  a  matter  of  knowledge  at  all."  That  so  recent 
a  philosopher  as  Comte,  so  acute,  learned,  and  discrimina- 
ting, is  still  so  bewildered  by  the  homogeneity  of  words, 
as  to  mistake  an  error  of  inquisition  for  a  mystery  tran- 
scending human  knowledge,  is  to  me  an  encouraging  proof 
that  the  present  work  is  not  unnecessary.  He  says,  again : 
"  Mr.  Fourier,  in  his  line  researches  on  heat,  has  given  us 
the  most  important  and  precise  laws  of  the  phenomena  of 
heat,  and  many  large  and  new  truths,  without  once  inqui- 
ring into  the  nature  of  heat,  as  his  predecessors  had  done, 
when  they  disputed  about  calorific  matter  and  the  action 
of  an  universal  ether."  Certainly,  if  we  are  to  mistake  for 
physical  the  "calorific  matter"  and  the  "universal  ether," 


UNFALLACIOUS  INTERPRETATION  OF  LANGUAGE.      239 

which  are  only  intellectual  conceptions,  Mr.  Fourier  was 
wise  in  not  disputing  about  such  delusive  misconstructions; 
but  his  researches  would  not  have  been  injured,  they  would 
have  been  more  definite,  had  he  stated  that  his  inquiries 
were  not  directed  to  the  physical  personality  of  heat,  as 
contradistinguished  from  heat's  sensible  manifestations — 
such  physical  personality  being  not  physical,  but  only  a 
conception  of  the  intellect. 

Like  the  above  is  the  assertion  of  Comte,  that  we  are 
"  without  data  about  the  constitution  of  bodies."  I  infer 
from  the  context,  that  he  means  we  possess  no  physical  data 
in  relation  to  the  constituents  which  the  intellect  conceives 
to  be  the  components  of  physical  bodies.  Of  course  we 
possess  no  such  physical  data,  and  never  can  possess  any ; 
the  components  being  not  physical,  but  intellectual  concep- 
tions. He  also  quotes,  approvingly,  somebody  as  saying, 
that  the  "  miniature  picture"  which  is  painted  on  the  retina 
of  the  eye  in  vision,  and  by  which  distant  external  objects 
are  brought  to  the  notice  of  the  intellect,  cannot  avail 
the  intellect,  unless  the  intellect  possesses  another  eye  to 
see  the  miniature.  This  sarcasm  is  pretty,  but  far  prettier 
is  an  elucidation  of  the  mistake  which  deems  the  optical 
theory  in  relation  to  the  miniature  a  physical  modus  oper- 
andi,  instead  of  only  an  intellectual  conception.  Our  indis- 
crimination between  intellectual  conceptions  and  sensible 
perceptions,  seems  proportioned  in  degree  to  the  marvel 
that  can  be  produced  by  the  indiscrimination.  Every  per- 
son talks  of  the  above  optical  theory  with  apparently  an 


240  THE  MEANING  OF  WORDS. 

entire  unsuspicion  of  the  difference  between  what  is  sensi- 
bly perceptible  in  relation  thereto,  and  what  is  intellectu- 
ally conceived.  The  same  may  be  said  of  the  theoretical 
agency  of  our  nerves  in  general,  in  fetching  information 
from  external  objects  to  our  brain,  and  carrying  volitions 
from  the  brain  to  the  other  members  of  our  body ;  of  our 
supporting  severally  on  our  bodies  a  physical  pressure  of 
fourteen  tons  of  atmosphere ;  of  being  physically  whirled 
through  space  every  hour  about  a  thousand  miles  in  one 
direction,  and  about  fifty-eight  thousand  miles  in  another 
direction.  Infidelity  sneers  at  the  prophet  Joshua,  and  we 
laugh  at  all  the  ancients  who  supposed  the  earth  was  at 
rest,  and  that  the  sun  and  other  celestial  bodies  revolved 
around  our  earth,  as  we  now  conceive  that  the  earth  re- 
volves around  the  sun ;  and  no  man  can  be  found  who 
supposes  that  the  difference  is  not  physical,  and  that  we 
differ  from  the  ancients  in  only  our  intellectual  conceptions 
on  the  subject.  Our  internal  feelings  relish  the  indiscrim- 
ination which  we  practise  between  what  is  intellectual  and 
what  is  physical ;  and  to  this  encouragement,  more  than  to 
any  obtuseness  of  the  intellect,  we  doubtless  owe  the  un- 
disturbed prevalence  of  the  indiscrimination;  just  as  we 
owe  to  the  same  encouragement  feats  of  legerdemain,  the 
tales  of  the  Arabian  Nights,  and  the  growing  tendency  to 
fabulize  all  history  and  all  biography.  We  relish  the 
equivoke  in  the  Arabian  tales  and  in  legerdemain,  though 
our  intellect  detects  it ;  and  we  may  continue  to  relish  also 
our  historical,  biographical,  and  our  scientific  indiscrimina- 


UNFALLACIOUS  INTERPRETATION  OF  LANGUAGE.    241 

tions  between  what  is  physical  and  what  is  intellectual, 
after  our  intellect  shall  detect  them ;  and  continue  their 
employment  as  a  provocative  to  reading  and  to  scientific 
studies,  an  end  for  which,  more  than  any  other  probably, 
they  have  so  long  remained  unchallenged. 

How  mysterious  are  the  ways  of  Providence !  This  is  a 
familiar  expression.  Physical  events  will  not  conform  to 
our  conceptions  of  the  order  in  which  they  ought  to  trans- 
pire, and  we  deem  the  physical  variance  quite  mysterious, 
and  ask  the  intellect  what  the  variance  means.  It  means 
that  we  fail  to  discriminate  the  generic  difference  between 
intellectual  conceptions  and  sensible  perceptions.  The  in- 
tellect will  conceive  according  to  either  its  organic  or  in- 
doctrinated tendencies — its  conceptions  being  subjective, 
not  objective ;  hence  the  variance  between  our  conception 
of  how  events  ought  to  transpire,  and  our  sensible  percep- 
tion of  the  order  in  which  they  occur,  are  no  way  antago- 
nistic to  each  other — the  two  belonging  to  different  branches 
of  our  ego.  Would  we  understand  accurately  the  "  ways 
of  Providence,"  we  must  learn  them  from  our  sensible  ex- 
perience if  we  desire  a  sensible  fruition  of  the  search ;  but 
if  we  desire  an  intellectual  fruition,  we  must  accept  such 
intellectually  conceived  words  as  different  intellects  will 
conceive  under  different  conditions  or  under  different  in- 
doctrinations. The  above  is  what  my  intellect  conceives 
on  the  subject,  and  I  give  it  for  nothing  more. 

§  8.  Having  thus  given  many  examples  of  questions 

which  seek  sensibly  what  is  intellectual,  I  will  adduce  some 
11 

X 


242  THE  MEANING  OF  WORDS, 

of  the  correlative  errors  of  seeking  intellectually  for  some- 
thing that  is  physical.  How  mysterious,  we  exclaim,  is 
death !  What  can  it  be  ?  "We  desire  the  intellect  to  tell 
us  what  death  is  physically — the  death  which  the  intellect 
conceives.  This  desire  in  us  to  have  the  intellect  materi- 
alize its  conceptions  of  death,  and,  indeed,  all  its  concep- 
tions, is  organic  in  our  feelings,  and  is  the  source  of  all 
theories  and  hypotheses.  That  this  organic  tendency  is 
useful  we  know,  from  the  practical  purposes  which  theories 
subserve,  and  from  the  faith  we  possess  that  all  our  organic 
powers  and  aspirations  subserve  important  practical  utili- 
ties. But  while  we  thus  accord  importance  to  such  inqui- 
ries of  the  intellect  as  ask  of  it  what  death  is  in  material 
personality? — what  life,  spirit,  mind,  soul  are  respectively? 
— we  shall  gain  nothing  by  not  recognizing  that,  though 
the  intellect  may  conceive  some  theory  or  hypothesis  by 
which  to  assimilate  its  conceptions  of  death,  etc.,  to  person- 
alities sensibly  perceptible,  yet  the  theoretical  assimilation 
will  still  be  intellectual,  not  physical.  The  inherent  dis- 
tinction, and  the  inconvertible  difference,  are  insurmount- 
able between  the  un verbal  things  of  the  three  great  depart- 
ments into  which  are  divisible  all  we  know  or  can  know. 
Language  can  assimilate  the  three  heterogeneous  things 
verbally,  but  not  unverbally ;  language  can  transmute  un- 
verbal  things  one  into  another  verbally ;  but,  unverbally, 
they  are  untransmutable. 

"  When,"  says  Comte,  "  any  attempt  has  been  made  to 
explain  what  is  attraction  and  weight,  it  has  ended  only  in 


UNFALLACIOUS  INTERPRETATION  OF  LANGUAGE.    243 

saying,  that  attraction  is  universal  weight,  and  that  weight 
is  terrestrial  attraction:  that  is,  that  the  two  orders  of 
phenomena  are  identical,  which  is  the  point  from  which 
the  question  set  out."  Of  course,  if  you  ask  the  intellect 
what  (physical  thing  understood)  weight  and  attraction 
are,  the  intellect  can  answer  by  only  some  intellectu- 
ally conceived  words.  If  you  desire  any  other  answer — 
especially  if  you  desire  a  physical  answer — your  question 
must  be  directed,  not  to  the  intellect,  but  to  the  senses. 
If  we  want  figs,  we  must  not  go  to  a  thistle ;  and  if  we 
want  thistles,  we  must  not  seek  them  on  fig-trees :  this  ob- 
vious scriptural  precept  applies  to  our  unverbal  knowledge 
in  its  threefold  heterogeneity. 

"  The  little  bodies  which  compose  water,  and  which  are 
so  loose  one  from  another  that  the  least  force  separates 
them,  and  which  bodies,  from  their  perpetual  motion,  seem 
to  possess  no  cohesion,  will  unite  under  a  sharp  cold,  and 
not  be  separated  without  great  force."  I  quote  the  above 
from  Locke,  who  adds,  "that  he  who  could  make  known 
the  cement  that  makes  the  little  bodies  adhere  so  closely 
together,  would  discover  a  great  and  yet  unknown  secret." 

"What  cement  makes  the  particles  of  frozen  water  adhere 
together  so  closely,  is  the  above  question  mooted  by  Locke. 
His  intellect  conceived  that  water  was  composed  of  "  little 
particles,"  and  that  ice  was  produced  by  some  "  cement" 
which  solidified  the  conceived  particles.  The  intellectually 
conceived  particles  and  cement  he,  being  misled  by  lan- 
guage, deemed  homogeneous  with  physical  particles  and 


244:  THE  MEANING  OF  WORDS. 

physical  cement.  This  was  error  number  one,  and  under 
the  influence  thereof,  he  deemed  very  mysterious  that  his 
senses  could  neither  feel  nor  see  in  ice  the  little  particles 
nor  the  cement  that  his  intellect  conceived  to  be  therein. 

Baffled  in  his  ability  to  thus  discover  sensibly  what  are 
only  intellectual,  he  committed  error  number  two,  by  seek- 
ing from  his  intellect  the  physical  personality  of  the  falla- 
ciously assumed  physical  particles  and  cement.  But  his 
intellect  could,  of  course,  yield  him  no  perceptions  thereof; 
his  intellect  could  yield  him  only  its  own  intellectual  con- 
ceptions thereon;  and  thus  he  deemed  the  particles  and 
cement  "  a  great  and  yet  unknown  mystery."  Had  Locke 
said  that  in  his  mind  was  some  thought  that  no  man's 
senses  could  discover,  no  person  would  have  suffered  sur- 
prise, the  terms  of  the  proposition  evincing  sufficiently 
that  he  alluded  to  an  intellection ;  but  when  Locke  speaks 
of  cement,  particles,  etc.,  the  threefold  meanings  which 
such  words  can  bear,  unverbally,  prevents  us  from  see- 
ing that  Locke  is  employing  them  in  only  their  intellec- 
tual meaning,  and  hence  necessarily,  that  our  senses  can- 
not discover  them. 

§  9.  Hume  says,  "  Our  senses  inform  us  of  the  colour, 
weight,  and  consistence  of  bread;  but  neither  sense  nor 
reason  can  inform  us  of  the  qualities  which  fit  bread  for  the 
nourishment  and  support  of  the  human  body."  Certain 
qualities  are  here  postulated  which  neither  the  senses  nor 
the  intellect  can  inform  us  of.  How,  then,  do  we  know 
they  exist?  We  must  know  from  the  intellect;  for  if  the 


UNFALLACIOUS  INTERPRETATION  OF  LANGUAGE.     245 

senses  cannot  discover  them,  they  are  intellectually  con- 
ceived qualities,  and  this  accounts  for  why  we  cannot  be 
informed  of  them  by  the  senses.  But  why  not  by  the  rea- 
son or  intellect?  Because  we  require  the  answer  to  be 
physical,  consequently  we  cannot  obtain  it  through  the 
intellect.  The  intellect  and  the  senses  can  inform  us  what 
fits  bread  for  the  nourishment  and  support  of  the  body; 
but  we  must  ask  from  the  senses  only  sensible  information, 
and  from  the  intellect  only  intellectual  information ;  and 
not  permit  the  duplicity  of  the  word  "qualities"  to  mislead 
us  into  an  inquiry  after  sensible  qualities  from  the  intellect, 
or  intellectually  conceived  qualities  from  the  senses. 

Locke  says,  further :  "  Our  body  possesses  the  power  of 
communicating  motion  by  impulse,  and  our  soul  the  power 
of  exciting  motion  by  thought ;  but  if  we  would  inquire 
how  the  soul  and  body  produce  these  effects,  we  are  en- 
tirely in  the  dark."  Let  us  separate  the  above  soul  and 
body.  The  body  communicates  motion  by  impulse,  but 
"  of  the  modus  operandi  we  are  entirely  in  the  dark."  The 
question,  therefore,  must  inquire  after  some  modus  oper- 
andi that  is  not  sensible,  bat  an  intellectually  conceived 
modus  operandi ;  and  we  cannot  find  it  sensibly  of  course. 
But  we  cannot  find  "how  our  soul  excites  motion  by 
thought."  The  modus  operandi  that  is  now  sought  is 
physical,  and  of  course  we  cannot  find  it  intellectually. 
In  ordinary  inquiries,  however,  of  the  intellect  after  a 
physical  modus  operandi,  the  intellect  will  conceive  a  the- 
ory which  will  verbally  satisfy  our  inquiry;  but  when  the 


246  THE   MEANING  OF   WORDS. 

inquiry  relates  to  how  "  the  soul  excites  by  thought  the 
physical  motion  of  our  limbs,"  the  process  of  volition, 
which  is  the  object  of  the  inquiry,  is  so  unique  that  sensi- 
ble experience  supplies  the  intellect  with  110  sensible  ma- 
terials out  of  which  it  can  conceive  a  satisfactory  theoretical 
modus  operandi.  Our  bodily  power  to  communicate  sen- 
sible motion  by  impulse  is  equally  unique ;  hence,  in  both 
cases,  an  intellectually  conceived  modus  operandi  is  equally 
difficult,  and  the  difficulty  is  the  fallacious  mystery. 

We  cannot  find  how  "  light  passes  through  solid  crys- 
tal ;"  that  is,  the  senses  cannot  perceive  the  modus  oper- 
andi which  the  intellect  conceives,  and  which,  of  course,  is 
not  sensible,  but  an  intellectual  conception;  or  we  may 
reverse  the  enigma,  and  seek  in  the  intellect  for  a  physical 
modus  operandi ;  and  of  course  we  cannot  find  it,  unless 
we  accept  therefor  a  theory,  and  mistake  it  for  a  physical 
revelation. 

§  10.  I  have,  as  yet,  said  nothing  of  questions  in  which 
the  object  sought  relates  to  an  internal  feeling.  Burke  in- 
quires, "  Why  visible  objects  of  great  dimensions  are  sub- 
lime ?"  Let  us  assume  that  he  meant  an  internal  feeling 
by  the  word  sublime.  The  reason,  then,  why  visible  objects 
of  great  dimensions  excite  such  a  feeling,  is  like  inquiring 
why  sugar  excites  the  taste  that  we  call  sweetness.  We 
are  so  organized  as  to  have  the  feeling  of  sublimity  excited 
by  what  does  excite  it,  and  the  taste  of  sweetness  excited 
by  what  does  exqite  it.  But  Burke  meant  more.  He 
wanted  the  intellect  to  find  some  modus  operandi,  and  his 


UNFALLACIOUS  INTERPRETATION  OF  LANGUAGE.     24:7 

intellect  accordingly  conceived  a  mode  which.  I  will  not 
quote ;  but  it  answered  his  question  in  the  way  he  desired 
an  answer,  and  he  was  accordingly  satisfied.  But  another 
person  may  not  be  satisfied,  but  may  want  to  find  sensibly 
Burke's  intellectually  conceived  modus  operandi ;  and  be- 
ing unable  to  discover  it  sensibly,  may  deem  the  inability 
a  great  mystery. 

§  11.  What  is  pride,  vanity,  ambition,  wisdom,  wit,  folly, 
anger,  rage?  Books  have  been  written  to  answer  these 
questions,  not,  however,  by  enabling  our  consciousness  to 
recognize  the  internal  feeling  which  each  word  names,  but 
to  state  what  the  intellect  conceives  of  the  materiality  and 
corporeity  of  the  various  personalities — for  such  the  intel- 
lect conceives  them  to  be ;  and  the  writers  seem  to  possess 
no  suspicion  that  the  intellect  can  tell  no  more  in  the  pre- 
mises than  its  conceptions  thereon.  They  evidently  im- 
pute to  the  feeling  named  anger,  and  the  intellectual  con- 
ception of  its  personality,  etc.,  an  homogeneity  and  oneness 
that  exists  verbally  only.  The  like  may  be  said  of  each 
other  nominal  feeling. 

§  12.  Can  we  prove  the  existence  of  an  external  uni- 
verse ?  Can  a  man  prove  his  own  existence  ?  Nothing 
which  philosophy  has  debated  is  perhaps  so  mysterious  as 
these  questions ;  but  the  whole  mystery  exists  in  the  du- 
plicity, or  rather  triplicity,  of  the  word  prove.  When  it 
refers  to  the  intellect,  it  alludes  to  an  intellectual  proof; 
when  it  refers  to  the  senses,  it  means  a  sensible  proof;  and 
when  it  refers  to  the  internal  feelings,  it  means  an  emo- 


248  THE   MEANING  OF  WORDS. 

tional  proof,  a  feeling  of  consciousness.  When,  therefore, 
Descartes  commenced  his  investigations  with  a  determina- 
tion to  assent  to  nothing  that  he  could  not  prove,  and  be- 
gan with  the  logical  enthymeme,  "I  think,  therefore  I  am," 
he  was  alluding  to  an  intellectual  proof.  "But,"  replies 
Dr.  Eeid,  "  how  do  you  prove  that  you  think  ?  If  you 
assume  this  without  proof,  you  may  assume  your  own  ex- 
istence without  proof."  Dr.  Reid  maintains  that  only  con- 
sciousness can  prove  the  existence  of  an  external  universe, 
or  of  a  man's  own  personal  existence.  Of  course,  therefore, 
Dr.  Eeid  is  alluding  to  an  emotional  proof — not  to  the 
proof  that  Descartes  alluded  to.  "  But,"  says  a  subsequent 
writer,  "  how  do  you  prove  the  existence  of  consciousness 
of  which  you  speak  ?"  He  doubtless  referred  to  a  sensible 
proof,  and  consciousness  is  not  sensibly  perceptible,  nor  is 
the  cogency  of  logic  sensibly  perceptible;  therefore,  this 
writer  can  maintain  that  neither  the  external  world,  nor  his 
own  personality,  is  provable  by  consciousness  or  logic. 

Of  the  unverbal  limitation  of  verbal  inquisition. 
§  1.  Havipg,  I  hope,  sufficiently  shown  the  errors  which 
are  involved  in  verbal  inquisition,  when  we  disregard  the 
heterogeneity  which  exists  among  un verbal  things  that  are 
verbally  homogeneous,  I  will  subjoin  a  few  remarks  on 
the  limits  of  verbal  inquisition.  To  inquire  of  the  blind 
in  relation  to,  colours,  or  of  the  deaf  in  relation  to  sounds, 
is  known  to  be  ineffectual ;  but  we  know  not  with  equal 
clearness  that  all  inquisition  is  bounded  by  man's  intellect, 


UNFALLACIOUS  INTERPRETATION  OF  LANGUAGE.     249 

his  senses,  and  his  internal  feelings ;  and  that  any  question 
that  relates  not  to  one  of  these  three  departments  of  our 
ego  is  as  unanswerable  as  an  inquiry  of  the  blind  and  deaf 
above  alluded  to,  and  for  precisely  the  same  reason.  I  will, 
however,  assume  as  a  result,  now  sufficiently  evident,  that 
every  question  is  unanswerable  whose  object  is  not  within 
the  purview  of  some  one  of  our  three  organic  inquirees; 
as,  for  instance,  the  question  asked  ironically  by  Sterne : 
"  What  if  the  sun  should  wander  from  the  zodiac?"  But 
some  intellects  may  be  able  to  conceive  consequences  from 
even  such  premises ;  hence,  to  them,  the  question  of  Sterne 
will  not  be  unanswerable  intellectually,  though  it  is  unan- 
swerable sensibly  and  morally.  Indeed,  language  can  frame 
no  question  that  the  intellect  m.ay  not  answer  with  some 
conceived  words,  even  were  we  to  ask  the  effect  which 
would  result  should  a  spark  of  fire  fall  amid  the  satellites 
of  Jupiter.  This  illimitability  of  intellectual  inquisition 
we  can  more  readily  understand  when  we  consider  that  the 
intellect  which  asks  questions  is  the  intellect  that  answers ; 
the  questioner  and  questionee  being,  therefore,  identical  in 
personality,  are  identical  in  purview. 

Examples  are,  however,  easily  given  of  unanswerable 
physical  inquisition ;  as,  for  instance,  what  is  the  shape  of 
a  taste,  or  the  colour  of  a  sound?  These  questions  arc 
unanswerable,  by  reason  that  their  object,  if  you  admit  it 
to  be  physical  information,  is  not  within  the  purview  of 
the  senses — the  senses  being  the  inquiree  to  whom  the 
questions  are  addressed.  In  addition,  therefore,  to  the  gen- 


250  THE   MEANING  OF  WORDS. 

eral  postulate,  that  all  solvable  inquisition  is  limited  to  the 
purview  of  our  senses,  our  intellect,  and  our  internal  feel- 
ings, we  arrive  at  the  more  definite  conclusion,  that  all 
physical  inquisition  is  unanswerable,  that  is  not  within 
the  purview  of  our  senses ;  all  inquisition  that  relates  to 
the  internal  feelings  is  unanswerable,  that  is  not  within 
the  purview  of  the  internal  feelings ;  and  all  intellectual 
inquisition  is  unanswerable,  that  is  not  within  the  purview 
of  the  intellect — if  any  such  intellectual  inquisition  can  be 
conceived. 

§  2.  A  distinction,  not  noted  above,  may  be  made  be- 
tween an  insignificant  question  and  a  question  that  is  un- 
answerable. To  ask  what  is  the  shape  of  a  taste  is  unan- 
swerable, if  the  information  sought  be  physical — such 
information  not  being  within  the  purview  of  our  senses : 
still  the  question  may  be  significant  to  the  intellect.  All 
verbal  inquisition  is  thus  embarrassed  with  the  threefold 
reference  of  words  to  our  threefold  organization;  unless 
we  avoid  the  embarrassment  by  postulating  which  of  our 
three  organisms  is  to  be  the  inquiree,  and  to  which  of  our 
three  organisms  belongs  the  object  that  is  sought  by  the 
inquiry.  A  man,  while  recently  perforating  the  earth  in 
search  of  a  salt  spring,  came  to  water  from  which  ascended 
a  stream  of  inflammable  gas ;  and  he  employs  a  newspaper 
to  solicit  from  philosophers  an  answer  as  to  whether  the 
gas  proceeds  from  a  decomposition  of  the  water,  or  exists 
independently  thereof.  The  querist,  probably,  never  re- 
flected whether  he  was  seeking  an  answer  from  the  intel- 


UNFALLACIOUS  INTERPRETATION  OF  LANGUAGE.     251 

lects  of  philosophers  or  from  their  senses,  though  the 
answers  of  the  two  inquirees  must  differ  generically,  the 
intellect  being  as  unable  to  originate  sensible  infor- 
mation as  the  senses  are  to  originate  intellectual  concep- 
tions. 

In  certain  essays  on  human  knowledge  (Ogilvie's  Es- 
says), published  in  New  York  some  years  since,  the  author 
asserts  that  "  he  will  endeavour  to  explain  the  extent  to 
which  mind  and  matter  are  knowable."  The  phrase  "mind 
and  matter"  is  not  deemed  by  him  to  be  limited  in  its  sig- 
nification by  our  knowledge ;  but  our  knowledge  is  deemed 
capable  of  teaching  us  a  certain  portion  only  of  the  signi- 
fication of  the  phrase.  What  a  curious  mystification  !  We 
know  "  mind  and  matter"  beyond  the  extent  to  which  we 
can  know  them.  The  mystification,  however,  terminates 
the  moment  we  analyze  the  word  "  know,"  and  find  it  pos- 
sesses three  wholly  different  and  inconvertible  meanings — 
sensible,  intellectual,  and  emotional.  We  can  know  mind 
and  matter  intellectually,  beyond  what  we  can  know  them 
sensibly ;  and  this,  instead  of  being  mysterious,  is  a  simple 
exposition  of  our  triform  organization.  The  verbal  an- 
nouncement of  the  result  seems  mysterious  by  reason  that 
we  fail  to  postulate  that  the  organs  which  know  mind  and 
matter  are  not  the  organs  which  know  them  not.  The  dif- 
ferent organs  are  like  two  Dromios ;  one  may  tell  us  he  knows 
certain  facts  of  mind  and  matter,  while  the  other  may  tell 
us  he  knows  them  not.  The  contradiction  seems  mysteri- 
ous, if  we  suppose  the  two  answerers  to  be  identical ;  but 


252  THE   MEANING  OF  WORDS. 

the  contradiction  is  simple  enough  when  we  know  their 
distinct  individuality. 

The  significance  of  language  can  be  made  as  capacious 
as  the  purview  of  our  organisms,  but  not  more  capacious. 
I  may  deem  very  mysterious  that  I  cannot  taste  the  fla- 
vour of  moonshine,  nor  smell  its  odour ;  nor  feel  the  tex- 
ture of  the  molecules  of  which  it  is  composed.  If  I  catch 
a  handful  of  them,  they  elude  my  grasp  before  I  can  con- 
vey them  into  a  dark  closet  for  closer  inspection.  This  is 
exceedingly  wonderful  to  a  person  who  sees  not  that  the 
flavour  which  I  cannot  taste,  the  odour  which  I  cannot 
smell,  the  molecules'  texture  and  particles  which  I  cannot 
catch  and  feel,  are  all  intellectual  conceptions,  not  sensible 
things;  and  hence,  of  course,  I  can  neither  taste,  smell, 
catch,  nor  feel  them.  The  true  mystery  is,  not  that  I  can- 
not accomplish  such  requirements,  but  that  the  error  of 
such  a  use  of  language  has  remained  so  long  unexplained. 

I  have  discussed  the  present  topic  too  briefly ;  but  I 
hope  sufficiently  to  manifest  that  no  man  can  inquire  intel- 
ligibly without  he  knows  whether  be  is  seeking  sensible 
information,  or  some  intellectual  conception,  or  some  emo- 
tional feeling ;  and  that  no  man  can  answer  understand- 
ingly  without  he  knows  which  of  his  three  organic  inqui- 
rees  is  to  furnish  the  answer ;  and  I  may  add,  that  no  answer 
can  be  correctly  interpreted  till  we  know  to  which  class  of 
unverbal  things  the  answer  refers — to  the  things  of  the 
intellect,  the  senses,  or  the  emotional  feelings.  I  referred 
in  rny  preface  to  the  ancient  oracle  that  was  engraved  or\ 


UNFALLACIOUS  INTERPRETATION  OF  LANGUAGE.     253 

the  pavement  of  a  temple  of  Minerva,  "  I  am  all  that  has 
been,  that  is,  and  that  shall  be,  and  none  among  mortals 
has  hitherto  taken  off  m j  veil."  I  may  not  have  succeeded 
in  the  attempt  which  the  oracle  announces  as  never  having 
been  accomplished,  but  I  fully  believe  the  accomplishment 
•will  be  consummated  when  the  mode  of  interpreting  lan- 
guage is  correctly  understood. 

The  ultimate  unverbal  signification  of  words. 

§1.1  am  now  arrived  at  the  last  topic  of  my  analysis  of 
words — their  ultimate  unverbal  signification.  I  have  anti- 
cipated the  topic  in  several  places,  but  it  properly  belongs 
here,  and  unless  we  possess  definite  knowledge  on  the 
subject,  we  shall  not  know  when  verbal  inquisition  is  prop- 
erly at  an  end.  Would  we  know,  for  instance,  the  un- 
verbal meaning  of  the  word  anger,  the  feeling  itself  alone 
can  yield  us  the  information.  It  can  say  as  God  said  from 
the  flaming  bush,  "  I  am  that  I  am,"  no  verbal  answer  being 
free  from  fallacy.  "We  may  repeat  the  like  of  every  other 
internal  feeling,  and  when  consciousness  presents  the  feel- 
ing unverbally,  the  question  is  answered  unverbally,  which 
is  the  only  answer  that  cannot  deceive — the  only  answer 
that  is  not  fallacious. 

§  2.  So  the  ultimate  unverbal  signification  of  every 
word  that  names  anything  sensible,  is  the  sensible  percep- 
tion itself  to  which  the  word  refers.  Our  ultimate  un- 
verbal sensible  knowledge  of  death,  for  instance,  our 
senses  alone  can  reveal  to  us  in  their  mute  unverbal  rev- 


254  THE  MEANING  OF  WORDS. 

elations.  And  what  we  have  thus  said  of  death  applies 
equally  to  every  other  sensible  thing,  and  to  all  sensible 
agencies  and  modes  of  operation.  Would  we  know  the 
agency  of  our  brain  over  our  actions,  the  agency  of  elec- 
tricity over  matter,  the  agency  of  volition  over  our  limbs, 
we  may  employ  our  senses  in  every  way  we  can  on  these 
several  subjects,  and  every  perception  they  yield  is  an  an- 
swer to  our  investigations — an  answer  unverbal  and  not 
ambiguous,  and  the  only  answer  that  is  unfallacious. 

§  3.  If,  however,  we  want  an  intellectual  answer  as  to 
what  death  is,  or  what  anger  is,  or  how  volition  acts 
on  our  limbs,  etc.,  we  must  accept  such  intellectually 
conceived  words  as  the  intellect  shall  be  able  to  present 
to  us  in  the  premises;  and  they  will  constitute  the 
answer  of  the  intellect — but  not  the  ultimate  answer — 
for  behind  all  such  intellectually  conceived  words  exists 
the  organism  of  the  intellect ;  in  which  organism  alone 
exists  the  unverbal  meaning  of  intellectually  conceived 
words.  In  the  discovery  of  such  an  ultimate  unverbal 
signification  of  intellectually  conceived  words,  lies,  proba- 
bly, the  original  distinction  between  nominalists  and  real- 
ists— realists  recognizing  such  an  unverbal  signification, 
and  nominalists  not  delving  quite  deep  enough  to  reach  it. 

§  4.  Finally,  our  unverbal  knowledge  consists  of  what 
our  senses  can  perceive,  what  our  internal  feelings  can 
manifest,  and  what  our  intellect  (interpreted  as  above) 
can  conceive;  and  if  we  keep  each  class  distinct,  so  as  not 
to  confound  them  by  means  of  their  verbal  transmutability 


UNFALLACIOUS  INTERPRETATION  OF  LANGUAGE.      255 

into  each  other,  we  shall  possess  our  knowledge  devoid  of 
all  fallacy ;  and  shall  no  longer  deem  perplexingly  myste- 
rious, that  we  cannot  discover  sensibly  what  we  conceive 
intellectually,  or  commit  any  kindred  solecism ;  and  we 
shall  pass  through  life  exempt  from  all  mystery  except 
the  one  great  common  mystery  that  attaches  equally  and 
alike  to  all  we  know,  or  can  know — an  ennobling  consum- 
mation abundantly  remunerative  of  all  the  intellectual 
labour  it  may  cost  the  man  who  shall  attain  it.  The  world 
also,  when  the  consummation  shall  become  general  (and 
general  it  must  become  at  some  future  day),  will  under- 
stand distinctly  the  kind  of  information  it  is  seeking  on 
any  occasion,  and  by  which  of  our  three  organisms  to  seek 
it;  and  will  look  back  at  our  present  indiscrimination 
of  un verbal  heterogeneities  in  things  verbally  homogeneous, 
etc.,  etc.,  as  a  man  looks  back  at  the  speculations  of  his 
childhood.  Then  will  be  known  the  new  logic  and  critic 
which  Locke  began  to  suspect  at  the  close  of  his  Essay  on 
the  Human  Understanding,  when  he  said  (in  Book  IV., 
chap.  21,  §  4),  "  Perhaps  if  ideas  and  words  were  distinctly 
weighed,  and  duly  considered,  they  would  afford  us  an- 
other sort  of  logic  and  critic  than  what  we  have  hitherto 
been  acquainted  with."  What  a  painful,  but  too  late  a 
dawning  of  light,  must  this  have  been !  He  had  just  com- 
pleted his  great  intellectual  labour  "concerning  the  Human 
Understanding,"  when  he  probably  began  to  see  that  what 
is  unverbal  in  human  knowlege  reveals  itself  to  us  spon- 
taneously, and  in  the  most  unmistakable  form ;  and  that 


256  THE  MEANING  OF  WORDS. 

all  about  which  men  can  differ,  and  about  which  he  had 
been  differing  from  others,  must  relate  to  only  the  words 
with  which  we  shall  talk  and  speculate  concerning  un 
verbal  things,  and  the  mode  in  which  words  shall  be  in 
terpreted  into  the  unverbal  things  to  which  the  words 
refer. 


UNIVERSITY  OF  CALIFORNIA,  LOS  ANGELES 
THF  UNTV  'TBRARY 


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